# International Cooperation Disadvantage Starter Pack File

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### 1nc shell – hegemony

#### Increasing cooperation with NATO has grave repercussions on American foreign policy and ensures security dilemmas.

Sachs 22 – Jeffrey Sachs, contributor to the Financial Times and director of the Center for Sustainable Development at Columbia University, [“*The US should compromise on Nato to save Ukraine*," The Financial Times, 2/21/22, https://www.ft.com/content/b5886606-4d7d-41af-87c1-8d9993722e51]RA

If US President Joe Biden and his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin do manage to hold a summit on Ukraine, what should Biden’s approach be? Biden has said repeatedly that the US is open to diplomacy with Russia, but on the issue that Moscow has most emphasised — Nato enlargement — there has been no American diplomacy at all. Putin has repeatedly demanded that the US forswear Nato’s enlargement into Ukraine, while Biden has repeatedly asserted that membership of the alliance is Ukraine’s choice. If a summit does materialise in the days ahead, and in the planned meeting this week between US secretary of state Antony Blinken and Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov, the US should propose a guarantee that Nato will not enlarge to include Ukraine in return for a full withdrawal of Russian forces from the Donbas region and an end to Russian support for the independence of the two Moscow-backed separatist regions in eastern Ukraine, a demobilisation along the Russia-Ukraine border and an assurance of Ukrainian sovereignty. If the US won’t do this, then France and Germany should step forward instead. This would inevitably lead to cries of appeasement. Many insist that Nato enlargement is not the real issue for Putin and that he wants to recreate the Russian empire, pure and simple. Everything else, including Nato enlargement, they claim, is a mere distraction. This is utterly mistaken. Russia has adamantly opposed Nato expansion towards the east for 30 years, first under Boris Yeltsin and now Putin. Before that, the Soviet Union largely opposed Nato expansion, too. It is easy to understand why. The US would not be very happy were Mexico to join a China-led military alliance, nor was it content when Fidel Castro’s Cuba aligned with the USSR 60 years ago. Neither the US nor Russia wants the other’s military on their doorstep. Pledging no Nato enlargement is not appeasement. It does not cede Ukrainian territory. It does not undermine Ukraine’s sovereignty. It would in fact help to secure it. Ukraine should aspire to resemble the non-Nato members of the EU: Austria, Cyprus, Finland, Ireland, Malta and Sweden. Americans can learn much from the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. As the historian Martin Sherwin showed in his book Gambling with Armageddon, the crisis was resolved by a deft compromise. The Soviet Union agreed to remove its missiles from Cuba while the US agreed to remove its missiles from Turkey. The American public never appreciated this, alas, because President John F Kennedy insisted on keeping the US removal of missiles from Turkey secret. Kennedy did not want to appear to speak for all of Nato, and sought to protect himself from charges of appeasement from the US right. The public therefore believed that the crisis ended with Soviet capitulation, not compromise. Despite claims to the contrary, the western nations offered informal assurances to the Soviet Union that Nato would not enlarge to the east after German unification. The US and allies acted deceitfully, using sophistical arguments to claim that previous pledges were not binding. It was especially reckless in 2008 for President George W Bush to open the door to Ukraine’s (and Georgia’s) Nato membership. Biden and the US foreign policy establishment has so far refused to reconsider Nato enlargement for three reasons. First, they fear the charge of appeasement. Second, the US wants the prerogative to puts its military in any country that will have it, even if that disregards the legitimate security concerns of neighbouring states. Third, the US foreign policy establishment has long failed to acknowledge valid Russian security concerns that go back to the second world war and even earlier. Russia has long feared invasions from the west, whether by Napoleon, Hitler or latterly Nato. For this reason, cooler and wiser US foreign policy strategists, including Bill Clinton’s defence secretary William Perry, the great statesman and diplomat George Kennan and former ambassador to the Soviet Union, Jack Matlock, argued that Nato enlargement to the east after the demise of the USSR was unnecessary, reckless and provocative. If war comes, Putin would of course deserve the blame and global opprobrium. Russia’s threats are thuggish and dangerous. Yet as misguided as the Russian actions are, American intransigence regarding Nato enlargement is also utterly misguided and risky. True friends of Ukraine, and of global peace, should be calling for a US and Nato compromise with Russia — one that respects Russia’s legitimate security interests while fully backing Ukraine’s sovereignty.

#### That decks American primacy and *causes retrenchment* – US hardline key to reliable and legitimate security commitments.

* Defense spending, strengthening American hardpower projection is a necessity, not relying on NATO – primacy key warrants

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There are historical precedents for this approach. The Nixon Doctrine and US withdrawal from Vietnam helped Washington retreat to a more defensible strategic perimeter in the 1970s following strategic overstretch in the decade prior. More significantly, beginning in the late-nineteenth century, the United Kingdom gradually conducted an elegant global retreat by first relying upon rising regional powers such as the United States and Japan to maintain acceptable regional orders, and later encouraging Washington to shoulder many of London’s global burdens after World War II. Graceful retrenchment, then, is not an impossibility.30 It is, however, extremely problematic today. This approach— particularly the more aggressive variants—would be enormously difficult to implement. The US commitment to the Baltic states is part of a larger commitment to NATO; shredding the former guarantee risks undermining the broader alliance. Even in Asia, where the United States has bilateral alliances, withdrawing the US commitment to Taipei could cause leaders in Manila, Seoul, or Tokyo to wonder if they might be abandoned next—and to hedge their strategic bets accordingly. Alliances hinge on the credibility of the patron’s promises; revoking some guarantees without discrediting others is difficult.31 This dynamic underscores another liability—the likelihood of profound geopolitical instability. Retrenchment works best when the overstretched hegemon can hand off excessive responsibilities to some friendly power. But today, there is no liberal superpower waiting in the wings. Rather, the countries most sympathetic to America’s view of the international order—Japan, the United Kingdom, and key European allies—confront graver long-term economic and demographic challenges than the United States. The countries most likely to gain influence following US retrenchment—Russia and China—have very different global visions. In these circumstances, US retrenchment seems unlikely to succeed. Rather than simply forcing friendly local actors to do more to defend themselves and check revisionist powers, the outcome might easily be underbalancing—in which collective action problems, internal political divisions, or resource limitations prevent timely action against a potential aggressor—or bandwagoning, in which exposed countries buy a measure of safety by aligning with, rather than against, an aggressive power.32 Meanwhile, although writing off Taiwan or Estonia might produce a near-term improvement of relations with Beijing or Moscow, the longer-term effect would be to remove a chief constraint on the aggressive behavior these powers have been increasingly manifesting. If Moscow and Beijing seem eager to bring their “near abroads” to heel now, just wait until the United States retracts its security perimeter.33 If more aggressive variants of retrenchment are thus deeply flawed, even more limited versions, such as a Middle Eastern Nixon Doctrine, have weaknesses. As Iran’s military power continues to grow, and the recent removal of nuclear-related sanctions makes this seem likely, even the wealthy Persian Gulf kingdoms will have great difficulty dealing with Tehran’s advanced and asymmetric capabilities without US assistance. In fact, without US leadership, the long-standing collection action problems between the Gulf countries are likely to worsen. Moreover, the United States essentially tried a version of this approach by withdrawing from Iraq in late 2011. But as soon became clear, Iraq, a vital state in a key region, could not withstand challenges from nontraditional foes such as the Islamic State on its own. In fact, US retrenchment actually encouraged developments that left Iraq more vulnerable to collapse, such as the increasingly sectarian nature of Nūrī al-Mālikī’s governance and the hollowing out of the Iraqi Security Forces.34 Retrenchment, then, may narrow the gap between capabilities and commitments in the short run, but only by inviting greater global dangers and instability. VI If the United States is unwilling to spend significantly more on defense, but does not wish to invite the geopolitical instability associated with retrenchment, a second option is to live with greater risk. Living with greater risk could take two different, but not mutually exclusive, forms. First, the United States could accept higher risk with respect to its global commitments by wagering that even exposed commitments are unlikely to be tested because US adversaries are risk averse and are unwilling to start a war, even a potentially successful one, that might cause American intervention. In other words, the United States might not be able to defend Taiwan effectively, but the mere prospect of an invasion provoking a Sino-American war would stay Beijing’s hand. Second, the United States could bridge the capabilitiescommitments gap through riskier strategies substituting escalation for additional resources. Most likely, this would entail relying more heavily on nuclear warfighting and the threat of nuclear retaliation to defend vulnerable allies in East Asia or Eastern Europe. Because US allies are already covered by the US extended nuclear deterrent, this approach would involve making more explicit nuclear threats and guarantees and integrating greater reliance on nuclear weapons into US plans. Similarly, this approach could entail the use, or the threat of use, of powerful nonnuclear capabilities such as strategic cyberattacks against critical enemy infrastructure for the same purpose—bolstering deterrence on the cheap by raising the costs an aggressor would expect to pay.35 Lest these approaches sound ridiculous, both have a distinguished pedigree. In the late 1940s, the United States could not credibly defend Western Europe from a Soviet invasion. But the Truman administration still undertook the security guarantees associated with NATO on the calculated gamble that Moscow was unlikely to risk global war by attacking US allies, particularly during the period of the US nuclear monopoly.36 And in the 1950s, to control costs and address the continuing deficiency of US and allied conventional forces, the Eisenhower administration relied heavily on nuclear threats to deter aggression.37 Throughout much of the Cold War, in fact, the United States compensated for conventional inferiority—particularly in Central Europe—by integrating early recourse to nuclear weapons into its war plans. Accepting greater risk would mean updating Cold War-era approaches for today’s purposes. Yet substituting risk for cost entails serious liabilities. Simply hoping exposed commitments will not be challenged might work—for a while. But this strategy carries enormous risk of those guarantees eventually being tested and found wanting, with devastating effects on America’s reputation and credibility. Meanwhile, a strategy of bluff could weaken deterrence and reassurance on the installment plan as allies and adversaries perceive a shifting balance of power and understand US guarantees are increasingly chimerical. The second variant of this approach, embracing more escalatory approaches, lacks credibility. Consider threatening to employ strategic cyberattacks against an aggressor in a conflict over Taiwan or the Baltic states. Such threats are problematic, because as President Obama acknowledged in 2016, “open societies” such as the United States are “more vulnerable” to massive cyberattacks than authoritarian rivals such as Russia or China.38 America may simply lack the escalation dominance needed to make a strategy of cyber-retaliation believable. So too in the nuclear realm. Threats to punish Communist aggression with nuclear retaliation might have been credible in the 1950s, when China lacked nuclear weapons: Washington had a massive nuclear advantage over Moscow, and neither adversary could reliably target the US homeland. But today, both rivals possess secure second-strike capabilities and could inflict horrific damage on America should nuclear escalation occur. This approach thus risks leading the United States into a trap where, if its interests are challenged, it faces a choice between pursuing escalatory options carrying potentially unacceptable costs and acquiescing to aggression. Awareness of this dynamic may, in turn, make adversaries more likely to probe and push. Trading cost for risk may seem attractive in theory, but in practice the risks may prove far more dangerous than they initially seem. VII This leaves a final option—significantly increasing resources devoted to defense, thereby bringing capabilities back into alignment with commitments and strengthening the hard-power backbone of US strategy. Given current trends, this strategy would likely entail a sustained, multiyear buildup of magnitude roughly similar to the Carter-Reagan buildup, when real defense spending increased by around 50 percent. This buildup would require permanently lifting the Budget Control Act caps to provide increased resources and budgetary stability. It would require not just procuring larger quantities of existing capabilities but also investing aggressively in future capabilities geared toward defeating great-power challengers as well as middle-tier problem countries such as Iran and North Korea. And crucially, greater resources would have to be coupled with developing innovative operational concepts, streamlining Defense procedures and acquisition processes, and maximizing the Pentagon’s other efforts toward effectiveness and efficiency. Recent proposals demonstrate the likely parameters of this approach. If the goal was to restore an authentic two major regional contingency capability, the United States might follow the recommenda- tions issued in 2014 by the National Defense Panel, which call for a force consisting, at minimum, of 490,000 active duty Army personnel and 182,000 marines, a Navy of between 323 and 346 ships (versus 274 today), and an Air Force of unspecified size but substantially larger than the end-strength envisioned in late Obama-era budgets.39 If, more ambitiously, the United States sought a two-plus or even a three-war standard, a more significant buildup would be required. One recent estimate issued by Senator John McCain calls for a threetheater force—a Navy of over 330 ships and nearly 900 frontline naval strike fighters, an Air Force of 60 combat squadrons and 1,500 combat aircraft, an Army of at least 490,000–500,000 active duty soldiers, and a Marine Corps of at least 200,000 active duty marines. Because McCain’s budget reaches out only 5 years, these numbers would presumably grow further over time.40 Another three-theater proposal by the American Enterprise Institute advocates a 10-year expansion to 600,000 active duty Army soldiers, over 200,000 active duty marines, a Navy of 346 ships, and an Air Force of unspecified but significantly increased end-strength. The number of F-22s, for instance, would rise from 185 to 450.41 These proposals would require significant new investments. The McCain budget calls for $430 billion in new money over 5 years, culminating in a Fiscal Year 2022 budget of roughly $800 billion.42 The American Enterprise Institute proposal, issued in late 2015, calls for $1.3 trillion in new money over 10 years.43 All of these force constructs reflect a high-low mix designed to enable effective operations ranging from counterterrorism, to major conventional war against Iran or North Korea, to high-end combat against a great-power adversary. All the proposals include robust recapitalization of the US nuclear triad. And although these proposals differ on specifics, all are meant to enable a range of investments necessary to maintaining US primacy in a more competitive environment. If the United States were to undertake a buildup of this magnitude, it could, for instance, invest in a more survivable, multibrigade presence in Eastern Europe. America could significantly increase investments in capabilities—from additional Zumwalt-class destroyers and nuclear attack submarines, to stealthy fighters and penetrating long-range bombers, to vastly enhanced stocks of precision-guided and standoff munitions, to improved air and missile defenses necessary to retain air and sea control in high-end conflicts as well as to maintain the upper hand in fights with Iran and North Korea.44 This approach would ease the tradeoffs between critical capabilities for today’s fight, such as the A-10, and those critical for tomorrow’s fight, such as the F-35. Crucially, this approach would also allow aggressive development and production of future technologies in areas from hypersonics to directed energy, which currently receive seed funding but cannot be adequately fielded without additional resources.45 Finally, this approach, particularly the more aggressive, three-theater option, would permit the increased force structure necessary to cover a larger number of contingencies and reduce stress on the current force. So how viable is this option? Critics offer four primary objections. The first critique deems this approach unnecessary, because the Pentagon can maintain US primacy at existing budget levels either by pursuing technological innovation and strategic offsets or by undertaking busi- ness and acquisition reforms. The second critique asserts a sustained, multiyear buildup will overtax the US economy, given persistent budget deficits and a debt-to-GDP ratio of 76 percent.46 The third critique views this approach as self-defeating because it will spur arms races with American adversaries. The fourth critique holds this approach will incentivize continued free-riding by US allies and partners by forcing Washington to continue subsidizing their defense. All of these argu- ments have some logic, but none is persuasive. The first argument—about innovation, offsets, and defense reform—is alluring but unsatisfying. To be sure, repurposing existing capabilities, developing high-end future capabilities to create significant dilemmas for competitors from Iran to China, and designing innovative operational concepts—essentially, what former Secretaries of Defense Hagel and Ashton Carter termed the Third Offset Strategy—are absolutely vital to restoring strategic solvency. Yet offsets and innovation cannot by themselves compensate for the lack of resources Washington faces in covering the range of plausible contingencies. Moreover, any meaningful offset strategy is dependent on significantly greater resources. As senior Pentagon officials have acknowledged, right now the United States simply cannot field even promising technolo- gies in numbers sufficient to have strategic impact. “We’ll do the demo, we’ll be very happy with the results, [but] we won’t have the money to go on,” Undersecretary of Defense Frank Kendall warned in 2016.47 Offsets and innovation are necessary for sustaining American primacy, but they are hardly sufficient. Similarly, although virtually all experts consider defense reform essential, no one has identified a feasible reform program sufficient to close the capabilities-commitments gap. The economic argument is also deceptive. Although a multiyear buildup would be very expensive, it would hardly be unmanageable. Even the most aggressive proposed buildups would push defense spending only to 4 percent of GDP. The United States has previously supported far higher relative defense burdens without compromising economic performance.48 One cannot draw a perfect parallel with earlier eras, of course, because during the 1950s America enjoyed higher growth and lower levels of deficits and debt. But these factors do not make a major buildup economically impossible. For one thing, defense spending increases can actually stimulate growth. As Martin Feldstein, a former chair of the Council of Economic Advisers, has noted, “Military procurement has the . . . advantage that almost all of the equipment and supplies that the military buys is made in the United States, creating demand and jobs here at home.”49 Moreover, defense spending simply does not drive federal spending or deficits to the extent often imagined. In fiscal year 2016, defense consumed 16 percent of federal spending; domestic entitlements consumed 49 percent.50 As a result, the growth of federal debt is influenced far more by unconstrained entitlement spending and insufficient tax revenues than by defense outlays. Put differently, if Washington can make politi- cally difficult decisions regarding tax increases and curbing entitlement growth, it can spend significantly more on defense while also getting its fiscal house in order. If, conversely, the United States is unwilling to confront such politically difficult decisions, then the deficit will explode, the debt-to-GDP ratio will skyrocket, and Social Security and Medicare/ Medicaid will go bankrupt regardless of how much or how little the country spends on defense. The third objection, regarding intensified competition with US rivals, is also problematic. It is hard to see how increased US defense spending could trigger an arms race with Russia or China, or Iran or North Korea, because these countries are already developing significant military capabilities aimed at the United States. China, for instance, has averaged double-digit annual defense spending increases for two decades. Strenuous military competition is already underway; US adversaries are just the ones competing most seriously. Moreover, although increased US defense efforts, particularly if paired with additional forward presence in Eastern Europe or East Asia, might cause increased near-term tensions with Moscow or Beijing, over the longer-term, failure to counter Russian and Chinese buildups and limit their opportunities for successful coercion might well prove more destabilizing. To be sure, Russia and China, or even Iran and North Korea, are not powerless to respond to US capability enhancement, and there may come a time when Washington simply cannot preserve the desired level of overmatch at an acceptable cost. Yet in light of the significant internal challenges—political, economic, demographic, or all of the above— facing each of America’s adversaries, the passing of US primacy is hardly inevitable.51 Given how advantageous US primacy has proven over the decades, America’s goal should be to push that point of unsustainability as far into the future as possible. The fourth and final objection, regarding allied free riding and the need for a collective approach, can also be answered. US strategy has always been a concert strategy, and so this approach certainly requires enhanced allied efforts. Countries from Japan and Taiwan to Poland and the Baltic states will have to spend more on defense if their situation is not to become untenable. They will, in many cases, also have to adopt more cost-effective and realistic defense strategies.52 But because the United States cannot simply make this decision for its allies, the question is which US approach will best encourage constructive changes. And although advocates of retrenchment often argue allies will only do more if the United States does less, the United States has been most successful at securing increased allied contributions when it, too, has been willing to do more. In previous instances when NATO allies collectively increased military spending—during the early 1950s or under the long-term defense program of the Carter-Reagan years—they did so as part of a broader program in which Washington also significantly increased its contributions to European security.53 Likewise, the United States elicited the best performance from the Iraqi military and government when the American commitment to Baghdad was greatest, during the surge of 2007–8. The performance declined rather than improved as the US commitment was subsequently reduced.54 In sum, the United States may actually get the most out of its allies and partners when those countries are reassured of the American commitment and thus prepared to take risks of their own. As the principal objections to increasing defense resources fall away, the advantages and logic become clearer. This approach recognizes, for instance, how beneficial US military primacy has been in shaping a relatively stable, prosperous, and congenial international order, and it makes the investments necessary to sustain as much of this order as possible. This approach provides the United States with greater ability to meet aggression from a range of enemies and rivals without resorting to dangerously escalatory strategies in the most operationally demanding scenarios. As a result, this approach is arguably best suited to avoid the use of force over the long term, by averting situations in which American adversaries from Iran and North Korea to Russia and China think aggression might pay. “Peace through strength” is not a meaningless catchphrase; it is good strategy. Closing the capabilities-commitments gap by dramatically increasing the former therefore represents the best available approach.

**Retrenchment causes extinction – US hegemony is an impact filter.**

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A core premise of deep engagement is that it prevents the emergence of a far more dangerous global security environment. For one thing, as noted above, the United States’ overseas presence gives it the leverage to restrain partners from taking provocative action. Perhaps more important, its core alliance commitments also deter states with aspirations to regional hegemony from contemplating expansion and make its partners more secure, reducing their incentive to adopt solutions to their security problems that threaten others and thus stoke security dilemmas. The contention that engaged U.S. power dampens the baleful effects of anarchy is consistent with influential variants of realist theory. Indeed, arguably the scariest portrayal of the war-prone world that would emerge absent the “American Pacifier” is provided in the works of John Mearsheimer, who forecasts dangerous multipolar regions replete with security competition, arms races, nuclear proliferation and associated preventive war temptations, regional rivalries, and even runs at regional hegemony and full-scale great power war. 72 How do retrenchment advocates, the bulk of whom are realists, discount this benefit? Their arguments are complicated, but two capture most of the variation: (1) U.S. security guarantees are not necessary to prevent dangerous rivalries and conflict in Eurasia; or (2) prevention of rivalry and conflict in Eurasia is not a U.S. interest. Each response is connected to a different theory or set of theories, which makes sense given that the whole debate hinges on a complex future counterfactual (what would happen to Eurasia’s security setting if the United States truly disengaged?). Although a certain answer is impossible, each of these responses is nonetheless a weaker argument for retrenchment than advocates acknowledge. The first response flows from defensive realism as well as other international relations theories that discount the conflict-generating potential of anarchy under contemporary conditions. 73 Defensive realists maintain that the high expected costs of territorial conquest, defense dominance, and an array of policies and practices that can be used credibly to signal benign intent, mean that Eurasia’s major states could manage regional multipolarity peacefully without the American pacifier. Retrenchment would be a bet on this scholarship, particularly in regions where the kinds of stabilizers that nonrealist theories point to—such as democratic governance or dense institutional linkages—are either absent or weakly present. There are three other major bodies of scholarship, however, that might give decisionmakers pause before making this bet. First is regional expertise. Needless to say, there is no consensus on the net security effects of U.S. withdrawal. Regarding each region, there are optimists and pessimists. Few experts expect a return of intense great power competition in a post-American Europe, but many doubt European governments will pay the political costs of increased EU defense cooperation and the budgetary costs of increasing military outlays. 74 The result might be a Europe that is incapable of securing itself from various threats that could be destabilizing within the region and beyond (e.g., a regional conflict akin to the 1990s Balkan wars), lacks capacity for global security missions in which U.S. leaders might want European participation, and is vulnerable to the influence of outside rising powers. What about the other parts of Eurasia where the United States has a substantial military presence? Regarding the Middle East, the balance begins to swing toward pessimists concerned that states currently backed by Washington— notably Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia—might take actions upon U.S. retrenchment that would intensify security dilemmas. And concerning East Asia, pessimism regarding the region’s prospects without the American pacifier is pronounced. Arguably the principal concern expressed by area experts is that Japan and South Korea are likely to obtain a nuclear capacity and increase their military commitments, which could stoke a destabilizing reaction from China. It is notable that during the Cold War, both South Korea and Taiwan moved to obtain a nuclear weapons capacity and were only constrained from doing so by a still-engaged United States. 75 The second body of scholarship casting doubt on the bet on defensive realism’s sanguine portrayal is all of the research that undermines its conception of state preferences. Defensive realism’s optimism about what would happen if the United States retrenched is very much dependent on its particular—and highly restrictive—assumption about state preferences; once we relax this assumption, then much of its basis for optimism vanishes. Specifically, the prediction of post-American tranquility throughout Eurasia rests on the assumption that security is the only relevant state preference, with security defined narrowly in terms of protection from violent external attacks on the homeland. Under that assumption, the security problem is largely solved as soon as offense and defense are clearly distinguishable, and offense is extremely expensive relative to defense. Burgeoning research across the social and other sciences, however, undermines that core assumption: states have preferences not only for security but also for prestige, status, and other aims, and they engage in trade-offs among the various objectives. 76 In addition, they define security not just in terms of territorial protection but in view of many and varied milieu goals. It follows that even states that are relatively secure may nevertheless engage in highly competitive behavior. Empirical studies show that this is indeed sometimes the case. 77 In sum, a bet on a benign post-retrenchment Eurasia is a bet that leaders of major countries will never allow these nonsecurity preferences to influence their strategic choices. To the degree that these bodies of scholarly knowledge have predictive leverage, U.S. retrenchment would result in a significant deterioration in the security environment in at least some of the world’s key regions. We have already mentioned the third, even more alarming body of scholarship. Offensive realism predicts that the withdrawal of the American pacifier will yield either a competitive regional multipolarity complete with associated insecurity, arms racing, crisis instability, nuclear proliferation, and the like, or bids for regional hegemony, which may be beyond the capacity of local great powers to contain (and which in any case would generate intensely competitive behavior, possibly including regional great power war). Hence it is unsurprising that retrenchment advocates are prone to focus on the second argument noted above: that avoiding wars and security dilemmas in the world’s core regions is not a U.S. national interest. Few doubt that the United States could survive the return of insecurity and conflict among Eurasian powers, but at what cost? Much of the work in this area has focused on the economic externalities of a renewed threat of insecurity and war, which we discuss below. Focusing on the pure security ramifications, there are two main reasons why decisionmakers may be rationally reluctant to run the retrenchment experiment. First, overall higher levels of conflict make the world a more dangerous place. Were Eurasia to return to higher levels of interstate military competition, one would see overall higher levels of military spending and innovation and a higher likelihood of competitive regional proxy wars and arming of client states—all of which would be concerning, in part because it would promote a faster diffusion of military power away from the United States. Greater regional insecurity could well feed proliferation cascades, as states such as Egypt, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Saudi Arabia all might choose to create nuclear forces. 78 It is unlikely that proliferation decisions by any of these actors would be the end of the game: they would likely generate pressure locally for more proliferation. Following Kenneth Waltz, many retrenchment advocates are proliferation optimists, assuming that nuclear deterrence solves the security problem. 79 Usually carried out in dyadic terms, the debate over the stability of proliferation changes as the numbers go up. Proliferation optimism rests on assumptions of rationality and narrow security preferences. In social science, however, such assumptions are inevitably probabilistic. Optimists assume that most states are led by rational leaders, most will overcome organizational problems and resist the temptation to preempt before feared neighbors nuclearize, and most pursue only security and are risk averse. Confidence in such probabilistic assumptions declines if the world were to move from nine to twenty, thirty, or forty nuclear states. In addition, many of the other dangers noted by analysts who are concerned about the destabilizing effects of nuclear proliferation—including the risk of accidents and the prospects that some new nuclear powers will not have truly survivable forces—seem prone to go up as the number of nuclear powers grows. 80 Moreover, the risk of “unforeseen crisis dynamics” that could spin out of control is also higher as the number of nuclear powers increases. Finally, add to these concerns the enhanced danger of nuclear leakage, and a world with overall higher levels of security competition becomes yet more worrisome. The argument that maintaining Eurasian peace is not a U.S. interest faces a second problem. On widely accepted realist assumptions, acknowledging that U.S. engagement preserves peace dramatically narrows the difference between retrenchment and deep engagement. For many supporters of retrenchment, the optimal strategy for a power such as the United States, which has attained regional hegemony and is separated from other great powers by oceans, is offshore balancing: stay over the horizon and “pass the buck” to local powers to do the dangerous work of counterbalancing any local rising power. The United States should commit to onshore balancing only when local balancing is likely to fail and a great power appears to be a credible contender for regional hegemony, as in the cases of Germany, Japan, and the Soviet Union in the midtwentieth century. The problem is that China’s rise puts the possibility of its attaining regional hegemony on the table, at least in the medium to long term. As Mearsheimer notes, “The United States will have to play a key role in countering China, because its Asian neighbors are not strong enough to do it by themselves.” 81 Therefore, unless China’s rise stalls, “the United States is likely to act toward China similar to the way it behaved toward the Soviet Union during the Cold War.” 82 It follows that the United States should take no action that would compromise its capacity to move to onshore balancing in the future. It will need to maintain key alliance relationships in Asia as well as the formidably expensive military capacity to intervene there. The implication is to get out of Iraq and Afghanistan, reduce the presence in Europe, and pivot to Asia— just what the United States is doing. 83 In sum, the argument that U.S. security commitments are unnecessary for peace is countered by a lot of scholarship, including highly influential realist scholarship. In addition, the argument that Eurasian peace is unnecessary for U.S. security is weakened by the potential for a large number of nasty security consequences as well as the need to retain a latent onshore balancing capacity that dramatically reduces the savings retrenchment might bring. Moreover, switching between offshore and onshore balancing could well be difficult. Bringing together the thrust of many of the arguments discussed so far underlines the degree to which the case for retrenchment misses the underlying logic of the deep engagement strategy. By supplying reassurance, deterrence, and active management, the United States lowers security competition in the world’s key regions, thereby preventing the emergence of a hothouse atmosphere for growing new military capabilities. Alliance ties dissuade partners from ramping up and also provide leverage to prevent military transfers to potential rivals. On top of all this, the United States’ formidable military machine may deter entry by potential rivals. Current great power military expenditures as a percentage of GDP are at historical lows, and thus far other major powers have shied away from seeking to match top-end U.S. military capabilities. In addition, they have so far been careful to avoid attracting the “focused enmity” of the United States. 84 All of the world’s most modern militaries are U.S. allies (America’s alliance system of more than sixty countries now accounts for some 80 percent of global military spending), and the gap between the U.S. military capability and that of potential rivals is by many measures growing rather than shrinking. 85

# 2NC Cards

## Uniqueness

### Uniqueness – Generic/AT Expansion High

#### NATO structural inefficiencies deck effective co-op efforts now – guarantees regional challenges and US leadership collapse.

Deni 19 – John Deni is a Professor of Joint, Interagency, Intragovernmental, and Multinational Security Studies at the USAWC SSI, [“*Staying Alive by Overeating? The Enduring NATO Alliance at 70,”* Journal of Transatlantic Studies, 2019]RA

Over the last 30 years, NATO’s evolving mission growth has exhibited two of the most commonly cited typologies of organizational change—adaptive learning and incremental growth.35 The former is rational, empirically driven, and usually efficient—organizations change by carefully studying and modifying ends, ways, and means. The latter may be rational but it is typically not efficient—new tasks are simply added on to old ones, without any critical appraisal of purpose or goals. With specific regard to the post-Cold War period, or roughly 1990 until 2014, both of these typologies were evident. In some cases during the 1990–2014 time period, the alliance engaged in a well-informed, almost methodical shift away from collective defense and toward crisis management and cooperative security. For example, NATO developed the Membership Action Plan (MAP) to build norms, establish guidelines, and manage the admission of new member states from Eastern Europe.36 In a similar way, the alliance developed a robust force generation system to manage the challenge of providing continuous force rotations for operations in Afghanistan during an era of shrinking resources.37 In other instances during the 1990–2014 time period, it seems clear that NATO’s post-Cold War shift toward crisis management and cooperative security was characterized by incremental growth, with member states pushing tasks onto the alliance’s plate without a knowledge-mediated approach. For example, the addition of energy security to the alliance’s agenda made little sense at a time when there was (and still is) significant divergence among the member states over what role NATO should play in this issue area, or when there was little understanding of what capabilities or capacity NATO could actually bring to the table.38 In contrast to the post-Cold War 1990–2014 time period, since Russia’s invasion of Crimea in 2014 NATO appears to have whole-heartedly resorted to incremental growth. It has done so by recommitting itself to collective defense while also maintaining or even augmenting its work in crisis management and cooperative security. Notably, there has been no significant strategic-level reassessment of NATO’s mission set and no new Strategic Concept published since the last was released in 2010. The alliance’s embrace of an all-of-the-above approach is largely a function of the unique principal–agent dynamic at work within NATO and among its member states, and the complex array of member state interests. As noted briefly earlier in this article, in contrast to an international organization like the United Nations, NATO’s potential for action independent of the interests of its largest member states is extraordinarily limited. Certainly, there are instances when NATO’s international secretariat or its Secretary General show signs of autonomy. However, the alliance organization’s ability to exploit its limited autonomy and truly counteract the desires of its member states is limited by several factors. First, the Secretary General’s position is not a permanent one but rather a rotating one—most NATO Secretary Generals serve a single 4-year term—and the nominees are subject to the unanimous approval of all member states. This prevents the development of an entrenched leader capable of making decisions against the wishes of most member states. In contrast, UN Secretary Generals are nominated by a minimum of 9 members of the UN Security Council, including no vetoes by the five permanent members, and then subject to a majority vote of the General Assembly. UN Secretary Generals normally hold two consecutive 5-year terms. Second, while it is true that the NATO International Staff consists of many permanent civil servants, it also is comprised of staff members temporarily assigned there by individual allied governments. This limits the autonomy that the International Staff might otherwise develop since temporarily assigned employees usually fail to develop strong biases toward the institution they work for, or biases that would displace their loyalties to their permanent employer back home.39 Moreover, the International Military Staff (IMS) is comprised almost entirely of military officials on temporary assignments. The same holds true with regard to the Allied Command Operations based in Mons, Belgium and the Allied Command Transformation based in Norfolk, Virginia. At the same time, the array of sometimes disparate interests among the various alliance member states drives much of NATO’s all-of-the-above approach. NATO exists for several reasons, such as the fact that the alliance is a community of (mostly) liberal democracies that share similar values. What is arguably more critical though is the fact that the alliance continues to exist because it provides more benefits than costs to its members—in short, it meets their security needs, at least in part, in an efficient and effective way relative to other options.40 Among other ways of meeting these needs, the alliance satisfies the demands of its member states by engaging in issue areas of interest to those member states. For instance, Spain wants security in the Mediterranean Sea and stability in northwest Africa. Italy desires the same as well as capacity-building in Africa. Meanwhile, Germany wants a framework for the further development of its political and economic power that reassures its neighbors as well as itself. France wants increased intelligence sharing to mitigate the challenge of returning foreign fighters. Poland wants reassurance against domination from the East (Russia) and possibly from the West (Germany). Farther east, the Baltic States want protection against an existential enemy. The United States wants political legitimacy and military burden sharing for operations near and far. The point is, NATO’s member states often have different security interests, threat perceptions, and strategic objectives, and yet they all look to NATO as a primary means of fulfilling their interests and meeting their objectives. Accordingly, the alliance responds by pursuing a broadening agenda. Arguably, this tendency on the part of the alliance to pursue a broadening agenda to satisfy the sometimes disparate interests of its member states has only gotten worse with enlargement. Since 1997, the alliance has steadily grown, and it seems that trend will continue albeit at a slower rate. In July 2018, the alliance decided to begin accession talks with Macedonia, and it is possible Kosovo may follow. Less likely but still possible is membership for Sweden or Finland, as addressed by Anna Wieslander elsewhere in this special issue. As membership grows, definitions of ‘why NATO matters’ may grow as well, and with it NATO’s agenda. 39 The primary challenge confronting the alliance today is that it lacks the capability and the capacity to fulfill all of the various missions and activities that member states wish to saddle it with. European defense budgets, on average, steadily declined through most of the post-Cold War period, and trends have only reversed since 2014. Despite the turnaround, that acquisition accounts are struggling to keep pace with demand, many military units remain whole on paper only, and readiness continues to be underfunded. Additionally, even though spending increases have been broad based, they have also been uneven. The most significant increases have come from those countries with relatively small military forces, while the ‘big four’ European NATO members—France, Germany, Italy, and the UK, which together account for roughly two-thirds of European NATO military spending—have been increasing at a slower pace. Until these countries pick up their defense spending pace, and until all of the European allies are able to acquire the equipment, manpower, and training necessary to fulfill their agreed upon defense plans, the alliance will continue to struggle in its effort to achieve ‘all of the above.’

## Link

### Link – Generic/Security Concerns

#### Increasing cooperation with NATO has grave repercussions on American foreign policy and ensures security dilemmas. It’s the sole security concern – historically proven.

Sachs 22 – Jeffrey Sachs, contributor to the Financial Times and director of the Center for Sustainable Development at Columbia University, [“*The US should compromise on Nato to save Ukraine*," The Financial Times, 2/21/22, https://www.ft.com/content/b5886606-4d7d-41af-87c1-8d9993722e51]RA

If US President Joe Biden and his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin do manage to hold a summit on Ukraine, what should Biden’s approach be? Biden has said repeatedly that the US is open to diplomacy with Russia, but on the issue that Moscow has most emphasised — Nato enlargement — there has been no American diplomacy at all. Putin has repeatedly demanded that the US forswear Nato’s enlargement into Ukraine, while Biden has repeatedly asserted that membership of the alliance is Ukraine’s choice. If a summit does materialise in the days ahead, and in the planned meeting this week between US secretary of state Antony Blinken and Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov, the US should propose a guarantee that Nato will not enlarge to include Ukraine in return for a full withdrawal of Russian forces from the Donbas region and an end to Russian support for the independence of the two Moscow-backed separatist regions in eastern Ukraine, a demobilisation along the Russia-Ukraine border and an assurance of Ukrainian sovereignty. If the US won’t do this, then France and Germany should step forward instead. This would inevitably lead to cries of appeasement. Many insist that Nato enlargement is not the real issue for Putin and that he wants to recreate the Russian empire, pure and simple. Everything else, including Nato enlargement, they claim, is a mere distraction. This is utterly mistaken. Russia has adamantly opposed Nato expansion towards the east for 30 years, first under Boris Yeltsin and now Putin. Before that, the Soviet Union largely opposed Nato expansion, too. It is easy to understand why. The US would not be very happy were Mexico to join a China-led military alliance, nor was it content when Fidel Castro’s Cuba aligned with the USSR 60 years ago. Neither the US nor Russia wants the other’s military on their doorstep. Pledging no Nato enlargement is not appeasement. It does not cede Ukrainian territory. It does not undermine Ukraine’s sovereignty. It would in fact help to secure it. Ukraine should aspire to resemble the non-Nato members of the EU: Austria, Cyprus, Finland, Ireland, Malta and Sweden. Americans can learn much from the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. As the historian Martin Sherwin showed in his book Gambling with Armageddon, the crisis was resolved by a deft compromise. The Soviet Union agreed to remove its missiles from Cuba while the US agreed to remove its missiles from Turkey. The American public never appreciated this, alas, because President John F Kennedy insisted on keeping the US removal of missiles from Turkey secret. Kennedy did not want to appear to speak for all of Nato, and sought to protect himself from charges of appeasement from the US right. The public therefore believed that the crisis ended with Soviet capitulation, not compromise. Despite claims to the contrary, the western nations offered informal assurances to the Soviet Union that Nato would not enlarge to the east after German unification. The US and allies acted deceitfully, using sophistical arguments to claim that previous pledges were not binding. It was especially reckless in 2008 for President George W Bush to open the door to Ukraine’s (and Georgia’s) Nato membership. Biden and the US foreign policy establishment has so far refused to reconsider Nato enlargement for three reasons. First, they fear the charge of appeasement. Second, the US wants the prerogative to puts its military in any country that will have it, even if that disregards the legitimate security concerns of neighbouring states. Third, the US foreign policy establishment has long failed to acknowledge valid Russian security concerns that go back to the second world war and even earlier. Russia has long feared invasions from the west, whether by Napoleon, Hitler or latterly Nato. For this reason, cooler and wiser US foreign policy strategists, including Bill Clinton’s defence secretary William Perry, the great statesman and diplomat George Kennan and former ambassador to the Soviet Union, Jack Matlock, argued that Nato enlargement to the east after the demise of the USSR was unnecessary, reckless and provocative. If war comes, Putin would of course deserve the blame and global opprobrium. Russia’s threats are thuggish and dangerous. Yet as misguided as the Russian actions are, American intransigence regarding Nato enlargement is also utterly misguided and risky. True friends of Ukraine, and of global peace, should be calling for a US and Nato compromise with Russia — one that respects Russia’s legitimate security interests while fully backing Ukraine’s sovereignty.

#### Increasing NATO cooperation historically ensures security dilemmas through permanent “*defense dependents*” and *intervention*.

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Both Finland and Sweden are applying to join NATO. The Blob, as the foreign policy establishment has come to be known, is ecstatic. It cannot conceive of saying no to any alliance applicant, no matter how insignificant or irrelevant. Once upon a time, serious nations defended themselves, rather than begging faraway great powers to do the job for them. And no serious great power would do so unless it believed the other state to be essential for its own security. As Great Britain’s Lord Palmerston remarked, countries had no permanent friends, only permanent interests. Even serious defensive alliances could drag members into war, often against their interests, when deterrence failed. World War I provides the most dramatic modern example. Serbia committed an act of state terrorism against the Austro‐​Hungarian Empire. When the latter threatened Belgrade, Imperial Russia stood by its Slavic brethren, lest Vienna establish dominance in the Balkans. Imperial Germany backed Austria‐​Hungary with the infamous “blank check.” France supported its ally Russia. Great Britain feared a rising Berlin and joined its historic enemies Paris and St. Petersburg. Other states, either feeling threatened (Ottoman Empire) or perceiving a chance for territorial gain (Italy) later joined in. The result was continent‐​wide catastrophe, and another much worse war just a generation later. The latter turned America into a global power and left Washington to play leader of “the free world,” defending Western Europe and Asian dependencies amid fears of Soviet aggression and threats posed by the newly created People’s Republic of China. The policy made sense as a temporary expedient, protecting vulnerable states as they recovered and became able to defend themselves. If the U.S. wants to remain a superpower and defend its own citizens’ interests, it must learn to say no. It wasn’t just the Old Right which feared “allies” becoming permanent defense dependents. So did Dwight Eisenhower, World War II allied commander, first NATO military head, and U.S. president. He warned against acting like “a modern Rome guarding the far frontiers with our legions.” Instead, he advocated helping “these people [to] regain their confidence and get on their own military feet.” Foreign policy scholar Mark Sheetz explained that “The purpose of America’s ‘temporary’ intervention in Western Europe was to eliminate the need for ‘permanent’ intervention.” However, Ike’s admonitions were forgotten as U.S. policymakers came to enjoy America acting as the “essential power.” Moreover, foreign governments—whether of allies, partners, friends, or otherwise connected states—learned the useful arts of deception and flattery. Defense dependents promised to do more while planning to do less, sure that Washington would forgive them, no matter how loud U.S. officials whined and wailed. Allies also insisted that freedom would disappear, a new Dark Ages would descend, and the world would end if the U.S. ever did anything less, an argument enthusiastically repeated by the Blob. Yet the transatlantic alliance’s spell over U.S. foreign policy appeared broken when the Warsaw Pact dissolved, followed by the Soviet Union. Even NATO’s most loyal retainers feared that the alliance’s time was coming to an end, proposing that the organization shift over to handling student exchanges and fighting the drug war. But creative policy entrepreneurs came up with “out‐​of‐​area” activities, which essentially meant bombing, invading, and occupying more distant nations which weren’t threatening NATO members. Of course, the U.S. would do the real war‐​making, while the allies would pretend that their assistance was essential. It was difficult to discern America’s interest in Serbia and Libya and Europe’s interest in Afghanistan, but all went forward as alliance campaigns. Although European NATO members suffered casualties in the latter, none of these wars could have been prosecuted except by Washington. Indeed, the Europeans ran out of missiles when fighting Libya. All the while the transatlantic alliance abandoned its role as continental guardian and became a militarized Welcome Wagon for the detritus of the Soviet empire. The European Union was better suited to that task, but the U.S. did not control the E.U. Hence, Washington’s preference was to use NATO to extend America’s reach. Unfortunately, this process violated a multitude of assurances given Moscow that the alliance would not advance ever eastward. The alliance also shifted from defense to offense, most importantly against Yugoslavia (an enhanced Serbia, for which Russia went to war in WWI). Although Vladimir Putin started out inclined to do business with the West, by 2008 his patience was gone and he turned toward confrontation, starting with Georgia. Although NATO expansion continued, even alliance members recognized that adding Georgia and Ukraine were steps too far: For 14 years the allies prevaricated, simultaneously reiterating and then ignoring promises to Tbilisi and Kyiv. Yet when the Ukraine crisis began last fall, the U.S. and European NATO members refused to state the obvious, that Kyiv would not be joining the alliance. Doing so might have forestalled Putin’s invasion. Of course, allied irresponsibility did not justify Moscow’s invasion, but Washington and Brussels share blame for the tragic war. With conflict raging in Ukraine, Finland and Sweden decided that they want formal U.S. protection as well. That comes as no surprise: Countries and even movements around the world eagerly seek the great superpower’s assistance. Years ago, I was asked by ethnic Karen insurgents in Burma/​Myanmar why Washington did not sent troops there to do what it had recently done in Kosovo. If I faced such a regime, I also would want the U.S. to eliminate the brutal, oppressive Tatmadaw, as the Burmese military is known. However, the U.S. government is not the world’s 911 number and should stop treating its defense guarantees as a matter of charity. Sweden, in its (long ago) day a great power, perceived no threat and reduced its military. Finland retained tough armed forces, which proved their worth—and the Finns’ determination to protect their nation—during the infamous “Winter War” from November 1939 to March 1940. The Soviet Union triumphed, but only at great cost; rather than occupy Finland, like the Baltic states, Moscow accepted territorial concessions and a pledge of neutrality.

### Link – AI/DIANA

#### NATO cooperation on AI ensures decentralization of American AI primacy – DIANA Plan proves.

Machi 4/6/22 – Vivienne Machi is a reporter in Stuttgart, Germany, contributing to Defense News' European coverage. She previously reported for National Defense Magazine, Defense Daily, Via Satellite, Foreign Policy and the Dayton Daily News. She was named the Defence Media Awards' best young defense journalist in 2020, *["NATO unveils tech accelerator footprint, with plans for over 60 sites,"* 4/6/2022, "NATO unveils tech accelerator footprint, with plans for over 60 sites," Defense News, <https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2022/04/06/nato-unveils-tech-accelerator-footprint-with-plans-for-over-60-sites/>]RA

The initiative comes with more than 60 innovation sites. That includes a headquarters in Europe and another in North America, about 10 “accelerator sites” that provide financing, mentorship and exposure to business opportunities to participating startups, and more than 50 dedicated test centers hosting labs and equipment. “Altogether, the initial footprint will cover 20 NATO nations, representing a true trans-Atlantic endeavor, and we expect it will continue to expand in the future,” Stoltenberg said. The technology accelerator will be a new NATO body, tasked to bring innovative civilian and military organizations closer together to develop cutting-edge solutions in the realms of emerging and disruptive technologies, said David van Weel, NATO assistant secretary general for emerging security challenges. The plan is for allies to agree upon a new strategic direction every two years, which will then dictate critical defense and security problems as well as the desired solutions. “This provides strong signals of market demand and opportunity for innovators,” van Weel said at a Tuesday press briefing. From there, startups, academic institutions and nontraditional industry members can participate in so-called challenge programs that work to solve real-world problems — such as operating in a GPS-denied environment — and submit proposals to participate in DIANA’s accelerator effort. Member nations submitted proposals for more than 90 institutions to be part of the DIANA footprint; after evaluations, NATO pared it down to more than 10 accelerator sites and over 50 test centers, with many already in existence, van Weel said. Among those selected sites are the Niels Bohr Institute at the University of Copenhagen in Denmark, which will focus on quantum technologies, and a new site in Turin, Italy, which will be dedicated to the space domain. Imperial College London will host the European headquarters along with a DIANA accelerator, in a space currently housing the U.K.’s Defence and Security Accelerator, according to the British government. The U.K.’s program will be “twinned” with a new accelerator based in Tallinn, Estonia, to help share expertise, test cyber innovations and explore the viability of “virtual sites” to trial new tech such as autonomous vehicles. “The UK and Estonia are two of the most innovative countries in NATO, and our hosting of DIANA will harness that innovation for the benefit of all allies tackling future military threats,” British Defence Secretary Ben Wallace said in a news release. While the centers on the European side have all been selected, the North American footprint will be announced at the NATO Summit in June in Madrid, Spain. The goal is to have DIANA reach its full operational capability by 2025, said van Weel. Alongside the tech accelerator is a nascent venture capital fund, dubbed the NATO Innovation Fund. “Ultimately, reimagining NATO’s engagement with civilian innovators is only credible if we also provide the right funding mechanisms,” van Weel noted. Twenty-one members worked together to establish the underlying framework of the fund — outlining the investment strategy, the pool of capital, and determining the fund’s structure and governance. They also provided initial financial support. The Innovation Fund will invest €1 billion into “deep-tech startups” over 15 years. These are public funds that participating nations can allocate, either from their existing defense budgets or established innovation funds, a senior NATO official said Tuesday. The participating nations in DIANA’s innovation fund currently include Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Montenegro, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Turkey and the United Kingdom.

#### Only US leadership in AI can counter a rising China – key to hardline approach.

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Put simply, the United States is in danger of losing the information and soft power war against the PRC and with it, its superpower status. China has successfully conducted numerous cyberespionage operations, stealing information to build advanced technology and military equipment to counter US information and military advantage. Moreover, the US is failing to rapidly transition emerging technologies into the armed forces and has fallen short in discovering novel ways in which these technologies can be used for enhanced military advantage over an adversary. In 2020, Secretary of Defense Mark Esper stressed the inability of the Department of Defense (DOD) to appropriately and rapidly acquire and scale innovative technology for military employment.21 Beijing has initiated a number of efforts to continue to move China closer toward attaining a global leadership position in the IC. China’s “intelligent” approach to warfare—the militarization of enabling technologies such as cloud computing, artificial intelligence (AI), quantum information, big data analytics, and unmanned systems—demonstrate its efforts to prepare for the demands of future combat operations requiring “rapid processing and the fusing of information to support quick and efficient command decision-making.”22 In 2016, China launched the first space-based quantum satellite, Micius, demonstrating considerable progress in in its goal to develop unhackable global communications through entanglement-based quantum key distribution.23 Additionally, its “Three Warfare” strategy—nonkinetic measures to manipulate the behavior of states in favor of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) preferred outcomes—serves to maintain CCP legitimacy, extend Beijing’s reach, and insert China’s brand of socialism across the IC.24 China’s use of information at the political level buoy these advances in information’s operational employment. Most recently, the PRC has taken advantage of the US State Department’s delayed response to the coronavirus pandemic, its emphasis in placing the blame on China and the Chinese people for the creation and spread of COVID-19, and its failure to rapidly allocate COVID-19 resources, including providing vaccines beyond US borders. Notably, Beijing was able to quickly portray itself as a “well-organized state capable of controlling the full situation,” rapidly distribute conspiracy theories that accused the US of spreading COVID-19, pose as the defender against an American bully, and provide vaccines to countries in need before the US—all soft power tools shaping global perceptions in favor of Chinese leadership and direction concerning the pandemic.25 Every action China takes to pursue its interests weakens the legitimacy and attractiveness of US hegemonic leadership, which results in a loss in relative power. A 2020 Pew Research Center survey of 14 advanced economies, three located in the Indo-Pacific region, most people believed China handled the coronavirus better than the US and overall had unfavorable views of both the US and China.26 While limited in scope, this poll provides a glimpse of reduced attractiveness to US liberal hegemony largely influenced by its soft power deficiencies. For weak Indo-Pacific states that regularly employ hedging strategies to prevent either the US or China from dominating the region, the decreased attractiveness of a US partner may spell disaster.27 The US can reverse this potential disaster through a strategy that combines power with ideas—strength with liberal values. The United States must maximize its power relative to that of China to preserve American dominance in the international community, while reinvesting in the propagation of its liberal values28 These smart power objectives emphasize the militarization of emerging technologies to deny CCP advantages in the information domain and require the US to take the lead in strengthening the legitimacy and attraction to US liberal hegemony. To gain a clear military advantage over China, the United States needs to continue to heavily invest in the research and development of emerging information-age technologies—AI, autonomy, robotics, quantum, big data, and machine learning—and its rapid integration into all aspects of US military infrastructure to increase the effectiveness of the information collected and how it is used. Specifically, the United States needs to allocate a larger portion of defense spending to the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, increase defense partnerships with Silicon Valley industries and research universities, and improve acquisition practices to facilitate and accelerate military applications of intelligent technologies. The US must invest in and further develop technologies that will enable persistent awareness of adversary actions, speed up effective decision-making, and increase lethality at a low cost and low risk to the US. Specifically, investing in quantum, AI, autonomy, and cyber technologies for offensive and defensive purposes requires further integration and cooperation between the Department of Defense and the scientific community. Increased integration and cooperation between scientific and technical entities and the DOD will assist and maintain US technical and military advantages. Information is power. These high-tech systems are a cost-effective avenue to overcome the limits of human intelligence and allow the United States to rapidly understand the environment and make decisions faster than the adversary. Moreover, a high-tech–enabled force supports rapid collection and analysis of large amounts of data, enables swift decision-making, and enhances the lethality of US military forces.29 Whereas now the US can neither effectively stop nor respond to China stealing US intellectual property via cyber channels, technology such as AI-enabled cybersecurity can be used to rapidly detect China encroachment into US systems and automatically deny its ability to steal US scientific and military data. In an environment characterized by information power, operational agility against an adversary must be met with agility at the political level. The US Department of State (DOS)—responsible for advancing American interests through diplomacy, advocacy, and assistance efforts—has fallen short in the narrative battle against its adversaries leading to an overall decline in US appeal and influence worldwide. To increase the attractiveness of US liberal hegemony, the United States needs to influence states to champion American interests and combat adversaries’ anti-US information campaign. To achieve this, the United States must craft a strategic narrative in which ‘a strong America means freedom, prosperity, and security for all,’ consistently reinforcing the story that only through US liberal hegemony can the international community achieve a peaceful end state. Knowing this, the United States must increase its emphasis on alternative instruments to comprehensively maximize power and maintain its superpower status, or risk being outpaced by its competitors.

### Link - Biotech

#### US biotech primacy is the only way to counter revisionist powers – offshoring precludes hardline strategy

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Maintaining America’s Biotechnology Advantage Biotechnology in the United States is a significant contributor to the economy. By one estimate, in 2017, U.S. biotechnology revenues exceeded $400 billion, or 2 percent of gross domestic product, substantially surpassing better-measured sectors such as mining. Bioeconomy revenues have grown at an average rate of 10 percent annually for two decades. Notably, U.S. biotechnology revenues alone were approximately equal to worldwide semiconductor revenues for 2017. Biotechnology now supplies critical medicines, and, as more than 90 percent of the corn and soy grown in the United States is genetically modified, biotechnology feeds the armed forces. Industrial biotechnology is responsible for upward of 20 percent of chemicals produced in the United States, suggesting a similar proportion of chemicals used in the military are also biologically derived. And these impressive figures may still be significant underestimates: Using a different methodology, the U.S. National Academy of Sciences recently concluded that the biotechnology industry contributes 5 to 7 percent of U.S. gross domestic product. Biotechnology, therefore, may already constitute an even larger share of the military supply chain. As biotechnology continues to mature, its contribution to physical and economic security will become even more significant. Tools are now being deployed that enable the engineering and biomanufacturing of materials that will eventually not only displace petrochemicals but also surpass them in production scale and performance. Over the next ten to twenty years, biological production could soon supply up to 60 percent of physical inputs across the global economy, and biotechnology could have a “direct economic impact of up to $4 trillion a year.” While the United States is arguably still leading in biotechnology, it risks losing this lead to China. In China, biotechnology is a national development and a security matter. China’s Innovation Driven Development Strategy emphasizes biotechnology’s essential role in the country’s economic development, while the Military-Civil Fusion Development Strategy seeks to ensure that biotechnology research is also oriented toward the country’s military and broader security goals. Chinese biotechnology revenues are reported to be of a similar size to those in the United States, although they are subject to even lesser clarity in reporting. While China continues its licit and illicit acquisition efforts targeting the U.S. biotechnology sector, it is also shifting its attention to domestic innovation. In time, this will provide the People’s Liberation Army with new capabilities and increase both America’s and the Pentagon’s reliance on Chinese biotechnology products. Recommendations As early as 1958, the Department of Commerce was tracking the economic contribution of semiconductors, even though they made up less than 0.1 percent of the gross domestic product. Yet, today, the U.S. government has made no equivalent effort to track the much more significant role of biotechnology. This illiteracy is a national security issue. American and Chinese bioeconomies are in competition, and Beijing asserts that it is investing with the intent to take, and to then maintain, the lead. To sustain America’s advantage, the U.S. Department of Defense should better understand its reliance on biotechnology and increase investment in it accordingly. The Pentagon’s recent investment in the BioIndustrial Manufacturing and Design Ecosystem is a notable step in the right direction. However, the seven-year budget for this project is approximately the cost of a single F-35A. For an investment that could impact the entire defense supply chain, this is inadequate. We recommend the following plan of action for the Department of Defense to take its place alongside the Departments of Commerce and State in the broader interagency effort to secure America’s biotechnology advantage. First, in close coordination with the Department of Commerce, the Department of Defense should make a systematic effort to better understand the role of biotechnology in the economy, supply chains, and manufacturing. This, in turn, should inform additional oversight and regulatory controls. The responsibility to understand, prepare for, and respond to biotechnology threats is balkanized, spread across at least nine departments and agencies. Vulnerabilities in the bioeconomy will affect the Department of Defense in terms of readiness, soldier health, and the ability to fulfill missions. Addressing those vulnerabilities begins with a sustained, comprehensive effort to understand the role of biotechnology in industry today, as well as how that industry contributes to defense supply chains, and how military acquisition policy shapes biotechnology. To that end, the Pentagon should work with the Department of Commerce to create domestic reporting codes for biotechnology revenues and employment for the quarterly and annual economic census, and further incorporate those codes into the North American Industrial Classification System. Institutionalizing the gathering of these data is the first step toward sustainable policymaking and rational spending. The Department of Commerce should then consider adding import/export controls on biotechnology, while avoiding overly broad restrictions that suffocate innovation. Protecting foundational technologies using the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act and Export Control Reform Act will be critical for securing biotechnology. However, biotechnology competition is not exclusive to commercial activities. The Pentagon should assess critical vulnerabilities and dependencies to assist the other agencies in bringing China’s foreign biotechnology access in line with standards in other major markets. The Department of Defense has been asked to document and secure supply chains critical to defense applications and to the overall U.S. economy. This should also apply to biotechnology. Current Pentagon efforts to expand domestic biological manufacturing capabilities are an important start, but a broader effort is needed. An empowered deputy national security adviser could help oversee the relationship between the Pentagon and the National Economic Council to promote and secure the military’s broader technology needs. Second, the Department of Defense should better study the accomplishments and intent of China, especially the Chinese military, in developing biotechnology as a strategic technology. Once the Department of Defense better understands critical U.S. biotechnology dependencies on China, it can begin the work of reducing them. This requires an interagency examination to identify cross-cutting resources, develop mitigation strategies, formulate best practices to bolster innovation, and expand outreach to allies and partners to reduce systemic gaps China could exploit. Partnership with industry and allies will allow the U.S. government to understand and counter Beijing’s efforts to distort commercial activity in its favor. To this end, the Department of Defense should mirror the National Security Council’s effort by creating an emerging technology portfolio within Office of the Under Secretary of Defense-Policy. While other technology offices in the Department of Defense are internally focused, an entity in this office that concentrates externally on foundational technology competition is required. Such an office may be able to address uncertainties in assessments of Chinese biotechnology revenues and capabilities. Finally, in coordination with the Department of State, the Department of Defense should identify opportunities for dialogue with the People’s Liberation Army about biotechnology-related security issues.

### Link – Cybersecurity

#### Only US leadership in cybersecurity can counter a rising China – key to hardline approach.

Dominguez 21 - Gabriella M. Dominguez (BA, Texas Tech University; MA, Texas Tech University; MMOAS, Air Command and Staff College) is an intelligence specialist with analytic expertise in adversarial doctrine, plans, and tactics regarding the employment of space, counterspace, and denial and deception systems against EUCOM, [*“‘Smart Power’ Is Hard Power: A Liberal Position on the US Approach to China,"* 12-21-2021, Air University (AU), https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/JIPA/Display/Article/2880386/smart-power-is-hard-power-a-liberal-position-on-the-us-approach-to-china/]RA

Put simply, the United States is in danger of losing the information and soft power war against the PRC and with it, its superpower status. China has successfully conducted numerous cyberespionage operations, stealing information to build advanced technology and military equipment to counter US information and military advantage. Moreover, the US is failing to rapidly transition emerging technologies into the armed forces and has fallen short in discovering novel ways in which these technologies can be used for enhanced military advantage over an adversary. In 2020, Secretary of Defense Mark Esper stressed the inability of the Department of Defense (DOD) to appropriately and rapidly acquire and scale innovative technology for military employment.21 Beijing has initiated a number of efforts to continue to move China closer toward attaining a global leadership position in the IC. China’s “intelligent” approach to warfare—the militarization of enabling technologies such as cloud computing, artificial intelligence (AI), quantum information, big data analytics, and unmanned systems—demonstrate its efforts to prepare for the demands of future combat operations requiring “rapid processing and the fusing of information to support quick and efficient command decision-making.”22 In 2016, China launched the first space-based quantum satellite, Micius, demonstrating considerable progress in in its goal to develop unhackable global communications through entanglement-based quantum key distribution.23 Additionally, its “Three Warfare” strategy—nonkinetic measures to manipulate the behavior of states in favor of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) preferred outcomes—serves to maintain CCP legitimacy, extend Beijing’s reach, and insert China’s brand of socialism across the IC.24 China’s use of information at the political level buoy these advances in information’s operational employment. Most recently, the PRC has taken advantage of the US State Department’s delayed response to the coronavirus pandemic, its emphasis in placing the blame on China and the Chinese people for the creation and spread of COVID-19, and its failure to rapidly allocate COVID-19 resources, including providing vaccines beyond US borders. Notably, Beijing was able to quickly portray itself as a “well-organized state capable of controlling the full situation,” rapidly distribute conspiracy theories that accused the US of spreading COVID-19, pose as the defender against an American bully, and provide vaccines to countries in need before the US—all soft power tools shaping global perceptions in favor of Chinese leadership and direction concerning the pandemic.25 Every action China takes to pursue its interests weakens the legitimacy and attractiveness of US hegemonic leadership, which results in a loss in relative power. A 2020 Pew Research Center survey of 14 advanced economies, three located in the Indo-Pacific region, most people believed China handled the coronavirus better than the US and overall had unfavorable views of both the US and China.26 While limited in scope, this poll provides a glimpse of reduced attractiveness to US liberal hegemony largely influenced by its soft power deficiencies. For weak Indo-Pacific states that regularly employ hedging strategies to prevent either the US or China from dominating the region, the decreased attractiveness of a US partner may spell disaster.27 The US can reverse this potential disaster through a strategy that combines power with ideas—strength with liberal values. The United States must maximize its power relative to that of China to preserve American dominance in the international community, while reinvesting in the propagation of its liberal values28 These smart power objectives emphasize the militarization of emerging technologies to deny CCP advantages in the information domain and require the US to take the lead in strengthening the legitimacy and attraction to US liberal hegemony. To gain a clear military advantage over China, the United States needs to continue to heavily invest in the research and development of emerging information-age technologies—AI, autonomy, robotics, quantum, big data, and machine learning—and its rapid integration into all aspects of US military infrastructure to increase the effectiveness of the information collected and how it is used. Specifically, the United States needs to allocate a larger portion of defense spending to the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, increase defense partnerships with Silicon Valley industries and research universities, and improve acquisition practices to facilitate and accelerate military applications of intelligent technologies. The US must invest in and further develop technologies that will enable persistent awareness of adversary actions, speed up effective decision-making, and increase lethality at a low cost and low risk to the US. Specifically, investing in quantum, AI, autonomy, and cyber technologies for offensive and defensive purposes requires further integration and cooperation between the Department of Defense and the scientific community. Increased integration and cooperation between scientific and technical entities and the DOD will assist and maintain US technical and military advantages. Information is power. These high-tech systems are a cost-effective avenue to overcome the limits of human intelligence and allow the United States to rapidly understand the environment and make decisions faster than the adversary. Moreover, a high-tech–enabled force supports rapid collection and analysis of large amounts of data, enables swift decision-making, and enhances the lethality of US military forces.29 Whereas now the US can neither effectively stop nor respond to China stealing US intellectual property via cyber channels, technology such as AI-enabled cybersecurity can be used to rapidly detect China encroachment into US systems and automatically deny its ability to steal US scientific and military data. In an environment characterized by information power, operational agility against an adversary must be met with agility at the political level. The US Department of State (DOS)—responsible for advancing American interests through diplomacy, advocacy, and assistance efforts—has fallen short in the narrative battle against its adversaries leading to an overall decline in US appeal and influence worldwide. To increase the attractiveness of US liberal hegemony, the United States needs to influence states to champion American interests and combat adversaries’ anti-US information campaign. To achieve this, the United States must craft a strategic narrative in which ‘a strong America means freedom, prosperity, and security for all,’ consistently reinforcing the story that only through US liberal hegemony can the international community achieve a peaceful end state. Knowing this, the United States must increase its emphasis on alternative instruments to comprehensively maximize power and maintain its superpower status, or risk being outpaced by its competitors.

#### The US must take the helm in cyber security – anything else collapses US military power

Barno and Bensahel 21 – Lt. Gen. David W. Barno, USA (Ret.) is a Visiting Professor of Strategic Studies and Senior Fellow at the Merrill Center in the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) in D.C. He was senior American commander of U.S. and coalition forces in Afghanistan from 2003–2005, Nora Bensahel, Ph.D. is a Visiting Professor of Strategic Studies and Senior Fellow at the Merrill Center in the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) in Washington, D.C, [*"Why the United States Needs an Independent Cyber Force,"* War on the Rocks, 5-4-2021, <https://warontherocks.com/2021/05/why-the-united-states-needs-an-independent-cyber-force/>]RA

Cyber is now the oxygen upon which the U.S. military depends for almost literally every element of its vast warfighting capabilities. No military service today can function without reliable, resilient cyber capabilities for everything from command and control, to intelligence analysis, to the routine functioning of every weapon system from tanks and ships to aircraft and satellites. Take away that oxygen, disrupt its availability, or sow mistrust in its integrity, and the whole global system of U.S. military power may catastrophically malfunction, if not collapse. What is more, almost every element of government, business, and civil society today also depends on cyberspace to enable every imaginable function. Disrupt cyberspace, and our entire society risks a plunge into chaos. Yet despite this existential reliance by both American society and the U.S. military, the nation’s cyber defense, deterrence, and offense capabilities today are fragmented and disjointed. While the Department of Defense cannot and should not take ownership of every aspect of this ubiquitous challenge that spans the public and private sector alike, it must bring new focus, capacity, and transformative change to effectively address the military dimensions of this challenge. To do so, it needs to establish the U.S. Cyber Force as a new military service. Two recent reports highlight the alarming perils facing the nation from the cyber domain. In March 2020, the Congressionally mandated Cyber Solarium Commission framed its final report by arguing “the status quo is not getting the job done. The status quo is inviting attacks on Americans every second of the day. The status quo is a slow surrender of American power and responsibility.” And this past March, the National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence concluded that “America is not prepared to defend or compete” in the era of artificial intelligence, and that the country “will not be able to defend against AI-enabled threats without ubiquitous AI capabilities and new warfighting paradigms.” Taken together, these two bipartisan efforts sound urgent alarm bells about the ability of the United States to defend itself against the burgeoning dangers in the virtual world, which threaten to undermine traditional U.S. deterrence and military dominance. The chilling findings and wide-ranging recommendations of these two commissions — over 150 in total — provide many arguments that buttress the case for an independent U.S. Cyber Force within the Department of Defense. They both highlight the need to fundamentally rethink how wars will be fought in this century, and flag the U.S. military’s continued reliance on legacy platforms and systems that are not AI-capable and were not designed for warfare in a digital world. The National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence, for example, observes that “a new warfighting paradigm is emerging,” and pointedly states that the Department of Defense “should not be a witness to the AI revolution in military affairs, but should deliver it with leadership from the top, new operating concepts, relentless experimentation, and a system that rewards agility and risk.” As currently structured, the Pentagon simply cannot meet this transformative challenge. Like the other unified combatant commands, U.S. Cyber Command and its Cyber Mission Force draw their personnel solely from the existing military services, each of which has its own cyber missions and responsibilities. The services should retain many of those personnel, since they will need to continue protecting their own cyber networks and providing tactical cyber support to their units on the battlefield. But the cyber warfare domain is entirely different from the physical domains of air, land, sea, and space that shape the focus and warfighting priorities of the services. Too often, the services treat cyber as an enabler of more conventional military operations in their respective domains, rather than an entirely new and unique domain of warfare. The nation needs more capacity and more finely honed skills in the cyber domain than the traditional services can contribute. In many ways, this dynamic parallels the struggle for an independent U.S. Air Force in the first half of the 20th century. In that era, the Army and Navy used newly invented airplanes to support their units and ships, rather than exploring how airpower might be used as a separate, even decisive, instrument of war. They successfully blocked attempts to create a separate Air Force until 1947, after the monumental contributions of American airpower to winning World War II were finally recognized. This pattern is largely repeating itself today, as the services continue to treat cyber principally as a means of advancing their legacy warfighting capabilities rather than think imaginatively about the necessity for a new paradigm that focuses on the revolutionary impacts of the cyber domain on warfare. Yet at a broader level, when no service is specifically charged with the responsibility for thinking solely about fighting in the cyber domain, the nation’s ability to leverage its full cyber warfare potential will forever remain fragmented and inevitably incomplete. A separate U.S. Cyber Force would deeply transform the Department of Defense and prepare it more effectively for the challenges of future warfare. The nascent state of strategic thinking about cyber conflict today shares many similarities with the early days of the nuclear age, when concepts of nuclear deterrence and warfighting were just forming. Establishing a new Cyber Force would speed that process by catalyzing new and truly innovative thinking, without the constraints of other service cultures, doctrine, legacy programs, and bureaucratic preferences. Consolidating and focusing the Pentagon’s expertise, energy, and budgetary power in a separate cyber service would promote new thinking on cyber warfare, cyber deterrence, and cyber defense. It would accelerate the development of AI and a range of other cyber-specific tools and doctrines for deterrence and warfighting in ways that the traditional armed services simply cannot replicate. And it would create a distinct cyberspace culture inside the U.S. military that can be both a lodestar and incubator of cyber talent in the force, distinct from the strong service cultures associated with war on land, in the air, and at sea.

### Link – Ukraine

#### Increasing engagement with Ukraine causes draw-in and escalates conflict – Russia is the example, not the exception.

Bilefsky and Peña 4/21/22 - Dan Bilefsky is an international correspondent, based in Montreal. He was previously based in London, Paris, Prague and New York. He was part of the team that won the 2022 George Polk Award for an investigation of the assassination of Haiti’s president, Richard Pérez-Peña, an international news editor in New York, has been with The Times as a reporter and editor since 1992, ["*The Roots of the Ukraine War: How the Crisis Developed,"* The New York Times, 4-21-2022, https://www.nytimes.com/article/russia-ukraine-nato-europe.html]RA

After the Soviet Union collapsed in the early 1990s, NATO expanded eastward, eventually taking in most of the European nations that had been in the Communist sphere. The Baltic republics of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, once parts of the Soviet Union, joined NATO, as did Poland, Romania and others. As a result, NATO moved hundreds of miles closer to Moscow, directly bordering Russia. And in 2008, it stated that it planned — some day — to enroll Ukraine, though that is still seen as a far-off prospect. Mr. Putin has described the Soviet disintegration as one of the greatest catastrophes of the 20th century that robbed Russia of its rightful place among the world’s great powers. He has spent his 22 years in power rebuilding Russia’s military and reasserting its geopolitical clout. The Russian president calls NATO’s expansion menacing, and the prospect of Ukraine joining it a major threat. As Russia has grown more assertive and stronger militarily, his complaints about NATO have grown more strident. He has repeatedly invoked the specter of American ballistic missiles and combat forces in Ukraine, though U.S., Ukrainian and NATO officials insist there are none. Mr. Putin has also insisted that Ukraine is fundamentally parts of Russia, culturally and historically. East-West relations worsened drastically in early 2014, when mass protests in Ukraine forced out a president closely allied with Mr. Putin. Russia swiftly invaded and annexed Crimea, part of Ukraine. Moscow also fomented a separatist rebellion that took control of part of the Donbas region of Ukraine, in a war that still grinds on, having killed more than 13,000 people. What does Putin want? Mr. Putin appears intent on winding back the clock more than 30 years, establishing a broad, Russian-dominated security zone resembling the power Moscow wielded in Soviet days. Now 69 years old and possibly edging toward the twilight of his political career, he clearly wants to draw Ukraine, a nation of 44 million people, back into Russia’s sphere of influence. Russia presented NATO and the United States in December with a set of written demands that it said were needed to ensure its security. Foremost among them are a guarantee that Ukraine would never join NATO, that NATO draw down its forces in the Eastern European countries that have already joined, and that the 2015 cease-fire in Ukraine be implemented — though Moscow and Kyiv disagree sharply on what that would mean. The West dismissed the main demands out of hand. Moscow’s aggressive posture has also inflamed Ukrainian nationalism, with citizen militias preparing for a drawn-out guerrilla campaign in the event of a Russian occupation. The Russian leader may also want to energize nationalists at home by focusing on an external threat, as he has in the past. Nevertheless, since the invasion began, thousands of Russians, some at great personal risk, have taken to the streets to protest the war.

### Link – Sweden/Finland

#### Increasing cooperation with Sweden/Finland harms risks security dilemmas, draw in, and wrecks our economy

Bandow 5-19-22 – Doug Bandow is a senior fellow at the Cato Institute, specializing in foreign policy and civil liberties. He worked as special assistant to President Ronald Reagan and editor of the political magazine Inquiry. He writes regularly for leading publications such as Fortune magazine, National Interest, the Wall Street Journal, and the Washington Times, [“*Sweden and Finland in NATO: What’s in it for Us?”,* Cato Institute, https://www.cato.org/commentary/sweden-finland-nato-whats-it-us]RA

Yet when the Ukraine crisis began last fall, the U.S. and European NATO members refused to state the obvious, that Kyiv would not be joining the alliance. Doing so might have forestalled Putin’s invasion. Of course, allied irresponsibility did not justify Moscow’s invasion, but Washington and Brussels share blame for the tragic war. With conflict raging in Ukraine, Finland and Sweden decided that they want formal U.S. protection as well. That comes as no surprise: Countries and even movements around the world eagerly seek the great superpower’s assistance. Years ago, I was asked by ethnic Karen insurgents in Burma/​Myanmar why Washington did not sent troops there to do what it had recently done in Kosovo. If I faced such a regime, I also would want the U.S. to eliminate the brutal, oppressive Tatmadaw, as the Burmese military is known. However, the U.S. government is not the world’s 911 number and should stop treating its defense guarantees as a matter of charity. Sweden, in its (long ago) day a great power, perceived no threat and reduced its military. Finland retained tough armed forces, which proved their worth—and the Finns’ determination to protect their nation—during the infamous “Winter War” from November 1939 to March 1940. The Soviet Union triumphed, but only at great cost; rather than occupy Finland, like the Baltic states, Moscow accepted territorial concessions and a pledge of neutrality. Although Russia’s attack on Ukraine understandably unsettled Europe, Moscow never demonstrated any interest in reviving hostilities with Helsinki or threatening Sweden. And Russia’s poor military performance demonstrates that, contra its pre‐​conflict reputation, Moscow could not conquer its many neighbors, let alone the entire continent, even if it desired to do so. The two countries’ desire to join appears to be an attempt to get an insurance policy at America’s expense, expanding still further Washington’s already lengthy list of defense dependents. If the Duchy of Grand Fenwick was available, it would join NATO as well. Instead, the U.S. should be shifting responsibility for Europe’s defense to Europe, which far outranges Russia in economic strength, population, and military outlays. While America patrols the entire globe, the Europeans (and America’s Asian allies as well) scrimp on their armed forces—for instance, 19 NATO members spend less than two percent of their GDP on defense. Today, Washington is hurtling toward insolvency. The national debt is 100 percent of GDP, nearing the record set after World War II. Even as the Covid‐​19 pandemic recedes, the U.S. is running trillion‐​dollar annual deficits, with the red ink set to increase as the Baby Boomers continue to retire, inflating medical and retirement outlays. The Congressional Budget Office warns that the debt to GDP ratio could hit 200 percent by mid‐​century. And now Washington is going to subsidize Finland’s and Sweden’s security? The U.S. also loses by further contributing to Russian paranoia. The invasion of Ukraine should make obvious that Putin’s oft‐​repeated concerns about NATO expansion were real. Overturning the peaceful Scandinavian status quo and creating another allied front just a few score miles from St. Petersburg will encourage a response likely to further unsettle regional security. Of course, there is little that Russia can do directly against Helsinki and Stockholm. However, Moscow is likely to further rely on nuclear weapons to bolster deterrence. Putin ally (and former stand‐​in president) Dmitry Medvedev warned: “If Sweden and Finland join NATO, the length of the land borders of the alliance with the Russian Federation will more than double. Naturally, these boundaries will have to be strengthened.” It would be one thing to accept enhanced nuclear risks as a response to necessary defense measures. But should we do so because two more wealthy European countries desire a share of America’s defense subsidy? Simply joining the alliance might be only the start. Who will help Finland cover its 810 mile border with Russia? Already, U.S. forces in Europe have jumped 20 percent since January to their highest level since 2005. Among Europe’s NATO members, only the U.K. has made a measurable, though still modest, troop contribution over the same period. Yet Poland and the Baltic states are not satisfied with NATO’s Article 5 guarantee. They also want American (not European) garrisons to create tripwires guaranteeing U.S. involvement in any war. Playing to President Donald Trump’s perceived vanity, Warsaw lobbied the last administration to establish a permanent base, proposing the name “Camp Trump.” Helsinki might not want to be left out the great garrison game. Instead of waving more applicants through NATO’s door, Washington should end expansion. Nothing in the alliance or its founding documents requires the organization to accept applications, let alone grant them. To the contrary, Article 10 provides: “The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European State in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty.” The transatlantic alliance is supposed to take the initiative and act for the benefit of existing members. That is, NATO was created to promote security, not extend charity. Instead of expanding the antiquated U.S. defense dole, the European security system should be reconstructed and placed in European hands. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine should remind Washington policymakers that alliances are serious commitments, which in the past have expanded as much as diminished conflict. Equally important, the U.S. should go to war only when forced to do so, to defend itself. That was not the case with Kiev, which is why America neither forced Ukraine’s inclusion in NATO nor joined in Ukraine’s defense against Russia. If the U.S. wants to remain a superpower and able to care for its own citizens, it must learn to say no.

### Link – Countering Russia

#### Increasing NATO cooperation to counter Russia only provokes the country, has the opposite affect and causes war

Galen 3/7/22 - Ted Galen Carpenter is senior fellow for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute. Carpenter served as Cato’s director of foreign policy studies from 1986 to 1995 and as vice president for defense and foreign policy studies from 1995 to 2011, [*"The U.S. and NATO Helped Trigger the Ukraine War. It's Not 'Siding With Putin' to Admit It,"* Cato Institute, 3/7/2022, https://www.cato.org/commentary/us-nato-helped-trigger-ukraine-war-its-not-siding-putin-admit-it]RA

Russian leaders and several Western policy experts were warning more than two decades ago that NATO expansion would turn out badly—ending in a new cold war with Russia at best, and a hot one at worst. Obviously, they were not “echoing” Putin or anyone else. George Kennan, the intellectual architect of America’s containment policy during the Cold War, perceptively warned in a May 2, 1998 New York Times interview what NATO’s move eastward would set in motion. “I think it is the beginning of a new cold war,” he stated. “I think the Russians will gradually react quite adversely and it will affect their policies. I think it is a tragic mistake.” U.S. and European officials blew through one red light after another. Kennan was speaking of the first round of enlargement that brought into the Alliance Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary. Later rounds, which added the Baltic Republics and other East European countries, were considerably more abrasive, and Washington’s subsequent attempt to make Ukraine and Georgia members was contemptuous of Russia’s core security interests. Moscow’s complaints and warnings were becoming increasingly sharp as well. Yet U.S. and European officials blew through one red light after another. George W. Bush began to treat Georgia and Ukraine as valued U.S. political and military allies, and in 2008, he pressed NATO to admit Ukraine and Georgia as members. French and German wariness delayed that endeavor, but the NATO summit communique affirmed that both countries would eventually achieve that status. In his 2014 memoir, Duty, Robert M. Gates, who served as secretary of defense in both Bush’s administration and Barack Obama’s, conceded that “trying to bring Georgia and Ukraine into NATO was truly overreaching.” That initiative, he concluded, was a case of “recklessly ignoring what the Russians considered their own vital national interests.” Indeed it was, and Moscow began to push back. Putin exploited a foolish provocation by Georgia’s pro‐​Western government to launch a military offensive that penetrated deeply into the country. Upon its victory, Russia permanently detached two secessionist‐​minded Georgian regions and put them under permanent Russian control. The Kremlin’s decisive action should have alerted even slow‐​learning U.S. leaders that the days of Russian officials merely issuing verbal protests about the West’s steady encroachment into Russia’s security sphere were over. Amazingly, though, the Obama administration still sought to turn Ukraine into a NATO political and military asset. In late 2013 and early 2014, the United States and several European governments meddled shamelessly to support the efforts of demonstrators to unseat Ukraine’s generally pro‐​Russia president, Victor Yanukovych, some two years before the expiration of his term. That campaign was especially inappropriate since Yanukovych became president in 2010 as the result of an election that even the European Union and other international observers acknowledged was reasonably free and fair. In a democratic system, the legal way to remove a president from office is, depending on a specific country’s constitutional rules, through a parliamentary vote of no‐​confidence, impeachment, or defeat in the next election. Angry street demonstrations do not fit into any of those categories, yet the United States and its allies backed that illegal process. A recording of the infamous leaked telephone call between Assistant Secretary of State Victoria Nuland and U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine Geoffrey Pyatt confirmed the extent of Washington’s meddling in the affairs of a sovereign country. The Ukraine episode proved to be an intolerable provocation to neighboring Russia. Putin responded by annexing the strategic Crimea peninsula and the United States and its NATO partners then imposed economic sanctions on Russia. The new cold war was on in earnest. Yet Washington still refused to back off. Instead, the Trump and Biden administrations poured weapons into Ukraine, approved joint military exercises between U.S. and Ukrainian forces, and even prodded the allies to include Ukraine in NATO war games. In late 2021, it became clear that the Kremlin’s restraint had run dry. Moscow issued demands for security guarantees, including a draw‐​down of military forces already deployed in NATO’s eastern members. With respect to Ukraine, the demand was very clear and uncompromising: Not only would Kyiv never receive a membership invitation, but NATO weapons and troops would never be deployed on Ukrainian soil. When the West failed to provide those guarantees, Putin launched his devastating, full‐​scale war. Moscow’s cruel overreaction deserves emphatic condemnation. However, the culpability of the United States and its NATO allies also is sizable. Moving an alliance that one great power dominates to the border of another major power is inherently destabilizing and provocative.

### Link – Countering China

#### Increasing NATO cooperation in Asia ensures China draw-in over regional disputes

Murphy et. al 22 - Colum Murphy, Lucille Liu, Jing Li, and Philip Glamann are contributors to Bloomberg News over international diplomacy and security matters, [*"China Warns U.S. Over Forming Pacific NATO, Backing Taiwan,"* Bloomberg, 3-7-2022, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-03-07/china-urges-world-not-to-add-fuel-to-fire-in-war-in-ukraine]RA

China warned the U.S. against trying to build what it called a Pacific version of NATO, while declaring that security disputes over Taiwan and Ukraine were “not comparable at all.” Foreign Minister Wang Yi told his annual news briefing Monday that the “real goal” of the U.S.’s Indo-Pacific strategy was to form Asia’s answer to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. China has often accused the U.S. of trying to form blocs to suppress its growth, a complaint that’s likely to attract greater attention after President Vladimir Putin cited similar grievances before his invasion of Ukraine. “The perverse actions run counter to the common aspiration of the region for peace, development, cooperation and win-win outcomes,” Wang added. “They are doomed to fail.” Complaints about U.S. efforts to strengthen its alliance network in Asia were among several points of contention raised by Wang in the almost two-hour briefing on the sidelines of the National People’s Congress in Beijing. The senior diplomat repeatedly alluded to the U.S. as the source of problems with countries around the globe and issued some of China’s most pointed warnings yet against calls to expand U.S. ties with Taiwan. “This would not only push Taiwan into a precarious situation, but will also bring unbearable consequences for the U.S. side,” Wang said on the sidelines of the National People’s Congress in Beijing, later adding: “Taiwan will eventually return to the embrace of the motherland.” Several Asian nations -- like their counterparts on Russia’s European frontier -- have sought closer security ties with the U.S. to keep from being dominated by the region’s biggest player. China has active border disputes with neighbors including Japan, India and Vietnam and has stepped up military, diplomatic and economic pressure on Taiwan, sending warplanes on some 960 forays through the island’s air defense identification zone last year. The Biden administration outlined efforts to push back against growing Chinese clout in its Indo-Pacific strategy released last month. The U.S. has sought to build a coalition of democracies around the world, including both traditional treaty partners such as Japan and new grouping such as the Quad, including also Australia and India. U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken criticized China in a news conference Monday hosted by Lithuanian Foreign Minister Gabrielius Landsbergis, whose Baltic nation has been embroiled in a dispute with Beijing over Taiwan opening a representative office in its capital. “Beijing talks a lot about the importance of upholding international order, stability, respecting sovereignty,” Blinken said. “But from its coercion of Vilnius to its failure thus far to condemn Moscow’s flagrant violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine, today and in 2014, Beijing’s actions are speaking much louder than its words,” he added, referring to Moscow’s earlier seizure of Crimea. Russia’s attack on Ukraine has undermined confidence that world powers would be able to prevent a crisis from similarly erupting over Taiwan, a democratically governed island of more than 23 million people and key global source of semiconductors. Wang dismissed the comparisons, arguing that Taiwan is part of Chinese territory -- a claim President Tsai Ing-wen in Taipei has rejected. “Some, while being vocal about the principle of sovereignty on the Ukrainian issue, have kept undermining China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity on the Taiwan question -- this is a blatant double standard,” Wang said. Russia launched its action in Ukraine weeks after President Xi Jinping hosted Putin in Beijing and publicly declared their friendship had “no limits.” China has sought to avoid taking a position in the conflict, as it attempts to balance support for Russian efforts to challenge U.S. dominance with its interest of being regarded as a responsible major power.

### Turns Case – Russia Relations

#### NATO fails to solve international crisis while making relations with Russia worse

Cohen 17 – Stephen Cohen is Professor Emeritus of Russian Studies and Politics at NYU and Princeton, [“*Have 20 Years of NATO Expansion Made Anyone Safer?”*, 10/18/2017, The Nation, https://www.thenation.com/article/have-20-years-of-nato-expansion-made-anyone-safer]

The expansion of the US-led military alliance, which began in Germany with 13 member states and now stretches to Russia’s borders with 29, is the largest and fastest growth of a “sphere of influence” (American) in modern peacetime history. Throughout the process, Russia has been repeatedly denounced for seeking any sphere of security, even on its own borders. NATO expansion included two broken promises to Russia that the Kremlin has never forgotten. In 1990, the Bush administration (and the West Germany government) assured Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev that, in return for Russia’s agreeing to a united Germany in NATO, the alliance would “not expand one inch to the east.” (Though denied by a number of participants and commentators, the assurance has been confirmed by other participants as well as by archive researchers.) The other broken promise is unfolding today as NATO builds up permanent land, sea, and air forces near Russian territory, along with missile-defense installations. NATO “enlargement,” as it is sometimes benignly termed by its promoters, continues. Montenegro became a member in 2017 and the “door remains open,” officials say repeatedly, to the former Soviet republics of Georgia and Ukraine. 2. NATO is more than the world’s most powerful military alliance. With lavishly funded offices, representatives, think tanks, and other advocates not only in Brussels but in many Western capitals, it is also a powerful political-ideological-lobbying institution—perhaps the world’s most powerful corporation, also taking into account its multitude of bureaucratic employees in Brussels and elsewhere. In the United States alone, scarcely a week passes without media “news” and commentary produced by NATO-affiliated authors or based on NATO sources. (See, among other examples, the Atlantic Council and Newsweek.) 3. Asking whether “enlarged” NATO has resulted in more insecurity than security requires considering the consequences of several wars it led or in which several of its member states participated since 1997: § The Serbian war in 1999 resulted in the NATO occupation and annexation of Kosovo, a precedent cited by subsequent secessionists and occupiers. § The 2003 Iraq War was a catastrophe for all involved and a powerful factor behind expanding organized terrorism, including the Islamic State, and not only in the Middle East. The same was true of the war against Libya in 2011, no lessons having been learned. § NATO promises that Georgia might one day become a member state was an underlying cause of the Georgian-Russian war of 2008, in effect a US-Russian proxy war. The result was the near ruination of Georgia. NATO remains active in Georgia today. § Similar NATO overtures to Ukraine also underlay the crisis in that country in 2014, which resulted in Russia’s annexation of Crimea, the still ongoing Ukrainian civil war in Donbass, and in effect another US-Russian proxy war. Meanwhile, US-backed Kiev remains in profound economic and political crisis, and Ukraine fraught with the possibility of a direct American-Russian military conflict. § Meanwhile, of course, there is Afghanistan, initially a NATO war effort but now the longest (and perhaps most un-winnable) war in American history. Any rational calculation of the outcomes of these wars, Cohen points out, reveals far more military and political insecurity than security, which is mainly pseudo-security or simmering crises. 4. NATO expansion has also bred political-ideological insecurities. NATO’s incessant, ubiquitous media saturation and lobbying in Western capitals, particularly in the United States, has been a major driving force behind the new Cold War and its rampant Russophobia. One perilous result has been the near-end of American diplomacy toward Russia and the almost total militarization of US-Russian relations. This alone is a profound source of insecurity—indeed of possible war with Russia. 5. Meanwhile, the vast resources devoted to NATO expansion have scarcely contributed anything to resolving real international crises, among them economic policies in Europe that have helped inspire secessionist movements; international terrorism in the Middle East and the refugee crisis; the danger of nuclear proliferation, which NATO has abetted by spurring a new nuclear arms race with Russia; and others. Nor does NATO’s vast expansion resolve its own internal crises, as, for example, the growing alliance between NATO member Turkey and Russia; and undemocratic developments in other member states such as Hungary and Poland. And this leaves aside the far-reaching implications of an emerging anti-NATO alliance centering around Russia, China, and Iran—itself a result of NATO’s 20-year expansion. 6. Cohen ends by considering the counter-arguments made by NATO expansion promoters over the years: § They say the small Baltic and other Eastern European countries previously victimized by Soviet Russia still felt threatened by post-Soviet Russia and therefore had to be brought into the alliance. This makes no empirical sense. In the 1990s, Russia was in shambles and weak, a threat only to itself. And if any perceived or future threat existed, there were alternatives: acting on Gorbachev’s proposed “Common European Home”—that is, a security agreement including all of Europe and Russia; bilateral security guarantees to those once-victimized nations, along with diplomacy on their part to resolve any lingering conflicts with Russia, including the endangered status of their own ethnic Russian citizens. This argument makes no historical sense either: The tiny Baltic states near Russia were among the last to be granted NATO membership. § It is also said that every qualified nation has a “right” to NATO membership if it wishes to join. This too is illogical. NATO is not a non-selective fraternity or the AARP. It is a security organization whose sole criterion for membership should be whether or not membership enhances the security of its members. From the outset, it was clear, as many Western critics pointed out, it would not. § Later, it is belatedly argued, Russia did become a threat under its leader Vladimir Putin. But as the British academic specialist Richard Sakwa has compellingly argued, any threat Russia now poses was created by NATO itself, by Moscow’s reactions to NATO expansion. Cohen puts this somewhat differently: Much of what is today denounced as “Putin’s aggression” abroad has been his responses to US and NATO policies. There is also another negative consequence. Moscow’s perception that it is being increasingly encircled by an “aggressive” US-led NATO has had lamentable, and predictable, influence on Russia’s domestic politics. For the sake of international security, NATO expansion must end now. But is there a way back from the 20-year folly, Cohen asks. Member states taken in since the late 1990s cannot, of course, be expelled. But NATO expansion could be demilitarized, its forces withdrawn back to Germany, from which they crept to Russia. This may have been possible in the late 1990s or early 2000s, as promised in 1997. Now it is mostly a utopian idea, but one without which the world is in ever graver danger—a world with less and less real security.

### AT: Uniqueness Overwhelms the Link/NATO not a concern

#### Sole concern – Russia invasion of Ukraine proves.

Ellyat, 2/1/22 - Holly Ellyatt writes for CNBC.com focusing on European macro-economics and politics. She has led digital coverage of the European financial crisis, U.K. politics and Brexit, and Russia. Holly joined CNBC in 2012, having worked previously in digital, radio and film production. She studied European Social and Political Studies at University College London (UCL) and then completed a MA in Broadcast Journalism at City University, [ *“Putin says the West has ignored Russia’s security concerns over NATO and Ukraine,”* 2-1-2022, CNBC, https://www.cnbc.com/2022/02/01/putin-the-west-has-ignored-russian-security-concerns-on-nato-ukraine.html]RA

President Vladimir Putin accused Western nations of ignoring key Russian security concerns, following the U.S.′ refusal last week to concede to Moscow’s demands over Ukraine and NATO. “It’s already clear now ... that fundamental Russian concerns were ignored,” Putin said at a press conference Tuesday, according to a Reuters translation. Putin said that the U.S. wanted to “contain Russia” and that it was using Ukraine to do that, as he reiterated Russia’s position that any possible membership of Ukraine in NATO would “undermine Russia’s security.” “Let’s imagine that Ukraine is a NATO member, it is fully packed of weapons, it gets advanced attack means like those in Poland and Romania and it starts an operation in Crimea,” Putin said, describing Crimea, a part of Ukraine annexed by Russia in 2014, as a “sovereign Russian territory.” “Let’s imagine that Ukraine is a NATO member state and it initiates a military operation. What should we do then, [should we] fight against the NATO bloc? Did anyone think at least something about that? Apparently not.” Nonetheless, Putin said he hoped dialog over Ukraine would continue and that a way needed to be found to, as he put it, “protect everyone’s security.” His comments followed talks with Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban, with whom Putin shares friendly ties, in Moscow. It’s the first time that Putin has commented publicly about the geopolitical crisis in weeks, despite a flurry of diplomatic meetings and calls between Russian and Western officials. While over 100,000 Russian troops remain stationed at various points along Russia’s border with Ukraine, there remains heightened concerns that Putin could be poised to give his troops a greenlight to invade Ukraine. Russia has denied it is planning an invasion, but trust in Russia’s word has been low ever since it annexed Crimea from Ukraine in 2014, and supported pro-Russian separatists in the Donbass region in eastern Ukraine. Political analysts believe that Russia wants to maintain its sphere of influence and power over former Soviet states and to stop Ukraine’s gravitation toward the West. Russia has insisted that it just wants to protect its security interests, particularly in the face of an expanded NATO that has deployed military hardware to eastern Europe. On the build-up of troops along its border with Ukraine, Putin has previously insisted late last year that Russia has a right to move its troops wherever it likes within its territory. The Kremlin has accused the West of stirring up “hysteria” over Ukraine. Putin’s comments comes after Russia made a series of security proposals to the U.S. in December, including its main demands that NATO does not expand further to the east or admit Ukraine to the military alliance. It would also like to see NATO rollback its military deployments in eastern Europe. Putin echoed that position on Tuesday, stating that missile launchers in Romania and Poland, both of whom are NATO members, “are a threat to Russia.” Last week, the U.S. responded to those demands, refusing to accept Russia’s key proposals over Ukraine and NATO. Still, it signaled a willingness to continue discussions aimed at calming tensions, and said there could be room for compromise in some areas potentially. On Tuesday, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken was due to speak to Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov. Russia’s official response to the U.S. remains unknown, at this point, although it has reportedly delivered a written response to the U.S. Putin’s meeting with Orban Tuesday comes as European leaders step up their engagement with Moscow with Putin already having spoken to French President Emmanuel Macron and Italy’s Prime Minister Mario Draghi this week. On Wednesday, he is due to speak to British Prime Minister Boris Johnson, who was visiting Ukraine Tuesday. Putin has not publicly commented on Ukraine since Dec. 23, according to the New York Times, which noted that he had chided a British journalist who asked, during Putin’s annual news conference, whether he would guarantee that Russia would not invade Ukraine. “It was the United States that came with its missiles to our home, to the doorstep of our home,” Putin said.

#### NATO has historically been a massive security concern – dates back to the end of WW2.

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Did the United States promise the Soviet Union that it would freeze NATO expansion? Russian officials say that the U.S. government made a pledge to Soviet leaders not to expand the alliance’s eastern borders, a commitment they say came during the flurry of diplomacy following the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and surrounding the reunification of Germany in 1990. Proponents of this narrative often cite the words that U.S. Secretary of State James A. Baker said to Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev in February 1990, that “there would be no extension of NATO’s jurisdiction for forces of NATO one inch to the east.” They say the United States and NATO have repeatedly betrayed this verbal commitment in the decades since, taking advantage of Russia’s tumultuous post-Soviet period and expanding the Western alliance several times, all the way to Russia’s doorstep in the case of the Baltic states. However, many Western analysts and former U.S. officials involved in these discussions dispute what they say is a selective view of history. They point out that, in early 1990, the focus of the diplomacy between the so-called Two Plus Four (East and West Germany plus the United States, France, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom) was the future of Germany and the question of whether the soon-to-be unified country would be part of NATO. (West Germany was already an alliance member, while East Germany was part of the Soviet-aligned Warsaw Pact.) They say that the discussions were not about NATO’s long-term plans for eastward expansion, which would have made little sense at that time; the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union still existed, and there was scant indication they would dissolve as quickly as they did, in a matter of months. In a 2014 interview, Gorbachev said as much: “The topic of ‘NATO expansion’ was never discussed. It was not raised in those years.” The diplomacy between U.S. and Soviet leaders during this period focused on Germany and included discussions of various post-unification security options, including the potential for Germany to become part of both NATO and the Warsaw Pact, for Germany to be nonaligned, and even for the Soviet Union to join NATO. Early in the talks, Soviet leaders insisted that a unified Germany never become part of NATO, though they eventually accepted Germany’s right to decide for itself. Similarly, the United States stepped back from Baker’s initial language on not expanding “NATO’s jurisdiction,” which he reportedly used only in the discussion about whether NATO troops would be based in what was then East Germany. In the end, the treaty recognizing German unification that the Two Plus Four powers signed in the summer of 1990 stipulated that only German territorial (non-NATO) forces could be based in East Germany while Soviet forces withdrew. After that, only German forces assigned to NATO could be based there, not foreign NATO forces. The treaty doesn’t mention NATO’s rights and commitments beyond Germany. How did NATO feature in diplomacy between U.S. and post-Soviet Russian leaders? Some experts point to another pivotal moment to help explain the mistrust between Russia and NATO today: the 1993–94 discussions between the Bill Clinton administration and the Russian government led by Boris Yeltsin. By this point, the Warsaw Pact and Soviet Union had collapsed, and the Clinton administration was seeking to craft a new security architecture in Europe that would help foster and fortify the continent’s fledging, post-Soviet democracies, including Russia. Some in the Clinton government, as well as Central European countries such as the Czech Republic and Poland, wanted to move quickly and start expanding NATO’s membership eastward. However, most Clinton officials reportedly did not, being wary that expansion would rankle Russian leaders at a fragile, transitional moment and detract from other U.S. foreign policy objectives, such as nuclear arms control. Instead, Clinton chose to develop a new NATO initiative called the Partnership for Peace (PfP), which would be nonexclusive and open to all former Warsaw Pact members, as well as non-European countries. Seeing this non-membership framework as a compromise of sorts, in October 1993, U.S. diplomats proposed it to Yeltsin, who eagerly accepted. (Just days before, Yeltsin, with the Russian military’s support, forcefully put down an attempt by parliament to oust him.) NATO launched PfP at its annual summit in January 1994, and more than two dozen countries, including Georgia, Russia, and Ukraine, joined in the following months. However, Clinton soon began speaking publicly [PDF] about expanding NATO’s membership, saying in Prague just days after the launch of PfP that “the question is no longer whether NATO will take on new members but when and how.” Yeltsin warned Western leaders at a conference in December of that year that “Europe, even before it has managed to shrug off the legacy of the Cold War, is risking encumbering itself with a cold peace.” Clinton subsequently made efforts to allay Yeltsin’s concerns: pushing off enlargement until after the Russian leader was reelected in 1996, inviting Russia to join the Group of Seven, and establishing a formal, non-adversarial forum for Russia-NATO diplomacy. But analysts say that NATO’s expansion in the ensuing years would leave deep scars on the Russian psyche. “For many Russians, most importantly Vladimir Putin, the 1990s were a decade of humiliation, as the United States imposed its vision of order on Europe (including in Kosovo in 1999) while the Russians could do nothing but stand by and watch,” James Goldgeier, an expert on NATO-Russia relations, wrote for War on the Rocks. The Russian government, led by Putin, continued to be wary of NATO expansion in the 2000s. Putin expressed doubts that the alliance, which grew its fastest in 2004, would be effective in tackling the security challenges of the day, including international terrorism and the conflict in Afghanistan. Many new members, particularly the Baltic countries, saw NATO membership as a shield against their former Soviet rulers. In the years that followed, Putin grew increasingly outspoken in his displeasure at NATO’s inroads into Eastern Europe, saying at a high-profile speech in Munich in 2007 that “it is obvious that NATO expansion does not have any relation with the modernization of the alliance itself or with ensuring security in Europe. On the contrary, it represents a serious provocation that reduces the level of mutual trust.” In the summer following NATO’s 2008 Bucharest Summit, where NATO stated its intent to admit Georgia and Ukraine, Russia invaded the former. Six years later, as Kyiv stepped closer to an economic partnership with another Western bloc, the European Union, Russia invaded Ukraine and annexed Crimea.

## Internal Link

### Ext. – Generic/AT multipolarity

**US hegemonic decline leads to nuclear war and extinction**

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A return to multi-polarity will therefore imply more instability among great powers. But great power rivalry will not be the only source of possible instability for the future multi-polar world. The current distribution of power allows not only great powers but also middle, small powers and non-state actors to have military capabilities that could threaten the global security. In particular, the presence of nuclear weapons constitutes a further reason of concern and implies that the future world could carry not only the potential instability of multi-polarity and great powers rivalry, but also the dangers entailed in nuclear proliferation. The future multi-polar world will thus be potentially more unstable than all the other multi-polar periods history has experienced until nowadays: for the first time in history, the world could become both multi-polar and nuclear. While some scholars argue that nuclear deterrence “could reduce the war-proneness of the coming multi-polar system” (Layne, 44-45), the majority of them consider the presence of nuclear weapons as a source of instability (McNamara; Rosen; Allison). In particular, regional powers and states that are not great powers armed with nuclear capabilities could represent a cause of concern for global security. A nuclear Iran could for example attack – or be attacked – by Israel and easily involve in this war the rest of the world (Sultan; Huntley). A war between Pakistan and India, both nuclear states, **could result in an** **Armageddon** for the whole Asia. An attack from the Democratic Peoples’ Republic of Korea (DPRK) on Japan or South Korea will trigger an immediate reaction from the US and “a nuclear proliferation ‘domino effect’ in East Asia” (Huntley, 725). Terrorists armed with nuclear weapons could wreak havoc and target the heart of the most powerful countries of the world (Bunn and Wier). Iran, Pakistan, DPRK, terrorist groups will rarely be great powers or poles in a future multi-polar world. Nevertheless, the effects of their actions could easily reverberate all over the globe and represent another cause of potential instability. For the first time in history, the stability of the future world will therefore depend not only on the unpredictable effects of the rivalry among great powers, but also on the dangerous potential of middle and small powers and non-state actors armed with nuclear weapons.

### Heg Sustainable

#### Unipolarity is durable—China and Russia’s strategies backfire.

Sears 16 – Nathan A. Sears is a PhD Candidate in International Relations at the University of Toronto, [“*China, Russia, and the Long ‘Unipolar Moment’*”, 4/27/16, <https://thediplomat.com/2016/04/china-russia-and-the-unipolar-moment/>]

In 1990, Charles Krauthammer declared a “[unipolar moment](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/1991-02-01/unipolar-moment),” arguing that “the center of world power is the unchallenged superpower, the United States.” To many observers, the word “moment” (or “[illusion](http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/is3102_pp007-041_layne.pdf)”) seemed an apt description of the durability of U.S. hegemony. International Relations (IR) theory—especially [neorealism](http://www.columbia.edu/itc/sipa/U6800/readings-sm/Waltz_Structural%20Realism.pdf)—predicts that the unbalanced power of a unipolar international system should catalyze the emergence of new great powers and a quick return to balance-of-power politics, in order to limit the power of the preeminent state and restore the system to its “natural” state of multipolarity. Today, [many](https://www.amazon.com/Post-American-World-Fareed-Zakaria/dp/039306235X) [analysts](https://www.amazon.com/No-Ones-World-Council-Relations/dp/0199325227) believe that this neorealist prophecy is coming true and that unipolarity is [coming to an end](http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/is3102_pp007-041_layne.pdf)—even if the “moment” lasted longer than originally expected. The 2008 global financial crisis revealed cracks in the [economic foundations](https://www.amazon.com/The-Rise-Fall-Great-Powers/dp/0679720197) of U.S. hegemony, especially when compared to a number of more spritely “emerging economies.” The United States also shows signs of “[war weariness](http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?lang=en&id=134242)” after over a decade of military escapades in Afghanistan and Iraq—evidenced by its more restrained military policy with respect to political instability in the Middle East (e.g. Libya and Syria), and the transition of its “War on Terror” into a [drone war](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/somalia/2013-06-11/why-drones-work) waged from a Nevada bunker. Most importantly, the long-awaited return to balance-of-power politics has finally arrived: two champions, China and Russia, have emerged to counter-balance the United States and restore proper equilibrium to the international system. Right? Wrong. Despite the “[rise and fall of the unipolar concert](https://www.ciaonet.org/catalog/33648),” China and Russia’s balancing strategies have backfired: they are not leading to multipolarity, but are actually **reinforcing unipolarity**. The reason is that China and Russia’s balancing strategies have focused on regional “revisionism,” which has provoked powerful responses in East Asia and Europe to contain them. This modern version of [containment](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russian-federation/1947-07-01/sources-soviet-conduct) is a diffuse reaction by China and Russia’s threatened neighbors, but it has centered on strengthening the U.S.-led alliance systems in East Asia and Europe in order to maintain the regional status quos. The United States is therefore the main strategic beneficiary of Chinese and Russian balancing, which is likely to lead to a long “unipolar moment.”

### Unipolarity Key

#### unipolarity generates great power peace

Daniel W. Drezner 14, professor of international politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, nonresident senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, 2014, “Bucks for the Bang? Assessing the Economic Returns to Military Primacy,” in A Dangerous World?: Threat Perception and U.S. National Security, ed. Preble and Mueller, p. 201-205

William Wohlforth has made the strongest theoretical argument for that position in the post-Cold War era. He argues, contrary to balance-of-power theorists, that unipolarity is the most stable and peaceful of all possible international systems: "Unipolarity favors the absence of war among the great powers and comparatively low levels of competition for prestige or security for two reasons: the leading state's power advantage removes the problem of hegemonic rivalry from world politics, and it reduces the salience and stakes of balance of power politics among the major states."47 Wohlforth has expanded on that argument in later work, applying social identity theory to explain the durability and peaceful nature of unipolarity.48 Regardless of the causal mechanism, once a military hegemon emerges, all of those international relations theories posit that the world should be much more secure, peaceful, and prosperous. With a preeminent military superpower, other states have less incentive to engage in arms races, brinksmanship, or security rivalries. Consequently, more resources are allocated for economic growth, which creates a virtuous circle of greater growth and greater peace.

The empirical evidence for that causal mechanism is stronger than for the imperial rents argument—although there are significant qualifiers. On one hand, the literature rejects the notion that hegemony is a necessary condition for an open global economy.'1" Indeed, the existence of a liberal hegemon alone is not even necessarily a sufficient condition; supporter states also play a crucial role in the spread of economic openness.50 Although the precise causal mechanisms remain disputed, it is, nevertheless, true that hegemonic eras are strongly correlated with lower trade barriers and greater levels of globalization.51

Furthermore, there is direct evidence that the exercise of military power to protect sea-lanes boosts global trade flows—though the magnitude of the effect is disputed. The presence of naval forces during times of militarized disputes has reduced market expectations of supply disruptions.52 It could be argued that concerns about energy disruptions have been overstated, however; world oil markets have rapidly adjusted to price spikes, even when U.S. military intervention was absent.33 The benefits of hegemonic military power can also be seen when analyzing the naval reaction to the post-2008 surge in Somali piracy. Attacks spiked after the financial crisis and peaked in 2011. Attacks remain at an elevated level after peaking in 2011, but their success rate has fallen markedly. Between 2011 and 2012, the number of successful global piracy attacks declined by 67 percent. The presence of multinational naval patrols—including the U.S. Navy—in the most vulnerable sea-lanes has helped matters. Improved private security on board commercial tankers appears to have helped even more, however.54

The historical evidence further suggests that global and regional systems with a sole superpower have lower levels of arms races and violent conflict. In one empirical review of the literature, Daniel Geller concluded, "The only polar structure that appears to influence conflict probability is unipolarity. Examinations of pre-Westphalian regional systems also support that finding.56 For example, the East Asia region had a clear hegemon in China from the start of the Ming dynasty to the peak of the Manchu dynasty. The result was a period of remarkable political stability. Countries in the region refrained from attacking China and each other; Beijing refrained from converting its hegemony into an expanding empire." Except for moments of Chinese stagnation, war was extremely rare during that period; indeed, it was so rare that Chinese international relations scholars now extol that tianxia era as a model for the future of global order.58

The post-Cold War era offers further evidence for reduced security rivalries and greater stability in a hegemonic world order. The Human Security Report Project has tracked violent conflict in the post-1945 era, and its data are incontrovertible—there has been a marked and secular decline in interstate violence since the end of the Cold War.31' There has been a further decline in other forms of violence, such as civil war and extrajudicial killings. Consistent with the logic of unipolarity, global military expenditures declined dramatically following the end of the Cold War. Global expenditures on defense as a percentage of global output averaged 5.1 percent between 1972 and 1990. Over the past decade—despite the global "war on terror"—defense expenditures as a percentage of global output have averaged only 2.5 percent.60 The peace dividend from the shift to unipolarity has been significant.

Military primacy alone is not the sole cause of that decline. A growing body of work suggests that the post-Cold War decline is merely the continuation of a long-term secular trend toward less violence.61 Still, even scholars advancing that long-term argument acknowledge the role that U.S. military hegemony plays. Joshua Goldstein, for example, attributes part of the decline in violent conflict to "the end of the cold war, and to a unipolar world order with a single superpower to impose its will in places like Kuwait, Serbia, and Afghanistan. . . . [A] unipolar world is inherently more peaceful than the bipolar one where two superpowers fueled rival armies around the world."62

There are two significant caveats, however. The first reservation is that eventually the cost of maintaining global public goods catches up to the sole superpower. Other countries will free-ride off the hegemon, allowing them to grow faster. Technologies diffuse from the hegemonic power to the rest of the world, facilitating catch-up. Chinese analysts have posited that those phenomena are occurring right now, allowing China to outgrow the United States.6"1

The absence of burden sharing is particularly acute on the military side of the public goods equation. Eugene Gholz and Daryl Press argue that the costs of a forward military presence outweigh the gains to the United States from global stability.64 Nuno Monteiro observes that the United States has been at war in 13 of the 22 post-Cold War years—a marked contrast to pre-1989 levels.65 Those military operations might have prevented wider wars from breaking out, but the United States pays the price in blood and treasure. The costs of the Iraq and Afghanistan operations have exacted a significant toll on America's fiscal health—more than $3 trillion to date, with an estimated $4-$6 trillion total for those conflicts.66

The second caveat is whether military power alone is the primary driver for the public goods benefits of unipolarity. Most scholars who attempt to determine the presence of unipolarity do not rely solely on military measures to make that assertion. The literature on measuring state power relies on multiple metrics. Joseph Nye has repeatedly referred to power in world politics as a "three-dimensional chessboard" that comprises military, economic, and "soft power" dimensions. Scholars who debate the persistence of American unipolarity include, at a minimum, both economic and military measures of power.67

Hegemony relies on multiple channels of power. That fact matters because the primary causal mechanism through which unipolarity leads to peace and prosperity is the elimination of uncertainty.68 When hegemony is uncontested and is acknowledged by all major actors, secondary states have less of a need to attempt to balance or to engage in status-seeking behavior. Indeed, even scholars who argue for the persistence of unipolarity acknowledge the importance of preeminence across a variety of power metrics. Wohlforth notes:

The theory suggests that it is not just the aggregate distribution of capabilities that matters for status competition but also the evenness with which key dimensions—such as naval, military, economic, and technological—are distributed. Uneven capability portfolios—when states excel in different relevant material dimensions—make status inconsistency more likely. When an actor possesses some attributes of high status but not others, uncertainty and status inconsistency are likely. The more a lower-ranked actor matches the higher-ranked group in some but not all key material dimensions of status, the more likely it is to conceive an interest in contesting its rank and the more likely the higher-ranked state is to resist."9

If Wohlforth's logic is accurate, then military power alone does not explain the reduction of conflict or security rivalries in the post-Cold War era. It is the combination of military and economic supremacy that leads to peace and prosperity. For unipolarity to yield positive economic benefits through systemic stability, it must be full-spectrum unipolarity.

That observation is problematic for the present and future. As previously noted, a broad-based consensus holds that the military primacy of the United States will remain uncontested for the next decade at least; indeed, even extrapolating current trends, it is far from clear whether Chinese military spending will catch up with the United States in the next generation.70 U.S. economic primacy is another question entirely, however. Multiple private-sector and public-sector estimates assert that China will overtake the United States within the next decade. The International Monetary Fund projects that China's GDP will overtake that of the United States, as measured using purchasing power parity, by the year 2016. At least one estimate posits that China has already overtaken the U.S. economy in purchasing power parity.71 China has been increasingly willing to use its economic power to influence its near abroad, such as withholding rare-earth exports to Japan after a Chinese fishing boat captain was seized in disputed territorial waters.72 It has also attempted to use its economic power to influence U.S. economic policy.73

China's economic rise has reintroduced uncertainty into assessments about the global distribution of power. That perceptual gap is revealed in the different national responses to the April 2012 Pew Global Attitudes survey.74 On the one hand, when asked to name "the world's leading economic power," only Turkey and Mexico had a majority of respondents name the United States. On the other hand, in five of the original G-7 economies, strong majorities or pluralities named China as the world's leading economic power. In other words, an increasing proportion of the developed and developing world thinks that economic primacy has shifted to China. One could argue that elites are immune from mass misperceptions; U.S. policymakers interpret China's rise differently.7. But that does not appear to be the case here. Both public rhetoric and private diplomatic discourse suggest that U.S. policymakers share that view of China's new economic status with the global public.76

That perception is wrong. By any objective assessment, the United States remains the world's largest and most powerful economy; it is also more appropriate to measure economic power by market exchange rates rather than by purchasing power parity.77 Furthermore, there are excellent reasons to doubt the straight-line extrapolation of China's economic ascent.78 Still, according to Wohlforth's logic, the shift in perceptions alone should lead to increases in status-seeking behavior by China. And, indeed, that argument parsimoniously explains the Sino-American relationship since the start of 2009.7P In the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, China challenged the security status quo. In early 2009, Chinese ships engaged in multiple skirmishes with U.S. surveillance vessels in an effort to hinder American naval intelligence-gathering efforts.80 Beijing responded angrily and forcefully to the awarding of the 2010 Nobel Peace Prize to activist Liu Xiaobo. China reacted to routine U.S. arms sales to Taiwan with extremely hostile rhetoric and threats to sanction U.S. firms. China refused to condemn North Korea for sinking the South Korean ship Cheonmi, frustrating Japan and South Korea. In response to pushback from the United States and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations on the South China Sea at the 2010 ASEAN Regional Forum, Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi responded by lecturing other participants that "China is a big country and other countries are small countries, and that's just a fact."81

### No Alt to Heg

#### Decline causes war—Thucydides’ trap

Allison 15 – Graham Allison is a former director of the Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and a former U.S. assistant secretary of defense for policy and plans, [“*The Thucydides Trap: Are the U.S. and China Headed for War?*”, 2015, <https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/09/united-states-china-war-thucydides-trap/406756/>]

And yet 100 years on, World War I offers a sobering reminder of man’s capacity for folly. When we say that war is “inconceivable,” is this a statement about what is possible in the world—or only about what our limited minds can conceive? In 1914, few could imagine slaughter on a scale that demanded a new category: world war. When the war ended four years later, Europe lay in ruins: the kaiser gone, the Austro-Hungarian empire dissolved, the Russian tsar overthrown by the Bolsheviks, France bled for a generation, and England shorn of its youth and treasure. A millennium in which Europe had been the political center of the world came to a crashing halt. The defining question about global order for this generation is whether China and the United States can escape Thucydides’s Trap. The Greek historian’s metaphor reminds us of the attendant dangers when a rising power rivals a ruling power—as Athens challenged Sparta in ancient Greece, or as Germany did Britain a century ago. Most such contests have ended badly, often for both nations, a team of mine at the Harvard Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs has concluded after analyzing the historical record. In 12 of 16 cases over the past 500 years, the result was war. When the parties avoided war, it required huge, painful adjustments in attitudes and actions on the part of not just the challenger but also the challenged. Based on the current trajectory, war between the United States and China in the decades ahead is not just possible, but much more likely than recognized at the moment. Indeed, judging by the historical record, war is more likely than not. Moreover, current underestimations and misapprehensions of the hazards inherent in the U.S.-China relationship contribute greatly to those hazards. A risk associated with Thucydides’s Trap is that business as usual—not just an unexpected, extraordinary event—can trigger large-scale conflict. When a rising power is threatening to displace a ruling power, standard crises that would otherwise be contained, like the assassination of an archduke in 1914, can initiate a cascade of reactions that, in turn, produce outcomes none of the parties would otherwise have chosen.

## Impact

### Ext/Turns Case – Conflict/Generic

**Heg decline triggers spheres-of-influence leading to insecurity and great power wars – turns the aff because they make conflict inevitable**

**Twining 17** – Daniel Twining is director of the Asia Program at The German Marshall Fund of the United States, based in Washington, DC, MPhil & PhD degrees from Oxford University, [“*Abandoning the Liberal International Order for a Spheres-of-Influence World is a Trap for America…*," Medium, 3-21-2017, https://medium.com/out-of-order/abandoning-the-liberal-international-order-for-a-spheres-of-influence-world-is-a-trap-for-america-7bfcdbb83df4]RA

The liberal world order is **under assault**. Polls suggest an American ambivalence about upholding the rules-based global system. Populists are besieging governing elites in the West while Russia works strategically to destabilize European and American governments through propaganda and proxies. A rising China wants to create a global system that is not U.S.-centric, one in which smaller powers defer to bigger ones and norms of democracy and rule of law do not prevail. Meanwhile, the U.S. alliance system looks adrift while competitors in China and Russia appear to be on the march. If it holds, this trend could produce a **spheres-of-influence world** — which many, including the current presidents of the United States, China, and Russia, find **intuitively attractive**. But were such an order to replace one based on global integration and American leadership in the geopolitical cockpits of Europe and Asia, it would only engender **insecurity** and **conflict**. In a spheres-of-influence world, great powers order their regions. The United States would go back to a “Monroe Doctrine” version of grand strategy; Russia would dominate the former Soviet space; China would govern East Asia, and India South Asia. The problem with this kind of order, however, is several-fold. Too many **spheres overlap** in ways that would **generate conflict** rather than clean lines of responsibility. Japan would oppose Chinese suzerainty in East Asia, including by **developing nuclear weapons**; India and China would **compete vigorously** in Southeast Asia; Russia and China would **contest the resources** and loyalties of Central Asia; Europe and Russia would clash over primacy of Central and Eastern Europe. The Middle East would be an even more likely arena for **hot war** between Saudi Arabia and Iran, and Turkey would contest regions also claimed by Russia, Europe, and possibly China. Russia, like the Soviet Empire before it, would keep pushing west until it met enough hard power to stop it. A spheres of influence world would also **sharpen great power competition** outside of each region. Regional hegemony is a **springboard** for global contestation. China would be more likely to challenge the United States out-of-area if it had subdued **strategic competition** in its own region. Russia, like the Soviet Empire before it, would keep pushing west until it met enough hard power to stop it. (The fact that Russian troops marched through Paris during the Napoleonic Wars demonstrates that the limits of Russian power need not be confined to the former Warsaw Pact). American leaders have long understood that a “Fortress America” approach is a source of national insecurity. Franklin Roosevelt made this case in a series of “fireside chats” in the run-up to America’s participation in World War II — even before the advent of the far more sophisticated power-projection technologies that exist today. Roosevelt and his generals well understood that the United States could not be safe if hostile powers controlled Europe and Asia, despite the wide oceans separating North America from both theaters. A spheres-of-influence world would also **crack up** the integrated global economy that underlies the miracle in human welfare that has lifted billions out of poverty in past decades. It would replicate the **exclusive economic blocs** of the 1930s, including an East Asia “co-prosperity sphere,” seeding conflict and undercutting prosperity. A real-world and real-time example of what happens when American power retreats in an effort to encourage regional powers to solve their own problems is the mess in Syria. It has produced the greatest refugee crisis since 1945 — a stain on the consciousness of human civilization — and has led many to conclude that the Middle Eastern order of states dating to the end of World War 1 is collapsing. President Obama pursued an express policy of retracting American military power from the Middle East, including withdrawing all troops from Iraq and refusing to intervene militarily when President Assad used chemical weapons against his own people, despite a red-line injunction from the United States not to do so. Obama and his White House political advisors believed that American withdrawal from the Arab Middle East (if not from the ironclad U.S. commitment to Israel) would lead a new balance of power to form, one policed by regional powers rather than by America. This flawed, amoral, and un-strategic approach has led to a series of hot wars— in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen — the collapse of Arab allies’ confidence in the United States as an ally, as well as an **intensified cold war** with Iran. Despite the international agreement freezing Iran’s nuclear program, Iran’s support for terrorism and hostile insurgencies targeting American allies across its region actually intensified during this period. A spheres-of-influence world leaves weaker states to become the victims of stronger or more aggressive ones, and it seeds insecurity by removing the reassuring variable of American military guarantees and presence This experience underlines a core problem with a spheres-of-influence world. It leaves weaker states to become the victims of stronger or more aggressive ones, and it seeds insecurity by removing the reassuring variable of American military guarantees and presence. It **emboldens American adversaries** and leads American allies to take self-help measures that themselves may **undercut** American security interests. A spheres-of-influence world would also produce contestation of the open global commons that are the basis for the **unprecedented prosperity** produced by the liberal international economic order. Should the Indian and Pacific Oceans, or the Arctic and Mediterranean Seas, become arenas of great-power conflict (like the South China Sea already has thanks to China’s militarization and unilateral assertion of sovereignty over it) as leading states seek to incorporate them into their privileged zones of control, economic globalization would **collapse**, harming the economies of every major power. The United States, because of its sheer power and resource base as well as its relative geographical isolation, might do OK in a spheres-of-influence world. Most of America’s friends and allies would not. Their weakening and insecurity would in turn render the United States weaker and more insecure — since U.S. allies are **force-multipliers** for American hard and soft power, and since norms like freedom of the global commons are in fact underwritten by that power. More broadly, such a transition would also likely lead to the kind of **hot wars** that **reorder the international balance of power**, including by **incentivizing aggressive states to push out and assert regional dominion**, knowing that America does not have the will or interest to oppose them. The fact that U.S. competitors such as Russia, China, and Iran — all of whom want to weaken the American-led world order — would welcome a spheres-of-influence world is another reason for Americans to oppose it. It would also be ironic if the United States were to back away from its historic commitment to shaping a world that is an idealized vision of America itself — one ruled by laws, norms, institutions, markets, and peaceful settlement of disputes.

### Heg Solves Conflict

#### Wars only escalate in a multipolar world.

Nilsson 21 – Marcon Nilsson is an Associate Professor of political science at the School of Education and Communication at Jonkoping University, [*“The Magnitude of Warfare Revisited—System Polarity and War Duration”*, 2021 <https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1885&context=jss>, acc 7/18/21]

21 Accordingly, this article presents the first theoretical discussion of the connection between polarity and war duration. Contrary to Haas and Levy, it argues that multipolarity is more likely to be associated with increasing war duration. The argument is based on a two-stage process derived from the realist and rational-choice perspectives. The first stage determines what types of wars are likely to emerge given different forms of systemic polarity, while the second stage determines how fast a bargaining space potentially emerges to resolve these conflicts. In the first stage, systemic polarity has an impact on what types of wars are likely to erupt. As Monteiro pointed out, unipolarity often produces conflict “between the unipole and recalcitrant minor powers.” 22 Such a selection bias is likely to create an imbalance in the belligerents’ military capabilities, which makes it easy for the unipole to defeat the minor power. Examples of such asymmetric confrontations that give rise to short wars include the Kuwait War of 1991 and the Iraq War of 2003. This selection bias is unlikely to be as great in bipolarity because of the strict alliance structures or spheres of interest that the two poles’ conflicting interests can create. For example, an attack on Iraq and the Kuwait War became possible only after the weakening of the Soviet Union led to a foreign policy change in Moscow and ultimately to the end of the Cold War. However, with more poles, external balancing by means of alliances becomes more flexible as the number of available alliance partners increases. As Snyder argued, “in a multipolar system, who allies with whom is structurally indeterminate…each state is logically eligible to be either friend or enemy of any other state.” 23 Indeed, if unipolarity increasingly brings asymmetric conflicts, the role of a balancer becomes more prominent in multipolarity, which creates symmetric wars. Especially after the Napoleonic wars, and even earlier, Great Britain played the role of a balancer within the European multipolar system and could throw its support behind one side at one time, and behind another side at another time. 24 Such balancing in multipolarity increases war duration by creating symmetric conflicts in which the warring parties are more equal in power and find it difficult to quickly defeat each other. While asymmetric conflicts can end without long negotiations, as the stronger side can quickly override the weaker side, symmetric conflicts more often involve the process of creating a bargaining space, that is, finding a mutually acceptable negotiated solution. Polarity can affect the duration of this process, as the amount of information that the systemic structure provides about the expected outcome of a war varies. Mearsheimer argued that the international state system “is peaceful when it is obvious that the costs and risk of going to war are high, and the benefits of going to war are low” and that the distribution of power between states “is at the heart of this incentive structure.” 25 Fearon further developed this rational-choice perspective, claiming that as fighting is costly and risky, “rational states should have incentives to locate negotiated settlements that all would prefer to the gamble of war.” 26 His answer to this puzzle of why rational states start wars relies on the widespread uncertainty in anarchy: Rational state leaders start wars when they miscalculate due to both a lack of information and disagreement about relative power.

### Turns Disease

#### NATO causes famine and disease – North Africa proves, fueling the war

Muhawesh 17 – Mnar Muhawesh is the founder, CEO, and editor in Chief of MintPress News, [“*NATO’s ‘War On Terror’ Leaves Famine, Disease in its Wake in Africa,”* 8/1/2017, Mint Press News <https://www.mintpressnews.com/natos-war-terror-leaves-famine-disease-wake-africa/230366/>]

Despite living in a time where there is a global surplus of food, millions of people around the world are still suffering from famine. If you follow mainstream media coverage about these humanitarian disasters, they’re most likely presented through the lens of climate change, high food prices and taxes. But in places like Yemen, South Sudan, the Lake Chad basin of West Africa and Somalia, where images of skeletal children have become commonplace several countries in Africa and the Middle East, it is perhaps no coincidence that the epidemic of famine is directly linked to modern-day colonialism and imperialism led by the U.S. It is in this part of the world where resource exploitation, the war on terror, military occupation and destabilization combine to create one of the most dire humanitarian crises of the modern era. While environmental factors do play a role, policies set by powerful oil companies and state actors have created and reinforced the present situation. In Somalia, where the U.S. has been waging a covert drone war, people have become accustomed to famine. In a span of just one year, between 2011 and 2012, over 260,000 people died, half of them under the age of 5, marking the worst famine in the last 25 years. According to data from Somalia’s Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit (FSNAU), 4.6 percent of the total population and 10 percent of children under 5 died in southern and central Somalia alone. The organization Somalia’s Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit (FSNAU) found that “the result was widespread livestock deaths, the smallest cereal harvest since the 1991-94 civil war, and a major drop in labor demand, which reduced household income.” Compounding environmental burdens were the wider impacts of British colonialism in Somalia, as well as U.S. militarism. While the United States plundered Somalia for resources by way of mineral excavation and so-called oil exploration, past and present administrations have also applied their full military might. In 1993, during the Clinton presidency, images of famine and war were used to convince Americans that U.S. military efforts were necessary. “We went [to Somalia] because only the United States could help stop one of the great human tragedies of this time,” Clinton said. “In a sense, we came to Somalia to rescue innocent people in a burning house.” What Bill Clinton didn’t disclose was that the United States was one of the reasons why the house was on fire to begin with, and military efforts would not help to put out the flames.

# Affirmative Answers

## Uniqueness

### Non-Unique – AI/Cyber/Biotech

#### Non-unique: 15 years of plans and increasing cooperation in tech sectors should have triggered the impact

Maigre 4/6/22 - Merle Maigre is the senior cybersecurity expert at e-Governance Academy in Estonia. In 2017–2018, she served as director of the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Center of Excellence (CCDCOE)in Tallinn; in 2012–2017 as the security policy adviser to Estonian Presidents Kersti Kaljulaid and Thoomas Hendrik Ilves, [“*NATO’s Role in Global Cyber Security,*" GMFUS, 4-6-2022, https://www.gmfus.org/news/natos-role-global-cyber-security]RA

The Alliance’s Achievements in Cyber So Far Over the past fifteen years, NATO’s approach to cyber issues has evolved from addressing cyber defense in primarily technical terms to viewing it as essential to the alliance’s strategic context. The need to “strengthen capabilities and to defend against cyberattacks” was first acknowledged by allied leaders at their 2002 summit meetings in Prague.1919NATO, Prague Summit Declaration, November 21, 2002. However, after Estonia’s digital infrastructure was hit by cyberattacks in 2007, NATO admitted that a confrontation between states might involve a cyber dimension, and at the Bucharest Summit in 2008 adopted its first cyber-defense policy. The 2008 conflict between Russia and Georgia demonstrated that cyberattacks have the potential to become a major component of conventional warfare. In parallel, the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE) was accredited as a NATO Centre of Excellence in 2008. Since then, it has grown into a strong, international knowledge hub for cyber defense, bringing together top cyber experts across fields—government, military, industry, and academia—from 29 nations for interdisciplinary research, training, and exercises in four focus areas: technology, strategy, operations, and law. The center connects a trusted community of like-minded states who wish to share information and expertise in cyber security. CCDCOE’s best-known projects are Locked Shields, one of the world’s largest and most comprehensive cyber-defense exercises; the annual cyber conference CyCon; and the Tallinn Manual, which looks at cyber operations within the context of international law. At the 2012 NATO summit in Chicago, allied leaders reaffirmed their commitment to improving the alliance’s cyber defenses by bringing all of NATO’s networks under centralized protection. At the 2014 Wales summit, NATO recognized that international law applies in cyberspace and declared that, since the impact of a cyberattack could be as harmful to modern societies as a conventional attack, cyber defense is a part of NATO’s collective defense mandate. Thus, NATO acknowledged that cyberspace is an operational domain for potential adversaries. NATO’s 2016 Warsaw summit resulted in a declaration recognizing that cyberspace has evolved into a separate domain of military operations, in which the alliance “must defend itself as effectively as it does in the air, on land, and at sea.” The subsequent roadmap included the drafting of a NATO cyber operations doctrine, as well as the development of military cyber capabilities. In January 2020, the Allied Joint Doctrine for Cyberspace Operations was published “to plan, execute, and assess cyberspace operations in the context of allied joint operations.”2020NATO, Allied Joint Doctrine for Cyberspace Operations, January 2020. At the Warsaw summit, NATO heads of state and government signed a Cyber Defence Pledge, in which they outlined how nations protect their cyber networks. NATO developed detailed questionnaires and metrics related to the pledge and uses them to regularly report on how each nation delivers on its cyber commitments. Allies also discussed how to strengthen the cyber component of NATO’s Command Structure. The Command Structure is the military backbone of the alliance; it is what makes NATO unique. NATO has continuously adapted its Command Structure over the past decades to take account of a changing security environment. In February 2018, NATO defense ministers established the Cyberspace Operations Centre (CyOC) as part of NATO’s SHAPE Command Structure, with the aim of integrating the allies’ cyber capabilities into NATO military-operations planning. The “eyes and ears” of the respective commanders in cyberspace, CyOC aims at enhancing situational awareness in cyberspace and helping integrate cyber into NATO’s planning and operations at all levels. CyOC is the first cyber-dedicated entity within the Command Structure. The “eyes and ears” of the respective commanders in cyberspace, CyOC aims at enhancing situational awareness in cyberspace and helping integrate cyber into NATO’s planning and operations at all levels. While CyOC operates within the existing NATO frameworks, its main aim is to equip the Supreme Allied Commander Europe with any necessary tools to operate in cyberspace.2121Wiesław Goździewicz, “Sovereign Cyber Effects Provided Voluntarily by Allies (SCEPVA),” Cyber Defense, November 11, 2019. As CyOC moves toward initial then final operating capacity, it will be critical that it is staffed with sufficient—and sufficiently expert—personnel.2222NATO, NATO's Role in Cyberspace, February 19, 2019. During NATO’s July 2018 summit, the allies affirmed, for the first time, their determination “to employ the full range of capabilities, including cyber, to deter, defend against, and counter the full spectrum of cyber threats,” shifting away from securing cyberspace with defensive measures only. The “full range” of cyber capabilities means that both defensive and offensive capabilities can be deployed by NATO, in line with its defensive mandate and in accordance with international law. As NATO will not develop or acquire any offensive capabilities, it will rely, like in other operational domains, on the voluntary contributions of allies. In late 2020, a team of experts appointed by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg and chaired by Thomas de Maiziere of Germany and Wes Mitchell of the United States gave their recommendations on how NATO could enhance its political role and better coordinate military tasks and political strategies among its members. In 2021, Stoltenberg’s NATO 2030 included eight of those recommendations to guide the revision of NATO’s Strategic Concept.23

#### The link is not unique or NATO’s quantum and DIANA plans should have caused the impact – affects entire emerging tech sector

Naujokaityte and Burke 22 - Goda Naujokaitytė and Fintan Burke are frequent contributors to Science|Business and emerging technology analysts, [*“NATO to launch €1B fund for high tech start-ups in dual use technologies,"* Science|Business, 4/1/2022, https://sciencebusiness.net/news/nato-launch-eu1b-fund-high-tech-start-ups-dual-use-technologies]RA

NATO has launched a new research programme called DIANA to bring industry, start-up companies and academia together to research new dual-use technologies that address both societal problems and national security issues. The Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA) is focusing on technologies such as artificial intelligence, big data processing, quantum-enabled technologies, autonomy, biotechnology, novel materials and space. In its initial stage, DIANA will run a network of more than 10 accelerator sites and over 50 test centres in innovation hubs across NATO alliance countries. The aim is to give innovators the means to bring dual use technologies closer to the market. No budget for the network has been announced yet, but pilot activities will start as early as summer 2023, with the aim of being fully up and running in 2025. There is also a complementary €1 billion venture capital fund for early stage start-ups. Tomas Jermalavičius, head of studies at the Estonia-based think tank International Centre for Defence and Security (ICDS), says this marks a notable shift in the alliance’s stance on innovation. “It‘s almost a revolutionary step. Creating this NATO structure shows flexibility and ability to take advantage of all the capacities that exist in the private sector, where innovations are born,“ he said. Until this point, the alliance has only supported applied research through the Collaboration Support Office in Paris, leaving a gap in support for translating technologies to the market. The bid to spruce up its innovation capabilities predates the Russian invasion and was agreed on at the 2021 NATO Summit in Brussels. The fleshed out plans for DIANA were published last week, following a meeting of NATO defence ministers. This is not the only military research announcement to pop up in the past weeks, with the US, Australia and UK setting out the AUKUS Quantum arrangement which eyes expanded quantum, hypersonic and other joint weapons research. Technology dominance The nine technologies NATO wants to advance are AI; data and computing; autonomy; quantum-enabled technologies; biotechnology and human enhancements; hypersonic technologies; space; novel materials and manufacturing; and energy and propulsion. These are all strategic for NATO if it is to maintain technological dominance. Losing grip was one of the drivers for DIANA, Jermalavičius says. The bid for technology dominance over countries like China and Russia is also a driver for DIANA‘s goal of shortening the technology development cycle, especially when it comes to software, AI and quantum. “It’s a long horizon, but capabilities do not appear overnight,” said Jermalavičius. The plan is for DIANA to launch challenge calls for non-dilutive financing that does not require start-ups to give up equity or ownership in their company. Mentoring, technology testing and potential contract opportunities will be available to go hand in hand with the financing. This will be delivered through network of innovation hubs across the alliance. One such site is the Big Data for Smart Society Institute (GATE) based in Bulgaria. An official at GATE said that the institute’s work in DIANA will focus on digital health, intra governmental communications and using data in industry and city infrastructure. One focus will be on disinformation research. However the official noted DIANA is still in its early stages. Talks are ongoing with NATO to flesh out exactly how cooperation will work between research centres, the national government, and the NATO secretariat. The approved charter stipulates some details, though others are still to be discussed, for example the affiliated centres of the network and the points of contact between them. The official said that many of these are likely to be finalised at a meeting at the end of June. Host institutions Last week, the UK and Estonia were announced as the hosts of the European part of DIANA. The Estonian accelerator will be based in Tallinn, while Imperial College London will host the UK headquarters at its Translation & Innovation Hub, from where the Institute for Security Science and Technology will lead Imperial’s work in DIANA. The UK headquarters is also supported by the UK Defence and Security Accelerator (DASA), which funds projects that have uses in defence and security. The accelerator works with major defence companies and the US Department of Defence’s Tri-Service Office. The UK and Estonian accelerators are to support start-ups working on dual-use technologies with funding and expertise. Researchers will also be able to use facilities such as the Defence BattleLab in Dorset, UK, a test centre that has air and sea ranges to test defence equipment. A DASA representative said research at the UK headquarters is likely to focus first on AI and autonomy, which is a focus of DIANA as a whole. Over time the UK site could to expand into biotechnology and materials. Nine accelerators are foreseen in Portugal, UK, Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, Italy, Turkey, Greece, and Czech Republic. Most European NATO members will host test sites, of which there will be 47 in total, except for France, Lithuania, and five Balkan countries, Slovenia, Croatia, Albania, Montenegro and North Macedonia. Quantum in Denmark Denmark is leading DIANA’s quantum bid, with an accelerator to be located at the Niels Bohr Institute at Copenhagen University. The Technical University of Denmark, Aarhus University and the Danish National Metrology Institute will also provide test centres and manufacturing facilities. For now, the goal is to augment the overall quantum capacities in the alliance, rather than focus on dual-use technologies. “The main mission here is to augment the entire NATO alliance within quantum technology,” said Jan Westenkær Thomsen, head of the Niels Bohr Institute. Denmark has been one of the leaders in quantum physics since the 1920s, when Bohr and his colleague Max Planck put forward the quantum theory. This deep expertise in quantum has resulted in many spin out companies, Thomsen noted. In the coming months, Thomsen and his colleagues will be hashing out the details of the centre with NATO. One of the universities’ goals is to use the know how of Denmark’s biotechnology accelerator at the Copenhagen Bio Science Park to reinforce the quantum counterpart. There will also be cooperation with other DIANA centres. “This was already an integral part. I’m hoping this will be a main theme in negotiations with NATO,” said Thomsen. Thomsen hopes the DIANA project will start delivering in five to ten years time, and he is positive about its potential. “It’s of course difficult to say at this stage, but it’s a great idea to pull resources from the whole NATO alliance together,” he said. “I’m pretty sure this will really change something for the better.” Multi-sovereign venture capital Before DIANA is up and running, the €1 billion Innovation Fund is expected to start making awards to start-ups developing dual-use technologies at the beginning of next year. NATO says the fund will be, “the world’s first multi-sovereign venture capital fund”. It will be a patient investor, giving companies uninterrupted support for 15 years to scale up innovations. NATO also intends to invest in the funds of venture capital firms that are already investing in technologies the alliance wants to promote.

## Link

### No Link – generic/no burden sharing

#### Their burden sharing arguments are wrong – all countries benefit from NATO stability

Kupochan 19 – Charles Kupochan is Professor of International Affairs at Georgetown University and a Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, [*"NATO Is Thriving in Spite of Trump,"* Mar 20, 2019, Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2019-03-20/nato-thriving-spite-trump]

Trump’s diatribes are not the only cause of the unease. A broadening chorus of realist strategists claims that the United States is overdue for a major strategic retrenchment and that it is past time for Europe to tend its own garden. Even staunch defenders of NATO express doubts about its future. Some worry that the growing U.S. preoccupation with East Asia will lure the United States away from its Atlantic calling and generate transatlantic tensions over how to deal with the rise of China. Others fear that democratic backsliding among members is compromising the alliance’s values-based solidarity. Close NATO watchers are concerned that EU efforts to more deeply integrate European foreign and defense policy could ultimately weaken the Atlantic link. And debate rages on both sides of the Atlantic as to whether NATO enlargement has enhanced or eroded European stability and whether to continue expansion despite the costs to the West’s relationship with Russia. These worries are unwarranted: NATO at 70 is actually in remarkably good shape. Yes, European allies have been laggards on defense spending, and some members—Hungary, Poland, and Turkey in particular—have tarnished democratic credentials. But NATO has demonstrated an impressive ability to adapt to the changing geopolitical environment since the Cold War’s end, ensuring that the United States and Europe remain each other’s go-to partners. The alliance opened its doors to the new democracies that emerged from the former Soviet bloc, helping to anchor security and democracy in a wider Europe. Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2014, members have taken important steps to strengthen deterrence against the Kremlin’s adventurism. NATO has struck partnerships across the globe and carried out ambitious missions well beyond the territory of member states—most notably in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Libya. All the while, the alliance has retooled to address new hazards such as cyberthreats, terrorism, hybrid warfare, and migration. Precisely because NATO has been so nimble and effective, it enjoys strong political support on both sides of the Atlantic, leaving Trump virtually alone as a vociferous critic.

### No Link –Russia

#### Political competition and perceived anti-Russian sentiment drives Russian diplomacy, NATO’s not key

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This assumption contradicts events of recent months and the historical record. While Vladimir Putin has claimed that his goal is keeping Ukraine out of NATO, he also insisted that he was just conducting military exercises. Instead, he is invading Ukraine again. He likewise insisted in 2014 that he wasn’t capturing Crimea, despite the presence of his unidentified “Little Green Men” and his subsequent annexation of the peninsula, or that he was not fighting in Ukraine’s Donbas area in the east all these years, despite all evidence to the contrary. There is no reason to take Putin at his word. His Feb. 21 diatribe conferring Russian recognition of independence for the two eastern Ukrainian regions of Donetsk and Luhansk and his order for Russian troops to move in as ostensible “peacekeepers” shows clearly his disdain for diplomatic resolutions. Moreover, this is not even primarily about NATO. NATO’s eastward expansion may have played a role in straining the relationship between Russia and the West, but mainly because, for Russia, seeing former satellites eagerly abandon it for the greener pastures of Euro-Atlantic integration stung. However, Putin’s rhetoric and actions over almost two decades reveal that his goals extend beyond imposing neutrality on Ukraine or even staving off further NATO expansion. The larger objective is to re-establish Russian political and cultural dominance over a nation that Putin sees as one with Russia, and then follow up by undoing the European rules-based order and security architecture established in the aftermath of World War II. Given these goals, Ukrainian neutrality is a woefully insufficient concession for Putin. If Russia’s main concern had been NATO enlargement, it would have reacted with rhetoric and/or hostile actions in its neighborhood after each step in the NATO expansion process. The largest wave of NATO’s eastward expansion took place in March 2004, when seven Eastern European countries joined, including the formerly Soviet Baltic states. Russia “grumbled,” as the New York Times put it then, by adopting a Duma resolution criticizing the expansion, but no hostile and sustained rhetoric followed about NATO enlargement as a Western plot against Russian interests. In 1997, Ukraine’s President Leonid Kuchma signed the Charter on a Distinctive Partnership between NATO and Ukraine, and in 2002, he publicly declared Ukraine’s interest in NATO membership, to little opposition from Russia. The NATO membership issue has ebbed-and-flowed within Ukraine, as presidents alternated in power who were either more pro-Western or more pro-Russian. Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko advocated during his 2005-2010 tenure for Ukraine to be granted a NATO membership action plan (MAP), a program of preparation for entry into the alliance, while successor President Viktor Yanukovych backed away from the idea after 2010. Russia did not respond to any of these pro-NATO moves by Ukrainian presidents with military threats and aggression. Russia knows further NATO expansion to the east is highly improbable because certain alliance members have long balked at the prospect, making the required consensus impossible to attain. Russia also has an authoritarian ally within NATO, Hungary’s Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, who can help stave off any future consensus, and other NATO members such as Germany and France do not support membership for Ukraine, Georgia, or other post-Soviet states. The security guarantee that Russia demands now goes much further than membership issues. Putin’s Feb. 21 speech shows he perceives any security cooperation between Ukraine and NATO, from modernization of airports to training exercises, as a “knife to [Russia’s] throat.” Even after a new pro-Western government in Ukraine that followed the 2014 incursions again embraced the goal of NATO membership and Ukrainian public support for such a move rose, Ukraine’s accession was that much more unlikely because of the alliance’s reluctance to embrace new members embroiled in territorial disputes. If Putin’s main concern now was to keep Ukraine out of NATO, he had nothing to fear in 2014, when he first invaded Ukraine and had even less to fear in 2021, when he embarked on the current escalation. If Not NATO, What is Putin’s Escalation About? A longer look at Putin’s two decades in power shows that, above all, he fears political competition in the neighborhood. When mass protests over rigged elections swept across the post-Soviet space in 2003-2005, toppling the Georgian and Kyrgyz incumbents and preventing the pro-Russian candidate from taking office in Ukraine, the Kremlin exploded with fiery rhetoric about Western-backed anti-Russian plots. A recent book on conspiracy theories in the Russian media since 1995 shows that the 2003-2005 “color revolutions” were the top source of conspiratorial, anti-Western narratives. All 1997-2002 NATO enlargement summits are lower in the ranking of analyzed events. American realists have long argued that Russia was too weak to strike back with actions, but evidence shows that the Kremlin did not react with strong rhetoric either. Instead of decrying NATO expansion, Russia prioritized complaints about Western political “meddling” in its neighboring countries, by which Russia meant U.S. and European support for domestic democratization drives. In 2014, when Russia annexed Crimea and instigated an armed insurgency in eastern Ukraine, NATO membership for Ukraine hadn’t even been on the agenda. Rather, the spark for Russia was the ouster of the increasingly authoritarian pro-Russian President Yanukovych, following months of street protests. Those “Euromaidan” protests had erupted after Yanukovych backpeddled, following pressure and bribery from Russia, from signing a trade agreement with the European Union. So why was 2014 so concerning to Russia that it chose to invade? Given Putin’s rhetoric about Euromaidan as a Western-backed plot, the most obvious conclusion is that he was afraid that regime change and democratization in Ukraine might reach – – or at least set an example for — Russian society and destabilize Putin’s increasingly consolidated authoritarianism. Research on the color revolutions and on the third wave of democratization in the region shows that this neighborhood effect was real. In other words, it’s not NATO at its doorsteps that’s so concerning to the Kremlin, but political competition, because it threatens authoritarian stability and introduces prospects of democratization.

### No link – China

#### China’s motivations are too dissimilar for comparison – NATO is not its threat

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China Is Not Russia Russia under Putin has repeatedly dispatched its armed forces for combat missions overseas to a range of countries, including Georgia, Syria and Ukraine, as well as conducted major military interventions against other states, most recently Kazakhstan (albeit at the invitation of that country’s president). Moscow has also actively supported armed groups and militias in some of these same countries and others. Although China has also been active and assertive in the use of its armed forces beyond its borders in recent years, Beijing has eschewed large-scale combat operations. Around its periphery, China has engaged in provocations, confrontations and even violent clashes. But China, unlike Russia, has refrained from massive interventions, invasions or occupations of other countries since it invaded Vietnam in 1979. China’s largest deployments of troops overseas in the post-Cold War era have been on U.N. Peacekeeping missions. Whereas Russia has more than 20 military installations beyond its borders, to date, China has only one official military base on foreign soil — in Djibouti (established in 2017) — and a handful of other facilities it does not formally acknowledge. Of course, Beijing has a history of using its potent armed forces and muscular coercive apparatus within China’s borders to repress vigorously peaceful protesters, political dissidents and disaffected ethnic minority peoples. The locations of these operations include Beijing, Tibet and Xinjiang, as well as Hong Kong. China has also not hesitated to employ armed force and a wide array of coercive instruments around its periphery. This includes building roads and bunkers in remote frontier areas of the high Himalayas along its contested border with India and constructing artificial islands and military installations in disputed waters of the South China Sea. In recent years, China’s armed forces have also engaged in deadly clashes and violent confrontations with Indian army units along the disputed Line of Actual Control and harassed and rammed the fishing boats and coast guard vessels of Vietnam, the Philippines and other countries. Putin appears to relish projecting the image of a strongman who is routinely willing to thumb his nose at the rest of the world. By contrast, Xi — at least to date — has mainly sought to cultivate a statesmanlike image on the global stage. At times he has given speeches attempting to cast China as a more responsible, less meddlesome and values-free version of the United States. And Xi has invested a lot of time and resources in promoting a set of high-profile international efforts intended to demonstrate that China is a constructive and proactive great power. Employing positive rhetoric touting “win-win” solutions and aspirations to build a “community with a shared future for mankind,” China under Xi’s leadership has launched ambitious efforts such as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. Putin, by contrast, has made no real effort to offer an alternative to U.S. global leadership beyond delivering vague grandiose declarations (often in tandem with Xi) and has offered the world little in the way of economic stimulus beyond the prospect of more energy exports and hype about the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). Despite consisting of only a handful of Soviet successor states, the EAEU is touted as Russia’s answer to China’s BRI. In terms of geostrategic activism, Russia’s major multilateralist initiatives have tended to involve China. These include the establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in 2001 and the formation of the BRICS grouping in 2010. The former is a security community with a Central Asian focus consisting of Russia, China and four Central and two South Asian states. The latter is a loose association of some of the world’s largest “emerging economies”: Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. However, Moscow’s most significant geostrategic maneuver under Putin has been to strengthen Russia’s strategic partnership with China. Both Beijing and Moscow insist that their relationship is not an alliance and their 2001 treaty of friendship — which was renewed in 2021 — does not commit either signatory to come to the defense of the other in case of military conflict. Yet, the Sino-Russian relationship is a clearly consequential alignment that has grown closer in recent years, particularly as their respective relationships with the United States have deteriorated. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has put China in a very uncomfortable position: Beijing does not want to antagonize Moscow but neither does it want to damage its relations with Washington and European capitals. Consequently, China has equivocated in its statements and actions. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi has called for peace but has stopped short of condemning Russia or calling upon Moscow to withdraw its military. The lengthy joint statement of February 4, 2022, issued by Putin and Xi during the Russian leader’s visit to Beijing on the eve of the Winter Olympics, makes no mention at all of Ukraine — and China has pointedly abstained on all U.N. Security Council resolutions related to Russia’s invasion. Xi appears to have asked Putin to delay any military action against Ukraine until after the Olympics. Russia’s invasion poses other difficulties for China both in terms of running counter to Beijing’s long espoused principles in foreign affairs and its adverse impact on China’s national interests in Ukraine. Russia’s actions clearly contradict China’s cornerstone foreign policy principles of noninterference in other countries’ affairs and respecting territorial integrity. Moreover, China has sizable economic investments in Ukraine and is a good customer of Ukraine’s armaments industry. In 2020, Ukraine signed the BRI cooperation agreement, which further bolstered the economic relationship between the two countries and marked Ukraine as an important partner in Beijing’s signature foreign policy and economic initiative. Taiwan Is Not Ukraine The fact that Ukraine is not a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was almost certainly a decisive factor in Putin’s calculus to invade Ukraine. Russia’s commander in chief knew that his invading forces would likely not have to contend with the militaries of any other countries. And if there were any lingering doubts in the Kremlin about the disposition of the most powerful member of NATO, U.S. President Joe Biden stated publicly that the United States would not send military forces to help defend Ukraine. Nevertheless, the Biden administration has taken strong steps to reinforce NATO allies in Eastern Europe and provide robust military assistance to Ukraine. By contrast, Xi and his Politburo colleagues have long been convinced that Taiwan has the resolute support of the world’s most capable military. The People’s Liberation Army — as all branches of China’s armed forces are known — continues to assume that if it launches an invasion of Taiwan, the U.S. military will swiftly and decisively intervene. The U.S.-Taiwan relationship, while technically “unofficial” due to the One China policy, has strengthened in recent years. On February 28, the Biden administration sent an unofficial delegation of former U.S. defense and national security officials to Taiwan as a signal to China of that commitment. It remains true that the greatest deterrence to a massive Chinese military attack on the island is Beijing’s assumption that war with Taiwan also means a war with the United States. However, there is no formal military alliance between the United States and Taiwan. The defense pact binding Washington to Taipei was formally abrogated in 1979. So why is Beijing convinced that Washington has an ironclad alliance-like relationship with Taiwan? There are at least two reasons. First, successive U.S. administrations have publicly committed themselves to support Taiwan against Chinese aggression and have regularly sold arms to the island’s armed forces. Second, although there is no language in the1979 Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) that explicitly commits the United States to come to Taiwan’s defense in the event of an attack on the island by China, many in Washington believe that such a commitment exists. While there are different interpretations as to what the TRA means, the most significant fact is that the vast majority of U.S. political and military leaders are fully convinced that this legislation binds the United States to a de facto alliance with Taiwan. China’s increased military assertiveness and greater level of armed provocations in the Taiwan Strait and elsewhere around China’s periphery in recent years have only served to strengthen the conviction in Washington that the island is a staunch democratic partner worthy of U.S. support as it tries to defend tiny Taiwan against efforts by Beijing to coerce the island into unwanted unification with China. However, Taiwan, unlike Ukraine, is not a member of the United Nation. While Ukraine has ambassador-level diplomatic relations with more than 180 countries, including China and the United States, Taiwan only has full diplomatic ties with approximately a dozen countries and none of these are major powers. Yet, thanks to the TRA, Taipei enjoys robust quasi-diplomatic relations with Washington, and thanks to Taiwan’s pragmatic ingenuity, the island possesses a vibrant worldwide network of de facto diplomatic missions. Although Ukraine’s diplomatic standing is far superior to Taiwan’s, the European country’s military alliance status is less impressive — Ukraine is not a member of NATO, although it is a very active member of NATO’s Partnership for Peace initiative. While Taiwan also has no formal military allies, the island has several close and consequential security partners, most notably the United States.

### Link Turn – Emerging tech counters revisionist powers/Cyber

#### Turn: Increasing allied cooperation in (AI/Cyber/Bio)-technology is the only way to effectively combat rising powers without risking primacy.

Rasser and Lamberth 21 – Martijn Rasser and Megan Lamberth are foreign policy experts and contributors to Center for a New American Security, [“*Taking the Helm A National Technology Strategy to Meet the China Challenge,”* CNAS, 1/13/21, <https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/taking-the-helm-a-national-technology-strategy-to-meet-the-china-challenge#the-case-for-a-national-technology-strategy>]RA

How the United States Should Compete Today The United States is competing with China in technology with one hand tied behind its back.78 While the United States has leading technology companies, the government is underperforming in its role as a critical catalyst of S&T innovation. The federal government has played a more active role in protectionist measures relating to Chinese tech in recent years, including export controls, investment screening, and executive orders banning Chinese firms, but the government has yet to bring to bear its substantial tools to help stoke the fires of American innovation. For the first time in nearly a century, the United States confronts a strategic rival that is capable of overtaking it as the world’s leading economic, military, and technological power, and one that is economically entangled with the United States. Policymakers in Congress and the White House need to recalibrate U.S. government involvement in the country’s innovation ecosystem to maximize advantages and opportunities and to successfully address the challenges that the United States will face in the global technology contest. The nature of this competition is fundamentally different from what America has faced since the 1940s. For the first time in nearly a century the United States confronts a strategic rival that is capable of overtaking it as the world’s leading economic, military, and technological power, and one that is economically entangled with the United States. China is leveraging comprehensive state-directed efforts such as Made in China 2025, Standards 2035, the Belt and Road Initiative, and the Digital Silk Road to guide its technology development at home and push its goals of making Chinese technology and technology standards dominant worldwide. Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin attend a meeting during the Belt and Road International Forum, an initiative aimed at pursuing dominance in a number of key technology areas. The United States must respond with policies that focus on research and development, patenting, and standard setting. (The Russian Presidential Press and Information Office/Wikimedia) The hallmarks of these initiatives include strategic goals and plans backed with substantial financial resources for R&D, patenting, and standard setting. Neither the United States nor any of the tech-leading democracies has anything equivalent, setting the stage for an uneven competition where Beijing is better positioned to have the upper hand over the long term. This is not to say the United States should emulate China’s top-down approach. Many aspects of China’s approach, such as the creation and promotion of national champions; the coddling of inefficient state-owned enterprises; export subsidies, forced technology transfers, and other illiberal trade practices; and the lack of accountability and oversight are anathema to the American system. At the same time, Beijing’s policies have had impressive results. China is the world’s largest trader, accounting for 12.4 percent of global trade in 2018.79 China’s R&D spending has grown at an average of 15 percent annually since 1998. It is on track to overtake the United States in total R&D spending by the mid-2020s and is at the forefront of foundational technologies such as AI, 5G, and quantum computing.80 The U.S. response has been largely protectionist and unilateral, focused on export controls, tariffs, and repatriation of manufacturing, while R&D spending remains flat as a percentage of GDP and policies to attract and retain high-skilled foreigners become increasingly restrictive. American policymakers must emphasize what is lacking so far: the proactive policies American policymakers can put in place to bolster America’s ability to outcompete. To effectively compete with China, the United States needs a technology strategy for the 21st century and a new approach to multilateral cooperation and collaboration. The United States has an unmatched strategic advantage over China in this technology competition: a global network of allies and partners. Harnessing this network for multilateral collaboration is critical to the success of a national technology strategy. The United States does not enjoy a monopoly over the technologies that will drive the 21st-century economy, but the United States also does not have to go it alone. By partnering with other tech-leading nations, the United States and its allies and partners can bring far more financial and human resources to bear in this competition than China can alone. Opportunities for multinational collaboration on technology policy abound. The United States could look to existing groupings such as the Five Eyes, the National Technology and Industrial Base, and the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue to enhance such collaboration. There are also proposals to create new groupings: U.K. government officials have proposed a “Democracy 10” to tackle 5G and other technology issues; and former U.S. government officials have proposed alliance frameworks to tackle a range of technology policy issues.81 A recent CNAS report by an international group of researchers lays out what countries should comprise such a grouping, how it should be organized and structured, how it should function, and what its top priorities should be.82 Recommendations A strategy’s success hinges on implementation. No expression of strategic direction is complete without actionable recommendations. As the initial framing document for a series of publications that will define and outline a U.S. national technology strategy, this report lays out the four pillars that comprise the actions necessary to execute it. The pillars are to promote America’s ability to compete; protect key U.S. technological advantages; partner with allies to maximize success; and plan effectively to reevaluate and adjust the strategy as needed. This section offers recommendations for each pillar. They include the highest priority actions U.S. policymakers should undertake to safeguard long-term U.S. technological competitiveness. It is by no means an exhaustive list. Rather, it is an opening salvo meant to underscore the scope and scale of the challenge, highlight the urgency with which the United States must act, and stimulate ideas for a broader set of necessary actions. Taken together, these pillars and the recommendations that underpin them are guidelines for a 21st-century industrial policy. The American experience with industrial policy throughout its history shows that it is beneficial and necessary to have government involvement in technology development and that it is feasible to do so in a manner that encourages rather than constrains innovations by the private sector. The recommendations that follow are crafted with that spirit in mind and are the baseline for American success in the global technology competition. Promote America’s Capacity to Compete The U.S. government needs to take comprehensive and urgent action to lay the groundwork for long-term and comprehensive structural improvements to its science and technology base. There are four categories of recommendations to promote U.S. competitiveness: 1. Increase investments in research and development in the United States. While tech-leading countries around the world have increased their R&D spending, the United States has kept steady as a percentage of GDP for decades. The U.S. share of global R&D fell from 69 percent in 1960 to 28 percent in 2016.83 During that period, the share of R&D investments by the federal government shrank by more than half, meaning that private industry is now driving R&D to a much greater extent. In response, Congress should act by: Raising federal government spending on R&D to at least 2 percent of GDP by 2030, up from around 0.7 percent in 2020. This spending is critically important to maintaining long-term capacity for technological leadership and innovation. The U.S. government remains the largest funder of basic research, which is foundational to game-changing technological achievements.84 Promoting an increase of total national (public and private) R&D expenditures to at least 4.5 percent of GDP by 2030, from under 3 percent in 2020, to keep in line with other leading technology nations. Tax incentives, targeted grants and contracts, and prize competitions all serve to stimulate private-sector investments.

### Link Turn – European Security

#### Turn: Increasing NATO cooperation is imperative – spreading democratic norms, near-perfect HR record, and decades of international peace prove.

Horesh 6/4/22 - Theo Horesh is the author of four books on the psychosocial dynamics of globalization, including The Fascism This Time: And the Global Future of Democracy and a newly revised version of The Holocausts We All Deny: The Crisis Before the Fascism Inferno. He is a democracy advocate who has written hundreds of articles on genocide, climate change, fascism, and human rights. He frequently writes for the Kyiv Post. And he is currently completing his PhD at the University of Leeds, with a thesis on The Retreat from Globalism: And the Reconstruction of the Cosmopolitan Imaginary, [“*NATO’s Role in a Peaceful and Socially Democratic Europe,”* Modern Diplomacy, 6/4/2022, <https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2022/06/04/natos-role-in-a-peaceful-and-socially-democratic-europe/>]RA

NATO brought peace to the most violent continent on the planet by binding its states together in a collective security pact that forbid them from fighting each other and committed them to coming to one another’s defense. In this way, the emphasis on NATO as a hedge against Russian aggression overlooks its role in bringing peace to its member states and gives the false impression of a zero-sum relationship wherein Russia can win only if Europe loses. Since its establishment in 1949, NATO has created a hedge against potential Russian aggression, but it is far from its only purpose. In keeping Europeans from killing one another, NATO opened the continent to trade and the free movement of peoples, thereby paving the way for the European Union, as Timothy Andrew Sayle points out in his epic history of NATO, Enduring Alliance. It made social-democratic institutions like universal health insurance and paid family leave possible by sharing the costs of defense among a multitude of states. It helped spread democracy by demonstrating that democracies are safe and secure, prosperous and peaceful, in their relations with one another. Thus, an ever increasing array of states sought entry into the club of wealthy democracies as a refuge from violence and disorder. And in bringing such a diversity of peoples together, NATO helped transform some of the most militaristic and nationalistic societies in the world into some of its most peaceful and cosmopolitan. In this way, it probably also played a part in transforming colonial regimes like Britain and France, Portugal and Spain, into normal nation states. If the vast majority of us have forgotten what a danger European states were to one another and how militaristic European societies could be, it is largely due to the way collective security arrangements allowed them to let their guards down. Thus, the idea that NATO is an imperialistic military organization bent on expansion misses the point. NATO was always a critical hedge against the Soviet Union, but when the Berlin Wall fell it remained essential to the institutional architecture at the heart of the European Union. Its abandonment would have come coupled with dramatic increases in military budgets and corresponding decreases in social safety net programs. And it would have brought about the remilitarization of Europe’s most vulnerable states, which it would have set on a quest for new protectors, thereby spurring the creation of new power blocks. In so doing, it might have spelled an end to the fledgling European Dream. Of course, collective security pacts also send a signal to would be aggressors that if they ever did attack, they would be up against several states at once, and in the case of NATO dozens. But NATO has been an astonishingly peaceful military pact. Over the course of its near three-quarters of a century existence, it has carried out only three military interventions, a statebuilding mission in Afghanistan, and a small counter-terrorism operation in Iraq. It stopped the Bosnian Genocide, which had already killed well over hundred thousand people, through a limited bombing campaign in 1995, which killed only 27 civilians. It halted the ethnic cleansing of Kosovo, which threatened to displace hundreds of thousands of people, through a more extensive bombing campaign in 1999, which according to Human Rights Watch killed up to 529 Serbian civilians. Finally, NATO helped bring down the Gaddafi regime after he embarked on the most intensive killing spree of any leader in the Arab Spring and then threatened to go “door to door” hunting down the rest. According to Libya’s own ambassador to the United Nations, who Secretary General Ban Ki Moon described as begging the U.N. to intervene in an unprecedented display of sobbing before the General Assembly, Gaddafi had just given the signal for his troops to commit genocide. According to Gallup, 75 percent of Libyans told pollsters a year after the intervention that they had wanted NATO to intervene, in spite of the intervention having killed 60 civilians, according to the UN Human Rights council. It was only three years later in 2014, following the degeneration of the world order brought about by Putin’s unanswered theft of the Crimea and Assad’s unanswered obliteration of his own country, that Britain and France would allow the Libyan statebuilding mission to fall apart as the country slipped into civil war. All in all, over the course of its three-quarter century history, NATO military missions were probably directly responsible for less than a thousand civilian deaths spread out over three humanitarian interventions, the vast majority of which involved a state that is now an associate of NATO, which is on track for entry into the European Union in three years. The only other major campaign it engaged in was a humanitarian mission in Afghanistan, where member states mostly helped with statebuilding, police trainings, financial management, and the provision of aid following the United States’ unilateral invasion in 2001. In a remarkable act of coordination, NATO member states each took on a different element of the statebuilding mission in Afghanistan, with only the United Kingdom engaging in heavy fighting in one small province, which they had committed to keeping secure. If these campaigns are remembered as being vastly more violent, and if a narrative has emerged that sees NATO as an expansionist imperial force, it is mostly because NATO missions are often confused in our collective memory with those of the United States and the former empires of Europe. It is also the result of Russian propaganda, which claims a “sphere of influence” tied to its former imperial possessions, many of which have joined NATO. And this points to another misunderstanding about how NATO actually works. Potential members request to join it, and far from being pressured, they have to demonstrate a commitment to democracy and the rule of law if they are to be let in. States have the right to join whatever international associations they want, and spheres of influence are a dated claim seldom invoked today outside of the Putin regime and Trump administration. Meanwhile, states on the periphery of Russia have a better reason for seeking entry into NATO than ever before. Yet, in overlooking the way collective security pacts foster the peaceful relations and prosperity of their member states, we help foster a narrative that sees NATO as an expansionist military organization locked in a zero-sum competition with Russia. Yet, Russians will only win when they establish genuinely democratic institutions, the rule of law, and the domestic respect for human rights. If Putin has overplayed his hand as much as it seems, they might soon find themselves lining up for NATO membership as well. And if that turns out to be the case, it would not be a reason to disband NATO but rather extend the order it has brought to Europe to Russia as well. This vision of a liberal internationalist order, wherein democratic states extend the rule of law and a respect for human rights to an ever increasing array of voluntary members, may appear utopian amid the threats and crimes against humanity of autocrats today. But it is no more fantastic than the “European Dream” of a peaceful continent of democratic states would have appeared at the end of the Second World War. Stranger things have been known to occur than democracy breaking out following the downfall of fascist strongmen and peace breaking out after war.Published 2 weeks ago on June 4, 2022By Theo Horesh

### Link Turn - Cyberterror

#### Turn: NATO key to ward off cyber terrorism

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A VALUABLE ALLIANCE NATO is entering its eighth decade in quite good health because it succeeds admirably in advancing the shared interests of its members. Russian aggression in Ukraine has brought back into focus NATO’s traditional mission of territorial defense. At its 2016 summit, NATO took the prudent step of deploying combat-ready battalions in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland. The United States has augmented its presence on the eastern flank, and the Trump administration has agreed to increase spending on European defense and deploy additional U.S. troops on the continent. At its 2018 summit, NATO established two new commands to enhance the security of maritime connections between North America and Europe and improve force mobility within Europe. NATO helped end ethnic conflict in the Balkans in the 1990s and has kept troops there ever since to guard the peace. Despite the difficulties and dangers of the mission in Afghanistan, since 2003 NATO has stayed the course, standing by its first and only invocation of Article 5—the commitment to collective defense—which followed the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. The alliance has contributed significantly to the campaign against the Islamic State (or ISIS), providing surveillance aircraft and helping train Iraqi forces. NATO has deployed ships to the Aegean and the Mediterranean to help provide maritime security and address the migration crisis. In addition to these missions, NATO works continuously to build capacity among its many partners. The Partnership for Peace offers training and exercises to Euro-Atlantic nonmembers. Through the Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, NATO advises many countries in the broader Middle East, including Egypt, Israel, Morocco, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates. NATO has cooperation agreements with its global partners, which include Australia, Japan, Korea, and Pakistan. The alliance has already opened the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats and is in the midst of establishing a new Cyberspace Operations Centre.

## Internal Link/Impact

### Internal Link Turn – Abandoning NATO wrecks Heg

#### Lack of American leadership in NATO collapses *US hegemony and democracy* – power vacuum and global war!

Berlinski 18 – Claire Berlinski is an American journalist, author, and holds a doctorate in International Relations, [*“Europe’s Dependence on the U.S. Was All Part of the Plan,”* Politico, 7/15/2018, [https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2018/07/15/trump-nato-europe-history-dependence-219011]RA](https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2018/07/15/trump-nato-europe-history-dependence-219011%5dRA)

What Trump fails to understand is that the disparity in spending, with the U.S. paying more than its allies, is not a bug of the system. It is a feature. This is how the great postwar statesmen designed it, and this immensely foresighted strategy has ensured the absence of great power conflict—and nuclear war—for three-quarters of a century. The open, liberal world order we know today was built in the wake of World War II and expanded after the collapse of the Soviet Union. By design, it is led by the United States; by design, it ensures permanent U.S. military hegemony over Eurasia while uniting Europe under the U.S.’ protection. The goal of this American grand strategy is to prevent any single power from dominating the region and turning on the United States and its allies. American hegemony serves, too, to quell previously intractable regional rivalries, preventing further world wars. Dean Acheson, George Marshall and the other great statesmen of their generation pursued this strategy because they had learned, at unimaginable cost, that the eternal American fantasy of forever being free of Europe—isolationism, or America Firstism, in other words—was just that: a fantasy. Four hundred thousand American men lost their lives in the European theaters of the First and Second World Wars. (American fatalities in all of the other 20th-century conflicts—including Vietnam, Korea and the Persian Gulf—do not total one-quarter of that number.) Our postwar statesmen were neither weak nor incompetent. They were the architects of the greatest foreign policy triumph in U.S. history. So successful was this policy that Americans now—most of whom weren’t alive to witness the enormity of these wars—see peace, unity, prosperity and stability as Europe’s natural state. This is an illusion. For centuries, Europe was the fulcrum of global violence. With the age of global exploration, it became the globe’s primary exporter of violence, the tempo and horror of the carnage rising every century with improvements in technology for violence. The Scramble for Africa, the division and colonization of that continent by Europe, is a case in point. The 1884-85 Berlin West Africa Conference, which assembled the representatives of 13 European powers to settle their colonial claims to Africa by diplomacy in place of arms, did lead to peace in Europe for several years. Africans, however, would not recall these years for their exceptional comity. For example, the conference indulged King Léopold II’s claim that the Congo Free State was his private property. Ten million Congolese souls perished under his ministrations. In recognizing this history of blood, however, we must recognize something equally true: In the wake of World War II, liberal democracy saw its fullest realization in the West. This flourishing of peace and human rights cannot be explained by a sudden outbreak of European pacifism. (Consider the 1956 Suez expedition, crushed by an infuriated President Dwight Eisenhower; or the 1954-62 Franco-Algerian War.) It happened because during World War II, Europe destroyed itself, leaving the United States overwhelmingly powerful by comparison, its only rival the Soviet Union. Through the application of economic, diplomatic and military force majeure, the United States suppressed Europe’s internal security competition. This is why postwar Europe ceased to be the world’s leading exporter of violence and became, instead, the world’s leading exporter of luxury sedans. Only America, and massive power as the U.S. exercised it, could have pacified and unified Europe under its aegis. No other continental country possessed half the world’s GDP. No other country had enough distance from Europe to be trusted, to a large extent, by all parties and indifferent to its regional jealousies. No other country had a strategic, moral and economic vision for Europe that its inhabitants could be persuaded gladly to share. Indeed, Europeans cooperated with the U.S. program because it created conditions under which both the United States and Europe flourished. The United States assisted Europe’s postwar economic recovery with $13 billion of aid in the form of the Marshall Plan. (In today’s dollars, roughly $113 billion.) It midwifed the groupings and treaties that would become the European Union. It brought Europe under the U.S. security umbrella with the NATO treaty. Article V of the treaty, its most important element, declares that an attack on one member of NATO is an attack on all members. These policies were intended not only to counter the Soviet Union, but to condition Europe’s prosperity upon its integration into a single market, with free movement of goods, capital and labor. The founders of these institutions fully intended them to be the foundations of a United States of Europe, much like the United States of America. Profound economic interdependence, they believed, would make further European wars impossible. At the same time, the United States built an open, global order upon an architecture of specific institutions: the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund and the International Court of Justice. This order is in many respects an empire—a Pax Americana—but it is more humane than any empire that preceded it, with institutions that are intended to benefit all parties. Postwar U.S. statesmen believed that prosperous, liberal democracies that traded freely with each other would neither go to war with each other nor the United States. They ascribed, in other words, to the so-called Democratic Peace theory—a theory with overwhelming empirical support. The U.S. military was always an integral part of the plan to unite and rebuild Europe from the rubble. Since World War II, U.S. troops have been deployed in Eurasia to ensure the continent cannot be dominated by a single power capable of monopolizing its resources and turning them against the U.S. The United States has built overwhelmingly massive military assets there to deter local arms races before they begin, and it has simultaneously assured those under U.S. protection that there is no need to begin local arms races, for their safety is guaranteed. American grand strategy rests upon the credibility of its promise to protect American allies; this credibility rests, in turn, upon U.S. willingness to display its commitment. (The Berlin Airlift, when U.S. troops airlifted supplies to Berlin during a Soviet blockade, was precisely such a display.) In return for the United States’ commitment, U.S. allies have accepted America’s dominant role in the international system. In the postwar era, just as now, the enemies of liberal democracy sought to undermine the order the U.S. was building. Precisely because the Marshall Plan would strengthen and unite the West under the United States’ protection, the Soviet Union’s propaganda organs cranked into overdrive to denounce it. A cartoon, for example, published in Isvestia in 1949, depicted the Marshall Plan’s administrator, Paul Hoffman, as a fat capitalist bent on destroying the sovereignty of European nations. The French paper L'Humanité, which reliably parroted Moscow’s line, wrote, “After disorganizing the national economies of the countries which are under the American yoke, American leaders now intend conclusively to subjugate the economy of these countries to their own interests.” The Soviet Union’s criticism of the Marshall Plan and other American involvement in Europe was eerily similar to the language Russia’s now uses in its campaign to undermine NATO and the EU. The vocabulary and tropes of Russian propaganda are widely echoed, wittingly or unwittingly, by far-right, far-left and other antiliberal politicians, parties and movements throughout the West. With the men who built the postwar world order now in their graves, and the memory of carnage and horror buried with them, a very sizable constituency of Americans has forgotten that their country built this system for a reason—that the United States does not maintain its alliances as an act of foolish largesse. The loudest exponent of the idea that the U.S. is getting rolled, that the European Union was “created to destroy us,” and that multilateral institutions such as the World Trade Organization assault the “sovereignty” of the nations concerned is, unfortunately, the president of the United States. It’s hard to understate how foolish and reckless these notions are. History can be shoved down the memory hole, for a time, but reality is never so cooperative. Global free trade sustains modern economic life. An interruption to this trade—carried out chiefly on global shipping lanes safeguarded by the U.S. military—would bring modern life to an end. The Second World War proved not only that isolationism and American-Firstism were fantasies, but exceptionally childish and dangerous ones, at that. In the age of hyperglobalized trade, international air travel, the internet, nuclear weapons and intercontinental ballistic missiles, these fantasies are even more childish and dangerous. The U.S. may be on another continent, but it is not on another planet. It is true that the U.S. spends more on its military, in absolute dollars and as a percentage of GDP, than any European country. That was always part of the deal. The U.S. is a global superpower. It can fight a war anywhere in the world, invade any country at will, and (at least in theory) fight multiple simultaneous major wars—even in space. Of course this costs more. It is in America’s advantage to be the only power on the planet that can do this. Conversely, it is not remotely in America’s advantage for other countries to spend as much money on their militaries as we do. Europe is America’s biggest export market, as designed. We want Europeans to spend their money enjoying U.S. goods and services, not razing Flanders to the ground yet again. Yet Trump’s refusal to deter our shared enemies and protect our allies risks provoking a regional European arms race—exactly what the U.S. has sought to avoid for 74 years. It is an invitation to adventurism from Putin. Trump’s refusal to adopt the encouraging language of past presidents toward European integration, language that until now has been transformed into policy by professional and experienced State Department employees, puts further strain on an already-weakened Europe. Above all, Trump’s overt support for sordid, Kremlin-backed actors who seek to undermine Europe’s unity is unfathomable: How could it be in Europe’s interest, or in ours, for the American president to lend the United States’ prestige and support to Europe’s Nazis, neo-Nazis, doctrinal Marxists, populists, authoritarians, and ethnic supremacists, particularly since all of them are ideologically hostile to the United States? The damage Trump has deliberately inflicted on Europe’s stability comes at a uniquely dangerous time. Democracy’s so-called third wave—the global blossoming of open political systems after the Cold War—has long since receded. A threat to liberal democracy, in the form of a distinct, rival ideology—illiberal democracy—is ascendant. We see it today in Russia and Turkey—a corrupt, oligarchic, kleptocratic and hollow form of democracy that spreads and consolidates itself through the new technologies of the 21st century. The global order the U.S. built was based on the principle that only a world of liberal democracies can be peaceful and prosperous. That principle is correct. Should the unraveling of the order the U.S. built proceed at this pace, the world will soon be neither peaceful nor prosperous. Nor will the effects be confined to regions distant from the United States. America will feel them gradually, and then, probably, overnight—in the form of a devastating, sudden shock.

#### Abandonment/unilateralism Wrecks US hegemony – removes *network* of diplomatic and military capabilities and *forecloses agenda-setting power* to new regional blocs

Kaufmann, Hertie School of Governance; Laius, Postdoctorate at Otto Suhr Institute; 17 (Sonja, Mathis, “Ever closer or lost at sea? Scenarios for the future of transatlantic relations,” <https://www-sciencedirect-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/science/article/pii/S0016328716303615)//EF>

The decline of American hegemony has been proclaimed many times, but the US has continued to be the sole superpower on the block. Yet the 2016 election might go down in history as the turning point – if the new administration follows through with its plan to put ‘America First’ and withdraws from international responsibilities. This policy change puts European collective action capacity to a test, leaving the EU to carry on the torch of liberal values and democracy in the global world order. Following the Brexit shock, EU leaders agree on a communications and legitimacy offensive to fend off populist movements in the wake of Brexit. Europe’s foreign policy apparatus evolves. As the EEAS gains experience and fine-tunes its working relationship with member states and the EU Commission, the changes intended by the Lisbon treaty begin to materialize in practical terms. The center of gravity for day-to-day foreign policy moves to the European level, not least because EU mxembers are happy to consolidate expensive foreign operations. At the same time, the United States decrease their footprint in terms of both diplomatic and military capabilities abroad. US foreign policy focuses on core regions and tasks, which means cutting back on large-scale diplomatic initiatives, early warning and conflict resolution, or intelligence analysis. These policy shifts draw heavy criticism from European allies and the transatlantic relationship suffers − also because the new US administration uses a different tone and style towards the old allies. These organizational and strategic changes are reflected in policy choices. In United Nations negotiations on climate change, the EU is the only actor that comes close to China’s willingness and capacity for leadership. Participants in transatlantic working groups discover that their goals are not aligned. In addition, US negotiators are much less enthusiastic about investing political capital and resources in global governance. UN operational budgets across the board are sharply reduced reflecting a reduction in US contributions that cannot be compensated by others. Thus, while the UN remains a forum for deliberation, its agencies lose practical relevance in global governance. At the same time, the member states of the European Union come to terms with the fact that their transatlantic partner seems less willing to assume a leadership role. A number of governments and the foreign-policy institutions in Brussels take on more responsibility in regional and global affairs. As a result, EU policymakers focus more heavily on inter-regional cooperation with organizations from Africa, Latin America and Asia. A number of so-called ‘intensive partnership’ treaties with regional blocs and individual emerging powers address cross-border issues, such as migration and the fight against crime. In trade and investment, regional arrangements increasingly replace the WTO, which is in hibernation due to the United States’ refusal to champion further trade liberalization on a global scale. NATO suffers from funding cuts and is strictly limited to its core mandate for territorial defense, while the UN Security Council drops from gridlock to paralysis. Military interventions still take place – but only based on ad-hoc coalitions. For the EU this means creating a more deeply integrated but still voluntary defense framework with a focus on security in the near abroad and African countries of strategic interest. A first indicator for this scenario is a shift in US foreign policy from a global leadership role to a few selected initiatives. American agenda-setting power on the global stage is reduced as foreign-policy priorities change, but also because European allies in turn focus on other partners and opportunities. EU-internal changes in the institutional setup and practice of foreign policy are another indicator to consider. The clearest sign of this scenario, however, would be bolder and more controversial European actions on the global arena – both diplomatically and militarily.

### Offense – Heg Unsustainable

#### Heg is unsustainable---retrenchment is gradual now, but recommitting makes it violent and forced.

Kupchan 20, professor of international affairs at Georgetown University and senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. (Charles A., 10-21-2020, "America’s Pullback Must Continue No Matter Who Is President", *Foreign Policy*, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/10/21/election-2020-smart-retrenchment/)

As the Trump era potentially comes to an end, many foreign-policy voices in the United States and abroad relish the prospect of the country’s roaring return to the global stage. But attempting a full-on comeback would be a mistake. If anything, the strategic pullback that President Donald Trump has initiated needs to continue—albeit in a more coherent and judicious manner. Much of the debate surrounding the next administration’s foreign policy has focused on boldly reasserting U.S. leadership in the world. And it’s true: Global interdependence and upheaval do require steady U.S. leadership and engagement. What’s been largely missing from this debate, however, are the challenges facing the next president when it comes to right-sizing U.S. engagement abroad—especially military involvement—and bringing the nation’s strategic commitments back into line with it means and purposes. The American electorate has turned sharply inward in response to military overreach in the Middle East, the economic dislocations brought about by innovation and globalization, and the national calamity caused by COVID-19. The nation’s next president would be wise to take note—and craft a brand of global statecraft that is effective but also politically sustainable. Otherwise, the strategic pullback that needs to take place will occur by default rather than by design, risking that U.S. overreach could turn into even more dangerous underreach. Indeed, that’s what’s been happening during Trump’s presidency. He seems to have understood the need to retrench. But his troop withdrawals from Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and Germany have been haphazard, making a hash of the effort. Retrenchment cannot be done by tweet, in unpredictable fits and starts, and couched in an abrasive “America first” unilateralism that has alienated allies and set the world on edge. Democratic candidate Joe Biden is far better suited to restore an equilibrium between the nation’s foreign policy and its political will. Throughout his career, he has been a pragmatic and prudent internationalist; looking forward, pragmatism and prudence will require a more selective and discriminating internationalism, not restoration of the status quo ante. Three-quarters of the American public want U.S. troops to leave Afghanistan and Iraq—it is time to downsize the U.S. footprint in the Middle East. U.S. foreign policy has become over-militarized—the next administration should reallocate priorities and resources, putting more emphasis on diplomacy, cybersecurity, global public health, and climate change. Washington should also return to being a team player if it is to lighten its load; retrenchment and multilateral engagement go hand in hand. Meeting the threat posed by China, managing international trade and finance, preventing nuclear proliferation, addressing pandemics—these and other urgent challenges all require broad international cooperation. And as the United States pulls back from its role as global policeman, it will want like-minded partners to help fill the gap. These partnerships become stronger through diplomacy and teamwork. The top priorities of the next president will be at home: taming the pandemic, repairing the economy, and reviving democratic institutions and norms. Only if the country’s democratic lights come back on can it effectively deal with the rest of the world. In the meantime, the next administration needs to continue Trump’s effort to downsize the nation’s foreign entanglements—but in a smart and measured way. The United States needs to step back without stepping away. “Build back better” applies abroad just as much as it does at home.

### Offense – Heg Causes Conflict

#### Liberal hegemony is obsolete – only de-centering US leadership can resolve next-gen prolif and planetary destruction

Sachs 16 (Jeffrey D. Sachs, Professor of Sustainable Development and Professor of Health Policy and Management at Columbia University, is Director of Columbia’s Center for Sustainable Development and of the UN Sustainable Development Solutions Network, “Learning to Love a Multipolar World,” 12/29, https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/multipolar-world-faces-american-resistance-by-jeffrey-d-sachs-2016-12)

NEW YORK – American foreign policy is at a crossroads. The United States has been an expanding power since its start in 1789. It battled its way across North America in the nineteenth century and gained global dominance in the second half of the twentieth. But now, facing China’s rise, India’s dynamism, Africa’s soaring populations and economic stirrings, Russia’s refusal to bend to its will, its own inability to control events in the Middle East, and Latin America’s determination to be free of its de facto hegemony, US power has reached its limits. One path for the US is global cooperation. The other is a burst of militarism in response to frustrated ambitions. The future of the US, and of the world, hangs on this choice. Global cooperation is doubly vital. Only cooperation can deliver peace and the escape from a useless, dangerous, and ultimately bankrupting new arms race, this time including cyber-weapons, space weapons, and next-generation nuclear weapons. And only cooperation can enable humanity to face up to urgent planetary challenges, including the destruction of biodiversity, the poisoning of the oceans, and the threat posed by global warming to the world’s food supply, vast drylands, and heavily populated coastal regions. Yet global cooperation means the willingness to reach agreements with other countries, not simply to make unilateral demands of them. And the US is in the habit of making demands, not making compromises. When a state feels destined to rule – as with ancient Rome, the Chinese “Middle Kingdom” centuries ago, the British Empire from 1750 to 1950, and the US since World War II – compromise is hardly a part of its political vocabulary. As former US President George W. Bush succinctly put it, “You’re either with us or against us.”

#### Liberal leadership *incites* global conflict, failed states, and terrorism – downsizing is comparatively safer and resolves their offense

Mearsheimer and Walt 16 (John J, R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, and Stephen M, Robert and Renée Belfer Professor of International Affairs at the Harvard Kennedy School, “The Case for Offshore Balancing: A Superior U.S. Grand Strategy,” Foreign Affairs, July/August, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2016-06-13/case-offshore-balancing)

HEGEMONY'S HOLLOW HOPES Defenders of liberal hegemony marshal a number of unpersuasive arguments to make their case. One familiar claim is that only vigorous U.S. leadership can keep order around the globe. But global leadership is not an end in itself; it is desirable only insofar as it benefits the United States directly. One might further argue that U.S. leadership is necessary to overcome the collective-action problem of local actors failing to balance against a potential hegemon. Offshore balancing recognizes this danger, however, and calls for Washington to step in if needed. Nor does it prohibit Washington from giving friendly states in the key regions advice or material aid. Other defenders of liberal hegemony argue that U.S. leadership is necessary to deal with new, transnational threats that arise from failed states, terrorism, criminal networks, refugee flows, and the like. Not only do the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans offer inadequate protection against these dangers, they claim, but modern military technology also makes it easier for the United States to project power around the world and address them. Today's "global village," in short, is more dangerous yet easier to manage. This view exaggerates these threats and overstates Washington's ability to eliminate them. Crime, terrorism, and similar problems can be a nuisance, but they are hardly existential threats and rarely lend themselves to military solutions. Indeed, constant interference in the affairs of other states-and especially repeated military interventions- generates local resentment and fosters corruption, thereby making these transnational dangers worse. The long-term solution to the problems can only be competent local governance, not heavy-handed U.S. efforts to police the world.

### Offense – Heg is Violent

#### The legacy of American hegemony is endless rivers of blood and feedback loops of sustained conflict **Morefield 19** (Jeanne Morefield, Professor of Politics at Whitman College, Professorial Fellow at the Institute for Social Justice at Australian Catholic University, PhD from Cornell University, January 8, 2019, “Trump’s Foreign Policy Isn’t the Problem,” Boston Review, <https://bostonreview.net/politics/jeanne-morefield-trump%E2%80%99s-foreign-policy-isn%E2%80%99t-problem>) gz






After two years of President Donald Trump, critics and commentators are still struggling to make sense of his foreign policy. Despite some hopes that he might mature into the role of commander in chief, he has continued to thumb his nose at most mainstream academic frameworks for analyzing and conducting foreign policy. Indeed, what makes Trump’s interactions with the rest of the world so confusing is the way he flirts with, and then departs from, the script. He may issue policies and give speeches that include words such as “sovereignty,” “principled realism,” and “peace through strength,” but they frequently appear cheek by jowl with racist rants, crass opportunism, nationalist tirades, and unrestrained militarism. It is this uncomfortable mixture of familiar and jarring that has proven disconcerting for many mainstream international relations scholars, particularly those “intellectual middlemen” who straddle the realms of academia, policy think tanks, and major news outlets. Yet rather than ask how U.S. foreign policy might have contributed to the global environment that made Trump’s election possible, most have responded to the inconsistencies of Trump’s world vision by emphasizing its departure from everything that came before and demanding a return to more familiar times. International relations experts thus express nostalgia for either the “U.S.-led liberal order” or the Cold War while, in outlets such as *Foreign Affairs* and the *New York Times*, they offer selective retellings of the country’s past foreign policies that make them look both shinier and clearer than they were. These responses do not offer much insight into Trump himself, but they do have much to tell us about the discourse of international relations in the United States today and the way its mainstream public analysts—liberals and realists alike—continue to disavow U.S. imperialism. For example, liberal internationalists such as John Ikenberry argue that Trump is guilty of endangering the U.S.-led global order. That system, according to Ikenberry and Daniel Deudney, emerged after World War II, when the liberal democracies of the world “joined together to create an international order that reflected their shared interests,” while simultaneously agreeing, as Ikenberry once put it, to transfer “the reins of power to Washington, just as Hobbes’s individuals . . . voluntarily construct and hand over power to the Leviathan.” The vision of cooperating nation-states may have originated in values that first “emerged in the West,” they argue, but these values have since “become universal.” In this accounting, Trump threatens the stability of U.S. liberal hegemony in two ways: by retreating from multilateral agreements such as the Iran nuclear deal, and by refusing to participate in the narrative of enlightened U.S. leadership. Future great threats to global stability, Ikenberry grumbled, were supposed to come from “hostile revisionist powers seeking to overturn the postwar order.” Now a hostile revisionist power “sits in the Oval Office.” By contrast, when realists such as Stephen Walt or John Mearsheimer criticize Trump, they start from the position that the liberal world order is a delusion, perpetuated most recently by post–Cold War members of the “elite foreign policy establishment.” Walt and others rightly point to the baseline hypocrisy of a “liberal Leviathan,” noting that the current fury over Russian election tampering and cyber espionage rings hollow given the long U.S. reliance on both strategies. This view accompanies a wistful longing for the putatively gimlet-eyed realism of the Cold War, a time when U.S. presidents understood that their role was to deter the Soviet Union, prevent the emergence of dangerous regional hegemons, and preserve “a global balance of power that enhanced American security.” Seen thus, Trump’s hyperbolic and embarrassing nationalism is a symptom of the abandonment of great power politics, while his fawning treatment of Vladimir Putin shatters any remaining hope that his self-styled “principled realism” might take us back to a more strategically realistic time. In the words of former Secretary of Defense Ash Carter, watching the Trump–Putin news conference was like “watching the destruction of a cathedral.” But what is Trump actually doing to destroy this cathedral? What makes Trump’s words and behavior so objectionable? Previous presidents have pulled out of multilateral agreements, entered into disputes with allies, and engaged in protectionism and trade wars. The majority of the Trump administration’s planned and ongoing military deployments are in regions where the military was already deployed by previous administrations in the name of the War on Terror. Moreover, Trump’s national security and national policy statements are littered with the vocabulary of the very experts who find him so terrifying. What, then, makes Trump’s foreign policy such a singular threat? Trump’s foreign policy is disturbing because it is uncanny—both grotesque *and* deeply familiar. Like a funhouse mirror, Trump’s vision of the world reflects back a twisted image of U.S. global politics that *is* and *is not* who we are supposed to be. For instance, deterrence strategy may require the rest of the world to believe that the U.S. president might use nuclear weapons, but the president is *not* supposed to hint that he might actually do so. The president is supposed to be concerned with regulating the flow of immigrants but not reveal that race plays a role in these calculations by blurting the phrase “shithole countries.” The president is supposed to believe that the United States is the most blessed, exceptional country on Earth—as Barack Obama put it, “I believe in American exceptionalism with every fiber of my being”—but *not* engage in excessive nationalism by making “total allegiance” the “bedrock” of his politics, or combine it with a commitment to “make our Military so big, powerful & strong that no one will mess with us.” Sometimes Trump’s utterances hit so close to home that they surpass uncanniness. In an essay by Sigmund Freud on the uncanny, Freud says dolls and mannequins unsettle precisely because of the possibility that they might actually be alive, a discomfort that has inspired nightmares, works of literature, and horror movies. Trump, by contrast, is a living nightmare. He opens his mouth and the things-which-must-never- be-said simply fall out. Thus, when Bill O’Reilly asked him why he supported Putin even though he is a “killer,” Trump shot back, “There are a lot of killers. You think our country’s so innocent?” Trump’s willingness to say such things has precipitated an existential crisis in the international relations world. U.S. foreign policy, as an academic discourse and political practice, is built on the delicate foundation of what Robert Vitalis has called the “norm against noticing,” This deflective move has long been the gold standard of international relations; under its rules of play, IR experts act as if the United States has never been an imperial power and that its foreign policy is not, and has never been, intentionally racist. The norm against noticing thus distinguishes between the idea of the United States as a necessary world-historical actor and the reality of how the United States acts. In that reality, the United States has long been an imperial power with white nationalist aspirations. Given the racialized nature of U.S. imperial expansion, it makes sense that Alexis de Tocqueville predicted, in a chapter entitled “The Three Races of the United States,” that the United States would one day govern “the destinies of half the globe.” In its early days, while still a slave-holding country, the United States asserted its sovereignty through genocide on a continental scale and annexed large portions of northern Mexico. The country went on to overthrow the independent state of Hawaii, occupied the Philippines and Haiti, exerted its regional power throughout Latin America, expanded its international hegemony after World War II, and became what it is today: the world’s foremost military and nuclear power with a $716 billion “defense” budget that exceeds the spending of all other major global powers combined. “Taking over from the British Empire in the early twentieth-century,” argues James Tully, the United States has used its many military bases located “outside its own borders”—now nearly 800 in over 80 countries— to force open-door economic policies and antidemocratic regimes on states throughout the formerly colonized world. An extremely partial list of sovereign governments that the United States either overthrew or attempted to subvert through military means, assassinations, or election tampering since 1949 includes Syria, Iran, Guatemala, Lebanon, the Congo, Cuba, Chile, Afghanistan, Nicaragua, Grenada, Cuba, Korea, Vietnam, Cambodia, Iraq, Yemen, Australia, Greece, Bolivia, and Angola. Such interventionist policies have contributed substantially to today’s inegalitarian world in which an estimated 783 million people live in profound poverty. In sum, for untold millions of humans in the Global South, the seventy years of worldwide order, security, and prosperity that Ikenberry and Deudney associate with Pax Americana has been anything but ordered, secure, or prosperous. And yet the norm against noticing prevents foreign policy analysis from even acknowledging—let alone grappling with—the relationship between race and imperialism that has characterized U.S. international relations from the country’s earliest days. This regime of politely un-seeing—of deflecting—connections between U.S. foreign policy, race hierarchy, and colonial administration was clearly not in effect when *Foreign Affairs* was released under its original name: the *Journal of Race Development*. This began to change, however, in the 1920s. Among other contributing factors, World War I, the rise of anti-colonial revolutions, and the emergence of liberal internationalism as a popular ideology helped convince foreign policy experts in the United States and Europe to adopt a policy language oriented toward “development” rather than imperialism or racial difference. Mainstream international relations scholarship today remains committed to a narrative in which the discipline itself and U.S. foreign policy has always been and remains race blind, concerned solely with the relationship between sovereign states who cooperate, deter, or compete with one another in a global system in which the United States is simply, like Caesar, the “first citizen” (Ikenberry) or “the luckiest great power in modern history” (Walt). For liberals, this involves a studied erasure of the imperial origins of twentieth-century internationalism in the League of Nations’ Mandate system and the complicity of Woodrow Wilson in preserving, as Adom Getachew puts it, “white supremacy on a global scale.” For realists, it requires both forgetting the anti-Enlightenment origins of postwar realist thought and reinserting the “security dilemma” back into history so that, with the help of Thucydides, Machiavelli, and Hobbes, the world can—as Slavoj Žižek says—“become what it always was.” International relations experts will acknowledge U.S. violence and overreach when necessary, but routinely read the illiberalism of U.S. foreign policy as an exception that is not at all representative, in Anne Marie Slaughter’s words, of “the idea that is America.” Slaughter, with Ikenberry, can consider bad behavior only briefly and only in the service of insisting that what matters most is not what the United States actually does with its power but what it intends to do. Yes, “imperialism, slavery, and racism have marred Western history,” Ikenberry and Deudney argue, but what matters is that liberalism “has always been at the forefront of efforts—both peaceful and militant—to reform and end these practices.” Indeed, even those public intellectuals such as Niall Ferguson and Michael Ignatieff who, after September 11, called for the United States to embrace its status as an imperial power, framed their arguments in deflective, liberal terms. By contrast, because realists project the security dilemma retroactively into history (while also simultaneously excising imperialism) they can only see the U.S. destabilization of Third World economies, assassinations, and secret bombings as tragic necessities (great powers, claims Mearsheimer, “have little choice but to pursue power and to seek to dominate the other states in the system”) or as the result of liberals’ ill-advised desire to force “our” values on other nations. Both of these deflective strategies reinforce the illusion that we live, in Nikhil Pal Singh’s words, in an “American-centered, racially inclusive world, one organized around formally equal and independent nation states” where some states just happen to have more power than others, and where the alternative—Russian or Chinese hegemony—is too frightening even to contemplate. That deflection would play such an outsized role in supporting the ideological edifice of international relations today is hardly surprising. Turn-of-the-century British liberals who supported their empire also drew upon a variety of different deflective strategies to reconcile the violence and illiberalism of British imperial expansion with the stated liberal goals of the Empire. Such deflection made it impossible for these thinkers—many of whom would go on to work as some of the first international relations scholars in Britain and help found The Royal Institute of International Affairs—to link the problems of empire with the violence and disruption of imperialism. Similarly, deflection within international relations today obscures the U.S. role in maintaining the profoundly hierarchical, racist, insecure, deeply unjust reality of the current global order. It also makes it impossible to address how U.S. foreign policy (covert and overt) has contributed to the destabilization of that order by creating the circumstances that give rise to “failed states,” “rogue regimes,” and “sponsors of terrorism.” Moreover, it impedes any theorizing about how the widespread appeal of Trump’s xenophobia at home might, in part, be the product of U.S. foreign policy abroad, the bitter fruit of the War on Terror and its equally violent predecessors. In other words, in the grand tradition of liberal empire, U.S. foreign policy deflection actively disrupts the link between cause and effect that an entire science of international relations was created to explain. What makes Trump’s attitude toward foreign policy so uniquely unhinging for international relations experts, then, is the fact that it is essentially undeflectable. When he explains to Theresa May that refugees threaten European culture or calls Mexican immigrants killers, he lays bare the meant-to-be unutterable fear of nonwhite migration that has haunted British, U.S., and European imperialists and foreign policy experts for over a century. When he summons the fires of nationalism to demand an unprecedented increase in the military budget, and then gets it with the overwhelming support of House and Senate Democrats, he reveals that constitutional checks on the commander in chief are only as good as the willingness of Congress to resist jingoism. When he calls nations populated by brown and black people shitholes, he openly advertises the unspoken white supremacist edge that has informed U.S. economic, development, energy, and foreign policies since the late nineteenth century. Trump’s Muslim ban is simply the War on Terror on steroids. In short, Trump’s foreign policy is unprecedented not because of what it does, but because Trump will openly say what it does—and because of what that then says about us as a nation. The discomfort Trump provokes ought to prompt international relations experts to reflect on the failings of their discipline to reckon with the relationship between U.S. imperialism, U.S. foreign policy, and the constellation of xenophobia, militarism, racism, and nationalism that haunts our days. The fields of intellectual and legal history and political theory are far ahead of international relations in their critical interrogation of the ideologies that sustain empire at home and abroad. In addition, Trump’s election has emboldened activists to make increasingly explicit the connections they see between a racialized, anti-immigrant politics of domestic dispossession and violence and the history of U.S. imperialism in the world. Unfortunately the same does not appear to be true for the majority of intellectual middlemen who set the public tone for U.S. foreign policy. Trump is, finally, both the emperor with no clothes and the pointing child, begging to hold a big military parade so we can collectively acknowledge the naked imperialist power at the heart of U.S. foreign policy. Trump practically screams at the United States to look at itself. And yet, the more he screams, the more the intellectual enablers avert their eyes. They are busy looking elsewhere—anywhere really—except at that nakedness.

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### Defense – Multipolarity

#### Their impact is non-unique: Multipolarity is inevitable --- but it’s currently a peaceful transition

Siddiqui 21 - Dr. Kalim Siddiqui is an economist, specializing in International Political Economy, Development Economics, International Trade, and International Economics. His work, which combines elements of international political economy and development economics, economic policy, economic history and international trade, often challenges prevailing orthodoxy about which policies promote overall development in less developed countries. Kalim teaches international economics at the Department of Accounting, Finance and Economics, University of Huddersfield, U.K.. He has taught economics since 1989 at various universities in Norway and U.K., [1, 1-25-2021, "*Prospects of a Multipolar World and the Role of Emerging Economies*," World Financial Review, [https://worldfinancialreview.com/prospects-of-a-multipolar-world-and-the-role-of-emerging-economies/]RA](https://worldfinancialreview.com/prospects-of-a-multipolar-world-and-the-role-of-emerging-economies/%5dRA), charts included!

IV. Growth of Regional Economy Although a significant share of East Asia’s trade is in intermediate manufactured goods for final destination export to the USA, Europe and Japan, it has allowed for technology transfers and has stimulated endogenous growth factors in East Asia region. The other dimension is regionalisation and the intensification of transnational trade and investment flows among the developing countries. Regionalisation has been an important feature of East Asian re-emergence. Initiated by the relocation of Japanese manufacturing capacities in the 1980s, which generated a concatenated division of labour in East Asia, regional economic integration has deepened over the past decade and a half. Intra-regional trade as a share of total trade has thus risen constantly over past decades by 20% in 1970, 32% in the early 1980s, 47% in the early 1995, 54.8% in 2000 and nearly 60% in 2012. The Chinese government appears to be only focusing on building its economy and the living conditions of its people. China has become the world’s largest economy, but it has a population of 1.4 billion, which is more than four times larger than the US. Having an economy the size of the US means that average living standards are far lower than in the US and at present, per capita income is one-fourth than of the US. It means that China still has a long way to go to become a rich country. Chinese annual GDP growth averaged over 9% between 1997 and 2019 and, in the aftermath of the East Asian crisis, trade and investment flows between China and the rest of Asia grew significantly. Since the late 1990s, regional trade with China has been growing faster than with the US. For instance, Japan’s imports from China already exceed those from the US, and Japanese exports to China have been steadily rising. This same trend is apparent in South Korean, Thai, Malaysian and Singaporean trade flows (Amsden, 2001; Siddiqui, 2020a). Chinese leaders thus interpret the 1997 East Asian financial crisis as a turning point: ‘The process of the East Asian cooperation has been consolidated day by day since then [and is now] based on a multi-layered, multi-faceted structure’. Recent moves to gradually internationalise the Renminbi and use it in regional transactions, such as the June 2012 Japanese–Chinese accord to trade in their currencies rather than the dollar, represent a further step in this direction. (Siddiqui, 2020d) Trade between China and all other developing countries grew significantly over the past two decades. While the share of South America, Africa and South Asia in China’s total trade remains relatively small, it is steadily growing, but China’s share in their total trade has become strategically important. The space is not available for a comprehensive review of the new transcontinental flows, but the pattern is clear even when we look at the data. Over the past two decades Asia has become Brazil’s main trading partner, accounting for 30% of its exports and 31% of its imports. Exports to China, as a share of total exports, have risen from 0.9% in 1992 to over 17%. China has thus become Brazil’s second trading partner, just behind the European Union (21%) but well ahead of the US (10%). Argentina’s exports to China, as a share of total exports, have likewise risen from 1.1% to 9.7%. Similar patterns are apparent for Africa, where South Africa’s export share to China has risen from 1.8% in 1998 to over 12% in 2018, while imports rose from 3% to 15%, and Nigeria’s exports from 0.5% to 6.9%. In South Asia the share of Indian exports to China has risen from 2.9% to over 10%, and imports from 2% to 12% during the same period. V. Restructuring Global Capitalism It seems that the historic pendulum, which had swung to the ‘West’ in the late 18th century, is swinging back to Asia, which is reclaiming the leading economic role it held for a very long period before the Age of the Western Empire. The movement towards a polycentric and plural world system has indeed quickened over the past quarter century, as major Asian regions have consolidated their position as a dynamic growth region of the world capitalist economy, developing regional and transcontinental linkages that are reconfiguring global trade, investment and financial flows. First in the 1960s, economic changes began in the East Asian region and later on in the 1990s, growth spread to other developing countries like Brazil, China, India, South Africa and Turkey. The systemic restructuring has primarily been driven by East Asia, which has experienced a process of economic expansion, the duration of which have been remarkable by historic standards. Beginning with Japan’s rapid economic transformation in the 1950s and 1960s, a regional development dynamic was set into motion that spread successively, in wave-like formations, to the Newly Industrialised Countries and moreover, over the last four decades, to spectacular growth in China. Varying initial conditions, historic pathways and a combination of both state and markets have produced positive results in East Asia. There are uneven country-to-country developmental outcomes, distinguishing first and second wave industrialising from third and fourth wave countries that are climbing the ladder but are not far from catching-up with the most developed economies. (Siddiqui, 2020c) Growing financial power derived from cumulative surpluses is another important feature of the rebalancing of the world economy, which has been accentuated by the deepening economic crisis in the European Union, Brexit and in the USA. Nonetheless, a coherent process has been at work, unfolding over time and space to most of the region, with global effects. East Asia’s aggregate share of constantly increasing world GDP (in PPP), which was negligible in the 1950s, has thus risen from around 10% in 1980 to 30% in 2015. China’s share has grown from 2% to over 18%. Over the same time period PPP per capita GDP in current international dollars was multiplied by 14 in South Korea, by over seven in Singapore and Thailand, by six in Malaysia and Indonesia, and by 39 in China (from US$250 to US$9380 in 2019)–a spectacular increase that reflects the intensity of growth and its cumulative impact. By the end of 2020 East Asia’s share of world GDP (in PPP) is expected to reach 32%, with China accounting for nearly two-thirds of the total. In South Asia, India’s world share has risen from 2.5% to 5.5%, and per-capita GDP has increased by a factor of 14, from $419 dollars to $3800 dollars today (in current US dollars). Asia’s aggregate share of world GDP (in PPP) is thus projected to approach 46% in a few years. When other major re-emerging countries and world regions – Brazil, India, Turkey, Mexico, and South Africa are taken into account, despite the Covid-19 setback, their world output share in 2020 is expected to exceed 55%. Over the past two decades, East Asia region has thus been the main source of world growth and has emerged as increasingly trade and investment linkages. Growing financial power derived from cumulative surpluses is another important feature of the rebalancing of the world economy, which has been accentuated by the deepening economic crisis in the European Union, Brexit and in the USA. We are witnessing the end of the long historical cycle during which wealth and power were concentrated in the hands of a small number of countries in Europe, North America and Japan. (Siddiqui, 2019a; also Siddiqui, 2012b) The hierarchical international system constructed in the last three hundred years, that was centred in Europe, and which instituted a global division of labour dividing the world into dominant cores and dependent peripheries, is giving way to a multi-polar world. In fact, the USA’s Cold War strategy required a few regions of secure and prosperous states in Northeast Asia to contain the Soviet Union and China, until the late 1960s Sino-Soviet border tension, and to minimise any possibility of radical movement in the region. (Siddiqui, 2017b) This is also true of China, which, because of its scale, nonetheless constitutes a special case. Gradual integration into the world capitalist economy and export-led industrialisation modelled on the neo-mercantilist strategies of earlier East Asian developmental states has generated intense growth and real GDP gains over long periods. The capitalist transformation has simultaneously led to spatial polarisation, large-scale continental mass migrations, sharp new social stratifications and major problems of environmental sustainability linked to energy use and urbanisation. Sustained growth, fuelled by transnational investment flows, has been made possible by the mobilisation and exploitation of a vast subordinate labour force, notably women concentrated in low value-added activities, raising crucial issues of gender and class. While they highlight the need for vigorous corrective measures, without which a country’s development is likely to be compromised, these problems do not call into question the fact that the strategy followed since 1978 has been broadly successful. China’s pathway bears some analogies to US economic expansion in the 19th century, which was fostered by transnational flows and relied on the exploitation of slave labour until the mid-19th century, and of low wage immigrant labour in the latter part of the century. This comparison is not meant to justify disciplinary Chinese labour policies, although there are currently some signs of relaxation, much less the authoritarian regime that is engineering capitalist transformation. It merely points to the fact that China, through the exploitation of its rural and most backward regions, is following the path of earlier successful European Capitalism. Soon after the communist revolution in China in 1949, the country faced enormous challenges, seeking to overcome severe underdevelopment, widespread malnutrition and illiteracy, and the Western monopoly over technology. It promoted reforms to encourage growth and economic development such as the government’s introduction of radical land reforms, compulsory primary education, and the availability of primary health care for all its citizens. Deng Xiaoping, the chief architect of the ‘open policy towards the West’ expressed this as: “Our country must develop. If we do not develop then we must be bullied. Development is the only hard truth.” China’s political orientation has been shaped by its history of subjugation by foreign powers since the mid-19th century, also known as the “century of humiliation”, and anti-imperialist struggles for national liberation. In the 1950s and 1960s, China extended support to developing countries due to the collective struggle of formerly colonised and oppressed nations against global inequality brought by the West. Four decades later, the success of the Chinese economic reform is undeniable, and it is even noted that such a rapid economic transformation has never happened in human history in such a short period. According to the World Bank, China has lifted nearly 800 million people out of poverty, more than ever happened in human history, and generated “the fastest sustained expansion by a major economy in history”. China’s GDP growth has averaged 10% annually for over forty years, without crises, with the country becoming a world leader in manufacturing, technology and innovation. In mater of just two life spans, from being extremely poor to an international power, China is now predicted to overtake the US in GDP terms in the next fifteen years. Measured in terms of PPP, China’s economy already surpassed the US in 2018. Since the last decade, the US-China trade imbalance has been rising against the US as shown in Figure 1. The US has blamed China and claimed it is due to the Chinese policy of currency manipulation. (Siddiqui, 2020b) After Donald Trump became President of the US in 2017, he initiated a rise in tariffs against certain Chinese products and also threatened more trade sanctions against China and Russia. However, a number of studies have pointed out that the US trade deficit rose not only with China but with Europe and Japan as well (see Figure 2). Therefore, the persistence of trade imbalances trends must be seen as a US domestic policy, rather than putting the blame on others. I argue that a disparity in real costs is the root cause of the US-China trade imbalance. Figure 1, which shows the trade in goods between the US and China, indicates that the US has had trade deficits in goods with China since the early 1990s, which has grown substantially. For example, the deficit was only US$10 billion in 1990, but by 2000 had reached US$100 billion; by 2005 it had risen further to US$200 billion, by 2012 it was US$ 315 billion, and by 2017 it had reached US$376 billion. The sharpest rise was since 2001, which also coincided with China joining the WTO. For example, China’s exports to the US increased from US$125 billion to US$505 billion, while US exports to China increased only US$19 billion to about US$130 billion for the same period. [](https://worldfinancialreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/Figure-1-United-States-%E2%80%93-China-Trade-in-Goods.jpg) Figure 2 indicates that China is an important trading partner for the US, but that China still has less than half of the US’s overall trade deficits. For example, in 2017 the US’s trade deficit with China was US$ 375 billion; however, its overall trade deficit was US$ 775 billion. This means that even if the US were to eliminate its trade deficit with China, its trade imbalance problems would still exist. [](https://worldfinancialreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/Figure-2-United-States-Trade-Deficit-with-all-Trading-Partners-1985-201.jpg) The US trade deficit and also external payments kept on rising as shown in Figure 3, and has grown remarkably over the last two decades. This was coincident with the period when China joined WTO, which appears to have given the US an excuse to blame China for raising its trade deficits. The US trade deficit with China and other countries are shown in Figure 2. Since 1990, the labour and total factor productivity in the advanced economies has witnessed negative growth, while in the emerging economies including China it has grown steadily, as indicated in Figure 5. [](https://worldfinancialreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/Fig-3Trends.jpg) The US-China trade war has facilitated the establishment of Russia as China’s top strategic partner. This also led Russian oil to be redirected from European countries to China. Chinese President Xi Jinping announced in Russia in 2019 the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), both countries signed to develop bilateral trade and cross-border payments using the Rouble and Renminbi, bypassing the US dollar. (Siddiqui, 2020d) [](https://worldfinancialreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/fig-4-multipolar.jpg) As China overtook the US as the worlds’ largest economy, a multi-polar world could be a welcome development for all, especially the developing countries. According to Fortune 2018, among global 500 top businesses, the China has moved into second position only behind the US (see Figure 4). The IMF has said that in 2019 China displaced the US as the world’s largest economy. The IMF’s estimation is made on a purchasing power parity (PPP) basis, meaning that it takes into account the differing prices in both countries. Therefore, if at present 1 US$ is worth Chinese 6.1 Renminbi on the foreign exchange market, it means that 6.1 Renminbi can buy much more in China than one dollar can buy in the US market. Hence, the PPP comparison makes adjustments for this, and this is why the Chinese economy is much larger than the measure most commonly used by international organisations and media, which simply converts China’s GDP to US dollars at the official exchange rate. [](https://worldfinancialreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/Figure-5-A-Long-Term-View-of-Total-Factor-Productivity-Growth-1950-2014..jpg) China is playing a very assertive and leading role in global affairs. It has launched the trillions of dollars on ‘Belt and Road Initiative’ – called “the largest single infrastructure programme in human history.” The BRI involves over 70 countries and 1700 developmental projects, connecting Asia, Europe, Africa and Latin America (Siddiqui, 2019c), while the US is facing economic stagnation and decline, and is losing international control. The US President Donald Trump in 2019 increased military spending rapidly to US$ 716 billion and has brought into his cabinet extreme hawks and anti-China hardliners such as Mike Pompeo and Peter Navarro. For US policy makers and elites, rather than accepting this new challenge, they see it as a threat to their world domination, and have formulated a recent policy known as the “containing China” policy. Similarly, three-quarters of a century earlier, the US took over as the leader of the capitalist world, declared the Soviet Union as its main enemy, and began an arms race with the Soviet Union. However, at that time the Soviet economy was one-quarter of the size of the US. But now the situation is very different, the Chinese economy is currently bigger than the US and also has huge amounts of trade and a current account surplus. Even after the Covid-19 set back, the Chinese economy has not only recovered, but began growing into the fastest economy in the world. Moreover, China has emerged as the top investor country in the world in recent years. China is a rising power, but they do not seem to be interested in building an empire. For example, China’s billon US dollar investment commitment to ‘one belt one road’, and it becoming the largest investor in Africa, while the West has still not recovered from the 2008 financial crisis and the more recent Covid-19 epidemic. It seems that due to the long-term consequences of the COVID crisis, public debt in most developed economies will rise sharply. In fact, the 2008 financial crisis increased government debt in the US and EU. (Siddiqui, 2020c; also Siddiqui, 2019b) We think of the financial crisis as a temporary shock that the developed economies barely recovered from, but as we look at the current crisis, it will increase government debt greatly compared to the GDP. This is a legacy that will remain for a long time and will pose very pressing policy questions. As we think about the future of developed economies, in the US and EU, we have to ask ourselves how we will be dealing with a level of government debt that will exceed, as a share of GDP, the amount we had at the end of World War II. The management of this new massive debt through the policy response in the aftermath of the crisis will shape Western society, determining the economic balance between generations, the actual opportunities for future generations, and the technological disruption and transformation that was already in place before this outbreak. VI. Conclusion As we have discussed, the new globalisation cycle that began in the late 20th century has led to an unexpectedly rapid, albeit still incomplete, rebalancing between emerging and advanced economies. East Asia has been the main driver of a systemic change that is leading to new transnational linkages between Asia, Africa and Latin America. These new patterns of interaction are part of a broad process of gradual decentring and restructuring of the world economy that, at the political level, is leading to a diffusion of power. Domestic or international events, for instance a hypothetical but not unthinkable Chinese overreach in the South China Sea leading to sustained inter-state tensions, might slow but are unlikely to halt a transformation that is embedded in globalisation and has become one of its driving forces. The rapid economic development in the emerging economies has been dynamically restructuring world capitalism from within. It conforms to one of the historic aims of generations of anti-colonial leaders and thinkers, gaining upward mobility and achieving sovereign equality, the way in which it is occurring represents a rather sharp break with the past. But unlike the first generation of postcolonial leaders, who aimed for revolution or sought to invent a ‘Third Way’ between capitalism and communism, and the framers of the NIEO who challenged the intellectual and material foundations of the post-1945 world order, the actors of the current shift in global power relations are claiming a central competitive place in the world capitalist system that their predecessors had attempted to either reform or supplant. (Dos Santos, 1970) The success of that claim, and their consequent implications for current and future global system management, has dampened and in some cases entirely submerged the broader emancipatory or universalistic dimensions of the long struggle for independence, equality and justice. The rapid economic development in the emerging economies has been dynamically restructuring world capitalism from within. It conforms to one of the historic aims of generations of anti-colonial leaders and thinkers, gaining upward mobility and achieving sovereign equality, the way in which it is occurring represents a rather sharp break with the past. It has now been sixty-five years since the historic Bandung Conference of 1955, rightly regarded as a milestone in the formation of SSC as a global political movement. The SSC as a movement intended to challenge the Northern-dominated political and economic system and, from the 1950s to the present, has been through a series of starts and stops, surges and retreats. As expressed at the Asian-African Conference held in Bandung in 1955, the newly decolonised countries of the global South emphasised economic and political cooperation, human rights, and the promotion of world peace. This emergent movement of solidarity among the developing countries thereby sought to challenge global power relations. The ‘Bandung Spirit’ henceforth came to encapsulate policies of non-interference and developing economic cooperation among the former colonies to end global inequality while lessening their economic and political dependence on the West. While Bandung and the NAM embodied the political dimensions, the Group of 77, named after the number of countries present at the founding of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), called for the establishment of a NIEO. The NIEO was to be achieved through tackling structural unequal exchanges through ‘a just and equitable relationship’ between the goods exported by developing countries and the goods imported, with an emphasis on sovereignty over natural resources and the right to nationalise key industries and to formulate their own domestic economic policies as sovereign nations. By the 1980s, however, the developing countries’ debt crisis and the rise of neoliberalism had served to eclipse the NIEO project. The retreat of developing countries’ solidarity was given no clearer indication than at the 1992 UNCTAD summit, when UNCTAD dropped its demands for the adjustment of the international patent system to the developmental needs of the global South, and adopted a statement expressing the belief that the adoption of adequate and effective International Patent Protections and related efforts in the World Intellectual Property Organization and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) would facilitate technological transfers to developing countries. Henceforth, UNCTAD had been sidelined by GATT, and its successor the WTO. The study finds that people have nothing to fear from a multi-polar world. And today it seems that the time is ripe for emerging economies to stand up and demand a greater role in the international arena related to the formulation of politics and economics, and in support of its historic promise to transform the world order. There has been a historically significant global shift in production and manufacturing from the advanced economies to the emerging economies, altering the economic geography of the world. The tendency over the past several decades to greatly intensify the globalisation of production, trade and financial flows was advocated primarily as a systemic solution to underlying structural problems in the international political economy, including growth, terms of trade, and productivity. But these same globalising tendencies have also enhanced the historical potential of economic growth and industrialisation in the emerging economies, although currently limited to only a few regions, but expected to spread in the coming decades.

#### Multipolarity coming now despite Covid – intraregional trade, investments, and globalization prove.

* Short version of the above card!

Siddiqui 21 - Dr. Kalim Siddiqui is an economist, specializing in International Political Economy, Development Economics, International Trade, and International Economics. His work, which combines elements of international political economy and development economics, economic policy, economic history and international trade, often challenges prevailing orthodoxy about which policies promote overall development in less developed countries. Kalim teaches international economics at the Department of Accounting, Finance and Economics, University of Huddersfield, U.K.. He has taught economics since 1989 at various universities in Norway and U.K., [1, 1-25-2021, "*Prospects of a Multipolar World and the Role of Emerging Economies*," World Financial Review, https://worldfinancialreview.com/prospects-of-a-multipolar-world-and-the-role-of-emerging-economies/]RA

IV. Growth of Regional Economy Although a significant share of East Asia’s trade is in intermediate manufactured goods for final destination export to the USA, Europe and Japan, it has allowed for technology transfers and has stimulated endogenous growth factors in East Asia region. The other dimension is regionalisation and the intensification of transnational trade and investment flows among the developing countries. Regionalisation has been an important feature of East Asian re-emergence. Initiated by the relocation of Japanese manufacturing capacities in the 1980s, which generated a concatenated division of labour in East Asia, regional economic integration has deepened over the past decade and a half. Intra-regional trade as a share of total trade has thus risen constantly over past decades by 20% in 1970, 32% in the early 1980s, 47% in the early 1995, 54.8% in 2000 and nearly 60% in 2012. The Chinese government appears to be only focusing on building its economy and the living conditions of its people. China has become the world’s largest economy, but it has a population of 1.4 billion, which is more than four times larger than the US. Having an economy the size of the US means that average living standards are far lower than in the US and at present, per capita income is one-fourth than of the US. It means that China still has a long way to go to become a rich country. Chinese annual GDP growth averaged over 9% between 1997 and 2019 and, in the aftermath of the East Asian crisis, trade and investment flows between China and the rest of Asia grew significantly. Since the late 1990s, regional trade with China has been growing faster than with the US. For instance, Japan’s imports from China already exceed those from the US, and Japanese exports to China have been steadily rising. This same trend is apparent in South Korean, Thai, Malaysian and Singaporean trade flows (Amsden, 2001; Siddiqui, 2020a). Chinese leaders thus interpret the 1997 East Asian financial crisis as a turning point: ‘The process of the East Asian cooperation has been consolidated day by day since then [and is now] based on a multi-layered, multi-faceted structure’. Recent moves to gradually internationalise the Renminbi and use it in regional transactions, such as the June 2012 Japanese–Chinese accord to trade in their currencies rather than the dollar, represent a further step in this direction. (Siddiqui, 2020d) Trade between China and all other developing countries grew significantly over the past two decades. While the share of South America, Africa and South Asia in China’s total trade remains relatively small, it is steadily growing, but China’s share in their total trade has become strategically important. The space is not available for a comprehensive review of the new transcontinental flows, but the pattern is clear even when we look at the data. Over the past two decades Asia has become Brazil’s main trading partner, accounting for 30% of its exports and 31% of its imports. Exports to China, as a share of total exports, have risen from 0.9% in 1992 to over 17%. China has thus become Brazil’s second trading partner, just behind the European Union (21%) but well ahead of the US (10%). Argentina’s exports to China, as a share of total exports, have likewise risen from 1.1% to 9.7%. Similar patterns are apparent for Africa, where South Africa’s export share to China has risen from 1.8% in 1998 to over 12% in 2018, while imports rose from 3% to 15%, and Nigeria’s exports from 0.5% to 6.9%. In South Asia the share of Indian exports to China has risen from 2.9% to over 10%, and imports from 2% to 12% during the same period. V. Restructuring Global Capitalism It seems that the historic pendulum, which had swung to the ‘West’ in the late 18th century, is swinging back to Asia, which is reclaiming the leading economic role it held for a very long period before the Age of the Western Empire. The movement towards a polycentric and plural world system has indeed quickened over the past quarter century, as major Asian regions have consolidated their position as a dynamic growth region of the world capitalist economy, developing regional and transcontinental linkages that are reconfiguring global trade, investment and financial flows. First in the 1960s, economic changes began in the East Asian region and later on in the 1990s, growth spread to other developing countries like Brazil, China, India, South Africa and Turkey. The systemic restructuring has primarily been driven by East Asia, which has experienced a process of economic expansion, the duration of which have been remarkable by historic standards. Beginning with Japan’s rapid economic transformation in the 1950s and 1960s, a regional development dynamic was set into motion that spread successively, in wave-like formations, to the Newly Industrialised Countries and moreover, over the last four decades, to spectacular growth in China. Varying initial conditions, historic pathways and a combination of both state and markets have produced positive results in East Asia. There are uneven country-to-country developmental outcomes, distinguishing first and second wave industrialising from third and fourth wave countries that are climbing the ladder but are not far from catching-up with the most developed economies. (Siddiqui, 2020c) Growing financial power derived from cumulative surpluses is another important feature of the rebalancing of the world economy, which has been accentuated by the deepening economic crisis in the European Union, Brexit and in the USA. Nonetheless, a coherent process has been at work, unfolding over time and space to most of the region, with global effects. East Asia’s aggregate share of constantly increasing world GDP (in PPP), which was negligible in the 1950s, has thus risen from around 10% in 1980 to 30% in 2015. China’s share has grown from 2% to over 18%. Over the same time period PPP per capita GDP in current international dollars was multiplied by 14 in South Korea, by over seven in Singapore and Thailand, by six in Malaysia and Indonesia, and by 39 in China (from US$250 to US$9380 in 2019)–a spectacular increase that reflects the intensity of growth and its cumulative impact. By the end of 2020 East Asia’s share of world GDP (in PPP) is expected to reach 32%, with China accounting for nearly two-thirds of the total. In South Asia, India’s world share has risen from 2.5% to 5.5%, and per-capita GDP has increased by a factor of 14, from $419 dollars to $3800 dollars today (in current US dollars). Asia’s aggregate share of world GDP (in PPP) is thus projected to approach 46% in a few years. When other major re-emerging countries and world regions – Brazil, India, Turkey, Mexico, and South Africa are taken into account, despite the Covid-19 setback, their world output share in 2020 is expected to exceed 55%. Over the past two decades, East Asia region has thus been the main source of world growth and has emerged as increasingly trade and investment linkages. Growing financial power derived from cumulative surpluses is another important feature of the rebalancing of the world economy, which has been accentuated by the deepening economic crisis in the European Union, Brexit and in the USA. We are witnessing the end of the long historical cycle during which wealth and power were concentrated in the hands of a small number of countries in Europe, North America and Japan. (Siddiqui, 2019a; also Siddiqui, 2012b) The hierarchical international system constructed in the last three hundred years, that was centred in Europe, and which instituted a global division of labour dividing the world into dominant cores and dependent peripheries, is giving way to a multi-polar world. In fact, the USA’s Cold War strategy required a few regions of secure and prosperous states in Northeast Asia to contain the Soviet Union and China, until the late 1960s Sino-Soviet border tension, and to minimise any possibility of radical movement in the region. (Siddiqui, 2017b) This is also true of China, which, because of its scale, nonetheless constitutes a special case. Gradual integration into the world capitalist economy and export-led industrialisation modelled on the neo-mercantilist strategies of earlier East Asian developmental states has generated intense growth and real GDP gains over long periods. The capitalist transformation has simultaneously led to spatial polarisation, large-scale continental mass migrations, sharp new social stratifications and major problems of environmental sustainability linked to energy use and urbanisation. Sustained growth, fuelled by transnational investment flows, has been made possible by the mobilisation and exploitation of a vast subordinate labour force, notably women concentrated in low value-added activities, raising crucial issues of gender and class. While they highlight the need for vigorous corrective measures, without which a country’s development is likely to be compromised, these problems do not call into question the fact that the strategy followed since 1978 has been broadly successful. China’s pathway bears some analogies to US economic expansion in the 19th century, which was fostered by transnational flows and relied on the exploitation of slave labour until the mid-19th century, and of low wage immigrant labour in the latter part of the century. This comparison is not meant to justify disciplinary Chinese labour policies, although there are currently some signs of relaxation, much less the authoritarian regime that is engineering capitalist transformation. It merely points to the fact that China, through the exploitation of its rural and most backward regions, is following the path of earlier successful European Capitalism. Soon after the communist revolution in China in 1949, the country faced enormous challenges, seeking to overcome severe underdevelopment, widespread malnutrition and illiteracy, and the Western monopoly over technology. It promoted reforms to encourage growth and economic development such as the government’s introduction of radical land reforms, compulsory primary education, and the availability of primary health care for all its citizens. Deng Xiaoping, the chief architect of the ‘open policy towards the West’ expressed this as: “Our country must develop. If we do not develop then we must be bullied. Development is the only hard truth.” China’s political orientation has been shaped by its history of subjugation by foreign powers since the mid-19th century, also known as the “century of humiliation”, and anti-imperialist struggles for national liberation. In the 1950s and 1960s, China extended support to developing countries due to the collective struggle of formerly colonised and oppressed nations against global inequality brought by the West. Four decades later, the success of the Chinese economic reform is undeniable, and it is even noted that such a rapid economic transformation has never happened in human history in such a short period. According to the World Bank, China has lifted nearly 800 million people out of poverty, more than ever happened in human history, and generated “the fastest sustained expansion by a major economy in history”. China’s GDP growth has averaged 10% annually for over forty years, without crises, with the country becoming a world leader in manufacturing, technology and innovation. In mater of just two life spans, from being extremely poor to an international power, China is now predicted to overtake the US in GDP terms in the next fifteen years. Measured in terms of PPP, China’s economy already surpassed the US in 2018. Since the last decade, the US-China trade imbalance has been rising against the US as shown in Figure 1. The US has blamed China and claimed it is due to the Chinese policy of currency manipulation. (Siddiqui, 2020b) After Donald Trump became President of the US in 2017, he initiated a rise in tariffs against certain Chinese products and also threatened more trade sanctions against China and Russia. However, a number of studies have pointed out that the US trade deficit rose not only with China but with Europe and Japan as well (see Figure 2). Therefore, the persistence of trade imbalances trends must be seen as a US domestic policy, rather than putting the blame on others. I argue that a disparity in real costs is the root cause of the US-China trade imbalance. Figure 1, which shows the trade in goods between the US and China, indicates that the US has had trade deficits in goods with China since the early 1990s, which has grown substantially. For example, the deficit was only US$10 billion in 1990, but by 2000 had reached US$100 billion; by 2005 it had risen further to US$200 billion, by 2012 it was US$ 315 billion, and by 2017 it had reached US$376 billion. The sharpest rise was since 2001, which also coincided with China joining the WTO. For example, China’s exports to the US increased from US$125 billion to US$505 billion, while US exports to China increased only US$19 billion to about US$130 billion for the same period. [figure omitted] Figure 2 indicates that China is an important trading partner for the US, but that China still has less than half of the US’s overall trade deficits. For example, in 2017 the US’s trade deficit with China was US$ 375 billion; however, its overall trade deficit was US$ 775 billion. This means that even if the US were to eliminate its trade deficit with China, its trade imbalance problems would still exist. [figure omitted] The US trade deficit and also external payments kept on rising as shown in Figure 3, and has grown remarkably over the last two decades. This was coincident with the period when China joined WTO, which appears to have given the US an excuse to blame China for raising its trade deficits. The US trade deficit with China and other countries are shown in Figure 2. Since 1990, the labour and total factor productivity in the advanced economies has witnessed negative growth, while in the emerging economies including China it has grown steadily, as indicated in Figure 5. [figure omitted] The US-China trade war has facilitated the establishment of Russia as China’s top strategic partner. This also led Russian oil to be redirected from European countries to China. Chinese President Xi Jinping announced in Russia in 2019 the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), both countries signed to develop bilateral trade and cross-border payments using the Rouble and Renminbi, bypassing the US dollar. (Siddiqui, 2020d) [Figure Omitted] As China overtook the US as the worlds’ largest economy, a multi-polar world could be a welcome development for all, especially the developing countries. According to Fortune 2018, among global 500 top businesses, the China has moved into second position only behind the US (see Figure 4). The IMF has said that in 2019 China displaced the US as the world’s largest economy. The IMF’s estimation is made on a purchasing power parity (PPP) basis, meaning that it takes into account the differing prices in both countries. Therefore, if at present 1 US$ is worth Chinese 6.1 Renminbi on the foreign exchange market, it means that 6.1 Renminbi can buy much more in China than one dollar can buy in the US market. Hence, the PPP comparison makes adjustments for this, and this is why the Chinese economy is much larger than the measure most commonly used by international organisations and media, which simply converts China’s GDP to US dollars at the official exchange rate. [figure Omitted] China is playing a very assertive and leading role in global affairs. It has launched the trillions of dollars on ‘Belt and Road Initiative’ – called “the largest single infrastructure programme in human history.” The BRI involves over 70 countries and 1700 developmental projects, connecting Asia, Europe, Africa and Latin America (Siddiqui, 2019c), while the US is facing economic stagnation and decline, and is losing international control. The US President Donald Trump in 2019 increased military spending rapidly to US$ 716 billion and has brought into his cabinet extreme hawks and anti-China hardliners such as Mike Pompeo and Peter Navarro. For US policy makers and elites, rather than accepting this new challenge, they see it as a threat to their world domination, and have formulated a recent policy known as the “containing China” policy. Similarly, three-quarters of a century earlier, the US took over as the leader of the capitalist world, declared the Soviet Union as its main enemy, and began an arms race with the Soviet Union. However, at that time the Soviet economy was one-quarter of the size of the US. But now the situation is very different, the Chinese economy is currently bigger than the US and also has huge amounts of trade and a current account surplus. Even after the Covid-19 set back, the Chinese economy has not only recovered, but began growing into the fastest economy in the world. Moreover, China has emerged as the top investor country in the world in recent years. China is a rising power, but they do not seem to be interested in building an empire. For example, China’s billon US dollar investment commitment to ‘one belt one road’, and it becoming the largest investor in Africa, while the West has still not recovered from the 2008 financial crisis and the more recent Covid-19 epidemic. It seems that due to the long-term consequences of the COVID crisis, public debt in most developed economies will rise sharply. In fact, the 2008 financial crisis increased government debt in the US and EU. (Siddiqui, 2020c; also Siddiqui, 2019b) We think of the financial crisis as a temporary shock that the developed economies barely recovered from, but as we look at the current crisis, it will increase government debt greatly compared to the GDP. This is a legacy that will remain for a long time and will pose very pressing policy questions. As we think about the future of developed economies, in the US and EU, we have to ask ourselves how we will be dealing with a level of government debt that will exceed, as a share of GDP, the amount we had at the end of World War II. The management of this new massive debt through the policy response in the aftermath of the crisis will shape Western society, determining the economic balance between generations, the actual opportunities for future generations, and the technological disruption and transformation that was already in place before this outbreak. VI. Conclusion As we have discussed, the new globalisation cycle that began in the late 20th century has led to an unexpectedly rapid, albeit still incomplete, rebalancing between emerging and advanced economies. East Asia has been the main driver of a systemic change that is leading to new transnational linkages between Asia, Africa and Latin America. These new patterns of interaction are part of a broad process of gradual decentring and restructuring of the world economy that, at the political level, is leading to a diffusion of power. Domestic or international events, for instance a hypothetical but not unthinkable Chinese overreach in the South China Sea leading to sustained inter-state tensions, might slow but are unlikely to halt a transformation that is embedded in globalisation and has become one of its driving forces. The rapid economic development in the emerging economies has been dynamically restructuring world capitalism from within. It conforms to one of the historic aims of generations of anti-colonial leaders and thinkers, gaining upward mobility and achieving sovereign equality, the way in which it is occurring represents a rather sharp break with the past. But unlike the first generation of postcolonial leaders, who aimed for revolution or sought to invent a ‘Third Way’ between capitalism and communism, and the framers of the NIEO who challenged the intellectual and material foundations of the post-1945 world order, the actors of the current shift in global power relations are claiming a central competitive place in the world capitalist system that their predecessors had attempted to either reform or supplant. (Dos Santos, 1970) The success of that claim, and their consequent implications for current and future global system management, has dampened and in some cases entirely submerged the broader emancipatory or universalistic dimensions of the long struggle for independence, equality and justice. The rapid economic development in the emerging economies has been dynamically restructuring world capitalism from within. It conforms to one of the historic aims of generations of anti-colonial leaders and thinkers, gaining upward mobility and achieving sovereign equality, the way in which it is occurring represents a rather sharp break with the past. It has now been sixty-five years since the historic Bandung Conference of 1955, rightly regarded as a milestone in the formation of SSC as a global political movement. The SSC as a movement intended to challenge the Northern-dominated political and economic system and, from the 1950s to the present, has been through a series of starts and stops, surges and retreats. As expressed at the Asian-African Conference held in Bandung in 1955, the newly decolonised countries of the global South emphasised economic and political cooperation, human rights, and the promotion of world peace. This emergent movement of solidarity among the developing countries thereby sought to challenge global power relations. The ‘Bandung Spirit’ henceforth came to encapsulate policies of non-interference and developing economic cooperation among the former colonies to end global inequality while lessening their economic and political dependence on the West. While Bandung and the NAM embodied the political dimensions, the Group of 77, named after the number of countries present at the founding of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), called for the establishment of a NIEO. The NIEO was to be achieved through tackling structural unequal exchanges through ‘a just and equitable relationship’ between the goods exported by developing countries and the goods imported, with an emphasis on sovereignty over natural resources and the right to nationalise key industries and to formulate their own domestic economic policies as sovereign nations. By the 1980s, however, the developing countries’ debt crisis and the rise of neoliberalism had served to eclipse the NIEO project. The retreat of developing countries’ solidarity was given no clearer indication than at the 1992 UNCTAD summit, when UNCTAD dropped its demands for the adjustment of the international patent system to the developmental needs of the global South, and adopted a statement expressing the belief that the adoption of adequate and effective International Patent Protections and related efforts in the World Intellectual Property Organization and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) would facilitate technological transfers to developing countries. Henceforth, UNCTAD had been sidelined by GATT, and its successor the WTO. The study finds that people have nothing to fear from a multi-polar world. And today it seems that the time is ripe for emerging economies to stand up and demand a greater role in the international arena related to the formulation of politics and economics, and in support of its historic promise to transform the world order. There has been a historically significant global shift in production and manufacturing from the advanced economies to the emerging economies, altering the economic geography of the world. The tendency over the past several decades to greatly intensify the globalisation of production, trade and financial flows was advocated primarily as a systemic solution to underlying structural problems in the international political economy, including growth, terms of trade, and productivity. But these same globalising tendencies have also enhanced the historical potential of economic growth and industrialisation in the emerging economies, although currently limited to only a few regions, but expected to spread in the coming decades.